ON

GOVERNMENT;

ADDRESSED TO THE

PUBLIC,

AND SOLD BY

THOMAS WYCLIFFE,

OF LIVERPOOL.

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PREFACE.

IN this pamphlet the reader will meet with many ſyſtems and principles which may perhaps be new to him; but I truſt to the candour of the reader that he will not too haſtily condemn them, merely on account of their novelty, hoping, if he will do me the favour to give them a ſerious attention, that he will find theſe ſyſtems and principles to have a tendency to promote theſe objects, viz. To ſpread the knowledge of Chriſtianity more generally in the world:—to eſtabliſh both perſonal and national liberty in every part of this empire, for the general happineſs of the whole empire:—to improve this imperial conſtitution of government; and by that improvement, not only to releaſe every branch of this empire from their preſent ſtate of national ſlavery, but alſo to render all thoſe branches more advantageous to Great Britain than they have ever yet been:—to obviate ſuch practices as evidently tend to deſtroy the ſpirit of this national conſtitution of government, and thereby to improve or rather to reſtore *your national conſtitution; for were that conſtitution to be effectually reſtored, I ſhould not think it poſſible for the utmoſt force of human abilities to improve it; and, to excite every Britiſh ſubject, and every friend of Great Britain, above all things, never to loſe ſight of, or deviate from, the ſtricteſt obſervance of this neceſſary political principle, viz.* Unanimity in the ſupport of government. *Theſe are the objects which this publication is intended to promote; and though theſe ſyſtems and principles may be ſo extremely inadequate to the propoſed objects, as to leave too much room to lament their not being ſufficiently effectual, yet, were they to be adopted, I humbly hope that they would not be found to be totally inefficient.*

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
ON National and Imperial Government,	1.
On the Powers of Government,	37.
On the Supreme Power, and on the Subordinate Power, of a State,	66.
On the Internal Government of Great Britain,	127.

N. B. The two firſt of theſe papers, viz. On National and Imperial Government, and, On the Powers of Government, were printed and publiſhed in 1776. In ſeventy-ſeven they were re-printed and publiſhed with additions. In ſeventy-nine they were again re-printed and publiſhed, with the addition of the two laſt papers, viz. On the Supreme and Subordinate Powers of a ſtate, and, On the Internal Government of Great Britain. And, though all the four papers have ſince been repeatedly printed and publiſhed with additions in the years eighty, eighty-one, and eighty-two; yet, being perſuaded, in whatever degree theſe ſyſtems and principles either have already been, or, may hereafter be further adopted, that they will be, in the ſame degree, beneficial to Great Britain, and being alſo deſirous, that the ſo much wanted, and the ſo much wiſhed for reformation in the civil government of this ſtate, whenever it takes place, may not be limited within ſuch narrow bounds as will juſt ſerve the purpoſe of amuſing an injured people, and thereby preventing a full and perfect by promoting a ſcanty reformation, but that the reformation may be equal to the real neceſſities of the ſtate, and the utmoſt wiſhes of the people; I have therefore here again offered this pamphlet with ſome further additions to the conſideration of the public.

ON

NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.

[*First publiſhed in* 1776.]

EVERY day brings freſh accounts of the preſent alarming ſituation of public affairs, and particularly the alarming circumſtance of loſing America; but as I believe that preſent evils are ſometimes productive of future good, let us hope that it is poſſible for ſome good conſequences to ariſe from the preſent loſs of America, and that it will at leaſt produce this good conſequence: viz. When government find themſelves weakened by the loſs of the external ſtrength of colonies, that they will be more inclined to purſue ſuch meaſures, as will beſt improve the internal ſtrength of this iſland; and many are the meaſures which would moſt effectually obtain that end, if ever neceſſity ſhould enforce the meaſures. And amongſt the many meaſures which might be adopted for improving the internal ſtrength of Great Britain, were you to adopt only ſuch meaſures as the reader will meet with in this Pamphlet, it does not appear to me to be a thing at all impoſſible, to make this iſland (though ſtripped of all her colonies) to ſtand fairly on her own legs, and, by her own internal and natural ſtrength, to defend herſelf againſt the united force of all her enemies. And until this kingdom is thus far rendered independent of

her colonies, to look for an extenſive and permanent empire, ſeems to me to be a vain purſuit; as every part of the empire will always ſee the defect, and never ſuffer this or any kingdom upon earth, to ſtand long on ſo ſandy a foundation. Firſt, let Great Britain take ſuch ſteps as will beſt improve her internal ſtrength, and ſecure her independency; and then, but not till then, ſhall I think this kingdom has a reaſonable and good foundation, on which ſhe can ſafely build an extenſive empire, in grandeur and dignity ſuitable to the unbounded genius and ſpirit of Britons.

But, before we attempt to ſpeak of an entenſive empire, conſiſting of many nations, it may be proper to conſider the diſtinction that ought to be made between a nation and an empire; and between the power of a national ſtate and the power of an imperial ſtate. Now, in order to make this diſtinction, we muſt recur to the original inſtitution of all ſocieties, or ſocial ſtates. When men leave the ſtate of natural liberty, and form a ſociety, or ſocial ſtate, then, it is to this firſt ſociety, or ſocial ſtate, in which they engage, that every man pledges his life and his whole property; and though this firſt ſociety might be called either a national, or an imperial ſociety, or might be called by any other name that you pleaſe; yet, allowing it to be called a national ſociety, or, a national ſtate, then, it is to that national ſtate that every man pledges his life and his whole property. But he does not pledge his life and property to this national ſtate, in conſequence of any expreſs contract made with the parties or individuals thus aſſociated; it is not in his power to make ſuch a contract; neither is it in any man's power to withhold the pledge, if ever he unite in any ſociety, for it is by this *firſt* act of aſſociation that he eſtabliſhes that pledge. After men are thus aſſociated in a national ſtate, and the nation is divided into many pariſhes, it is impoſſible for the parochial ſtates to have a right to an unlimited power over the property of their reſpective pariſhioners, all the pariſhioners having previouſly, as national ſubjects, pledged their whole property to the national ſtate; and therefore, the national ſtate can only allow the parochial ſtates, a limited power over the property

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BRITISH MUSEUM 13 71 FEB

of their pariſhioners: neither is it poſſible for the parochial ſtates to have a right to any power at all over the lives of their reſpective pariſhioners, all the pariſhioners having alſo previouſly, as national ſubjects, pledged their lives to the national ſtate. And it is for the very ſame reaſon, that when many nations are united in one empire, it is impoſſible for the imperial ſtate to have a right to an unlimited power over the property of the imperial ſubjects, all the men in the empire, in this caſe alſo, having previouſly, as national ſubjects, pledged their whole property to their reſpective national ſtates; and thetefore, theſe national ſtates alſo, can only allow the imperial ſtate, ſuch a limited power over the property of the imperial ſubjects, as ſhall be eſtabliſhed by expreſs contract: neither is it poſſible for this imperial ſtate to have a right to any power at all over the lives of the imperial ſubjects, all the men in the empire, in this caſe alſo, having previouſly, as national ſubjects, pledged their lives to their reſpective national ſtates. Or, in other words, all national ſtates being original aſſociations, have, therefore, by thoſe acts of aſſociation, a right to a power over the lives, and an unlimited power over the property, of all their reſpective ſubjects; but it is impoſſible to extend a right to thoſe powers, to any ſubſequent ſtates (whether they are parochial or imperial ſtates) that are formed, either by dividing, or compounding, thoſe original national ſtates: and an imperial ſtate being only a ſubſequent aſſociation of men previouſly aſſociated in national ſtates, can, therefore, by that act of aſſociation, have no right to any power, but what is derived from the conſent of the nations thus united in this ſubſequent imperial ſtate. This, therefore, conſtitutes a manifeſt diſtinction between a nation and an empire; and between the power of a national ſtate, and the power of an imperial ſtate. The power of a national ſtate is *unlimited*, except by Divine laws, there being no expreſs contracts to limit the power of the general will of the nation: the power of an imperial ſtate is *limited*, not only by Divine Laws, but there are alſo expreſs contracts to limit the power of the general will of the empire.

In a ſociety thus formed, where many ſmall national ſtates, under particular national governments, conſtitute one large imperial ſtate, under a general imperial government, if any of theſe governments attempt to exerciſe an authority which is the juſt right of another government, ſuch a meaſure is almoſt ſure to diſturb, if not to deſtroy the empire; but, if each of theſe governments keep within the bounds of their juſt authority, ſuch harmony in government, muſt be a bleſſing to the ſociety, and will as certainly tend to preſerve the empire.

As to the propriety of eſtabliſhing a large and an extenſive empire, I think it perfectly conſiſtent with all the eſtabliſhed laws of ſociety, that, as a great many individuals conſtitute one pariſh, and become ſubject to a parochial government; and as a great many pariſhes conſtitute one nation, and become ſubject to a national government; ſo alſo may a great many nations be collected into one empire, and become ſubject to a general imperial government, or, an emperor of the confederate ſtates, or, a general guardian of nations: nor do I ſee what could fix the bounds to ſuch a confederacy of nations, or, what could determine, how far ſuch a general empire might poſſibly be extended, under a free and liberal ſyſtem of government. And, as to the neceſſity and effects of ſuch an extenſive government as this, I think they are much the ſame as in ſmaller departments of government. Without judicial authority to determine the rights of individuals, thoſe individuals would be conſtantly encroaching on each other's rights, and conſtantly quarrelling: and without imperial authority to determine the rights of nations, thoſe nations alſo will be as conſtantly encroaching on each other's rights, and as conſtantly at war: and the world continue a reſtleſs theatre of national contentions; unleſs an imperial government be eſtabliſhed, with power to preſide over nations, to determine their rights, and check their contentions. When we hear of a nation without laws, or without judges to execute laws, and determine the rights of individuals, we call it *anarchy*; and pity the poor wretches, who are deſtined to live in that unhappy confuſed ſtate. The want of a general imperial government,

with

with power to preſide over, and determine the rights of nations, is *univerſal anarchy*. And, as the great Judge of the world does ſuffer particular governments in particular nations, for the ſafety and happineſs of his creatures, who can ſay, that he will not, for the ſame reaſon, ſuffer a more general government in the world, if there be the ſame neceſſity, and if it will produce the ſame effects. And as, by a comparative view of greater things with ſmaller, the neceſſity and effects ſeem to be nearly the ſame; I cannot help concluding, that I think the probability rather in favour of this ſuppoſition, viz. that, as men are obliged to unite in a national ſociety, in order to ſupport the weakneſs of individuals, by the united ſtrength of a nation, and, on principles of ſelf-preſervation, to ſubject themſelves to a national government; ſo, in proceſs of time, will national ſocieties be obliged to unite in a general imperial ſociety, in order to ſupport the weakneſs of nations, by the united ſtrength of a general empire; and that, on principles of ſelf-preſervation, thoſe nations alſo will be obliged to ſubject themſelves to a general imperial government, or, an emperor of the confederate ſtates, or, a general guardian of nations.

Now, as on one hand, ſhould the reader apprehend, that ſuch a general power as this might be dangerous to the freedom of nations; I here beg leave to obſerve, that whenever a number of diſtinct national ſtates, are all collected into one and the ſame imperial ſtate, under a free conſtitution of government, then the imperial government can only have a right to make *general laws* reſpecting the *external government* of all the nations in the empire; but they can have no right to interfere in making *particular laws* reſpecting the *internal government* of any national ſtate or kingdom whatſoever. Or, in other words, whenever many diſtinct national ſtates, are collected into one and the ſame imperial ſtate; as every national ſtate ought of right to be governed by its own national government, and every imperial ſtate by its own imperial government; therefore, it is impoſſible for a national government to have a right to make imperial laws, or, for an imperial govern-

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ment to have a right to make national laws. So, on the other hand, ſhould the reader apprehend, that giving this freedom to nations, might be dangerous to the general ſafety and peace of the world; I alſo beg leave to obſerve, that whenever many diſtinct national ſtates are collected into one and the ſame imperial ſtate, then the imperial government has as undoubted a right to give laws *externally* to every nation in the empire, and to enforce obedience to the imperial laws; as a national government has to give laws *internally* to every ſubject in the nation, and to enforce obedience to the national laws.

Now, admitting that ſuch an empire as this ſhould ever be eſtabliſhed, then comes the principal queſtion; What nation muſt be honoured with the *ſeat* of imperial government, and is equal to ſo great an undertaking? When I conſider Great Britain, her natural ſtrength, as an iſland; and her acquired ſtrength, as the moſt improved iſland in the world; her improvements in ſcience, to direct her to a proper uſe of that ſtrength; and the genius and ſpirit of her inhabitants, to give a full exertion to ſuch ſtrength and knowledge: when I conſider this, I believe, I may venture to ſay, that, if government do their part to improve all theſe advantages, there is not a kingdom upon earth ſo well intitled as Great Britain to be the *ſeat* of this imperial government; nor, a king upon earth, ſo well entitled to the imperial laurel, as the king of Great Britain.

Now, ſhould it be ſaid, If Great Britain can be independent and happy, why ſhould ſhe diſturb that happineſs, by encumbering herſelf with this unwieldy government? To anſwer this queſtion; Obſerve the world, its inhabitants, and every thing in it. Every thing that is not in a progreſſive ſtate, going on to perfection, is falling back to decay; this has hitherto been the caſe with every nation in the world; it is a fatality founded in the very nature of things; and, ſhall Great Britain look for an exemption from the eſtabliſhed and invariable laws of nature? No. If Great Britain does not

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preſs forward to the ſummit of power, ſhe will moſt certainly ſink into ſome kind of dependence, perhaps be a ſneaking colony, or, at beſt, a tributary ſtate.

But leſt any nation ſhould take an unneceſſary alarm, ſtill thinking the freedom of nations endangered, by eſtabliſhing ſuch a general power as this; give me leave to remind them, that this imperial government is expreſsly forbidden, and ought, by contract, to be expreſsly precluded from a right to interfere in the internal concerns of any nation. So that, were ſuch an imperial government as this to be eſtabliſhed, and the imperial conſtitution of government to be ſtrictly obſerved; inſtead of endangering the freedom of nations, this imperial government would guard that freedom from the encroachment of any foreign power, and would be a ſure and an effectual ſecurity to all nations, againſt that unlawful, though common practice, *of one ſtate claiming a right to give laws to another ſtate*, or, *an imperial government claiming a right to make national laws:* a practice which has hitherto made the hiſtory of the world, little more than an hiſtory of wars and rebellions: a practice which not only reaſon declares, but the experience of all ages has alſo plainly proved, can never be productive of any other conſequences; for there is no other alternative, but that of either tamely ſubmitting to the yoke of ſlavery, or, by reſiſtance, rendering the world an horrid ſcene of human carnage. Or, ſhould any empire take an unneceſſary alarm at the power of their governors being reſtrained from interfering in the internal concerns of any nation; give me leave to remind them alſo, *That diſtinct governments interfering with each other in their internal concerns*, is a practice which Infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs ſeems to have ſtamped with repeated marks of his diſpleaſure (probably to preſerve an equal diſtribution of juſtice to all mankind.) For, I believe, that this unlawful practice has been a principle cauſe of deſtroying the three greateſt empires that have yet been in the world, viz. the Aſſyrian, the Grecian, and the Roman empires:

empires: and, if Great Britain (in this American diſpute) will bring another devoted empire to the very ſame teſt, what can we reaſonably expect, but the very ſame fate, from HIM, *with whom is no variableneſs, neither ſhadow of turning?*

THE ſovereign of a general empire, if he does not act on principles of univerſal benevolence, I think it very unlikely, that either his power or dominions would ever be in any degree adequate to his title; for, how can we ſuppoſe, that Infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs will ever ſuffer a *general power* on earth, but to obtain a *general good?* Or, how can we ſuppoſe, that it will not be ſuffered, if that power be neceſſary to obtain that end? Then again, men differ much about what is, or is not good: ſome ſay, it is a good thing to make a man a *Mohometan*, others to make him a *Chriſtian:* but allowing it to be the Divine Will, to ſpread chriſtianity throughout all the world, as the goſpel, after it was eſtabliſhed by miracles, was left to be propagated by human power, under Divine Influence; then, as long as human power co-operates with the Divine Will, to obtain that end, who can ſay, how far that human power may be ſuffered, or, how far the dominions of that power may be extended? And when we conſider, that no leſs than a *Divine Character* did condeſcend to eſtabliſh chriſtianity in the world; we may reaſonably conclude, that the propagation of it muſt be a moſt acceptable human ſervice, and highly becoming the greateſt *human character* upon earth, the ſovereign of a general empire, who acts on principles of univerſal benevolence.

THE ſovereign of a general empire, that is univerſally benevolent, can no more depart from his moral, than from his religious duties. For inſtance, ſuppoſe a province in America apply to be admitted into the empire, it would be impoſſible for the ſovereign, conſiſtent with his principle of univerſal benevolence, to admit that province into the empire, while there is a *ſlave* in it; for, if he does not extend his benevolence to that ſlave, when he has it in his power, and can ſo

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eaſily do it, I am ſure, he is not univerſally benevolent; therefore, he muſt either give up his fundamental principle of univerſal benevolence, or oblige the province to emancipate every ſlave in it, before that province can poſſibly be admitted into the empire. And, if the ſovereign is thus careful of the freedom of individuals, he muſt certainly be as careful of the freedom of nations; allowing every ſtate or kingdom in the empire, the full enjoyment of every freedom that is conſiſtent with the natural rights of nations.

THE ſovereign of a general empire may, conſiſtent with his own principles, make any ſtate or kingdom upon earth tributary to him, on ſuch terms as ſhall be mutually agreed on; for mutual compacts are perfectly conſiſtent with freedom, and with the nature of human ſocieties.

NOW, if ever ſuch an empire as this is attempted with any proſpect of ſucceſs, ſuch a mighty fabric muſt certainly be built on the broad baſis of mutual ſafety, mutual happineſs, and the moſt generous and liberal principles; giving every liberty of mind and conſcience, both civil and religious, to every part of the empire, that can poſſibly be given, conſiſtent with particular and general ſafety.

LET us then ſuppoſe a great many ſtates or kingdoms to be collected into one great empire, on the following terms: viz.

THAT the chriſtian religion, as it is eſtabliſhed in England, ſhall be the eſtabliſhed religion of every ſtate or kingdom in the empire: and that all other religions or ſects that are tolerated in England, ſhall alſo be tolerated in all the other ſtates or kingdoms: and to prevent further diſſenſions in chriſtianity, owing to different ideas that may ariſe from different tranſlations of the Goſpel, that it ſhall alſo be profeſſed in the ſame language; and if this eſtabliſhment be made in a ſtate or kingdom where they ſpeak another language, that the ſubjects of that ſtate or kingdom ſhall be ſuffered to uſe any other tolerated religion, in their own or any other language that they pleaſe, until it be convenient and agreeable to them to conform to the eſtabliſhment:

THAT every ſtate or kingdom in the empire ſhall pay to the emperor ſuch a tribute as ſhall be mutually agreed on:

THAT in conſideration of this tribute, the emperor ſhall be obliged to protect at ſea, every ſtate or kingdom in the empire, with the ſame care as his own immediate kingdom:

THAT as every ſtate or kingdom in the empire would then be protected againſt all maratime inſults; therefore, none of them ſhall ever be ſuffered to have any men of war or armed veſſels whatever:

THAT every ſtate or kingdom in the empire ſhall be limited in the number of their ſoldiers, and that they ſhall not exceed that number without the conſent of the emperor:

AND, That the ſubjects of every ſtate or kingdom in the empire, ſhall have a free liberty of trading to every part of the empire, the ſame as the ſubjects of the emperor's own immediate kingdom.

Now, the queſtion is, whether theſe terms are, or are not, conſiſtent with the ſafety, happineſs, and natural rights of men, and of kingdoms?

As to the general ſafety of the empire: The firſt thing neceſſary for the ſafety of a great empire is to deſtroy the power of all its branches, leaving no power but in that kingdom, which is the ſeat of imperial government; for, if all the different kingdoms of an empire are allowed power (ſuch is the luſt of ambition) they will moſt certainly unite that power againſt, and, if they can, they will deſtroy that kingdom, which is honoured with the ſeat of imperial government, in hopes of obtaining that honour themſelves; therefore, power muſt not be ſuffered in the branches of an empire, it being utterly incompatible with the ſafety of the whole. And, as to the ſafety of the different branches of the empire, the emperor would be obliged by treaties to defend them againſt all inſults at ſea; and the ſame treaties would alſo allow them a ſufficient ſtrength to defend themſelves on land: and, as to the ſecurity theſe branches would have for the emperor's fulfilling his

his treaties; I cannot offer them the ſecurity of any other earthly power, but they would have, what I think, a much better ſecurity; the emperor would be bound to fulfil theſe treaties by the never-failing principle of ſelf-love and ſelf-defence; and, on this principle, it would be impoſſible for the emperor ever to deny a ſufficient ſtrength, both at ſea and on ſhore, to defend the very branches of his own empire. Theſe tributary ſtates would be the very ſtrength and dignity of the empire, nay, they would be the empire itſelf; or however, they would be as much a part of the empire as a man's hands and feet are a part of himſelf: and therefore (without the obligation of treaties) to ſuppoſe that an emperor would be ſo very careful of his own immediate kingdom, that he would not allow every thing neceſſary for the ſafety and welfare of every other part of his empire, is as abſurd and ridiculous, as to ſuppoſe a man ſo very careful in covering his head, that he will not allow himſelf cloathing to his back. So that theſe branches, when thus united with the head, and all collected into one great and powerful body, would certainly be in a ſafer ſtate as to national defence, than when they ſtand detached from each other, and each nation is obliged to defend itſelf.—Compared with this mode for a general government of nations, look at the preſent ſituation of Europe; are not all the ſmaller powers, in conſtant fear and danger, of being deſtroyed by the greater? And, are not all the great powers, in as conſtant fear and danger, of being deſtroyed by each other? And, to prevent it, they are obliged to keep up a political ſyſtem, called the balance of power, and in this ſyſtem, Great Britain, to be ſure, muſt take the lighter ſcale to make it balance; and then, if any of the other powers on the continent get into a wrong ſcale, Great Britain muſt go to the other, to preſerve that balance; and ſo dance from ſcale to ſcale, that one would really wonder how men of ſenſe can poſſibly be led by ſuch a dancing political phantom. So that, as to national ſafety, I think I may fairly conclude, that the mode here propoſed for a general government of nations, is

as much ſafer than their preſent ſituation, as government is ſafer than anarchy.

As to the happineſs of men; as every ſtate or kingdom in the empire, would have the very ſame religious eſtabliſhment, ſoftened by the ſame tolerations; and, as every nation in the empire, would have a free liberty to chooſe their own form of government, and afrerwards an uncontrouled exerciſe of their own civil government, and internal policy; and as every ſtate or kingdom in the empire, would have a free trade to all parts of the empire; ſo, every ſubject in every branch of the empire, would have the ſame opportunities of obtaining wealth by trade, and the ſame indulgences in a full enjoyment of that wealth, under every liberty, both civil and religious, that are enjoyed by the ſubjects of the emperor's own immediate kingdom. Which, I hope, will be allowed to be as much political liberty and happineſs, as can reaſonably be looked for by any ſubject.

And, as to the natural rights of men and of kingdoms: in order to inveſtigate thoſe rights, it may be neceſſary to make theſe diſtinctions, viz. The diſtinctions between a natnral right and an acquired right, and between a ſupreme power and a ſubordinate power; and alſo, by which of thoſe different powers thoſe diſtinct rights are exerciſed.—A natural right is a divine inſtitution—An acquired right is an human inſtitution—A ſupreme power is a divine inſtitution—And a ſubordinate power is an human inſtitution. Now, a natural right, being a divine inſtitution, muſt be excerciſed by a ſupreme power, becauſe a ſupreme power is alſo a divine inſtitntion, and, an acquired right, being an human inſtitution, muſt be exerciſed by a ſubordinate power, becauſe a ſubordinate power is alſo an human inſtitution. And therefore, when men are united in a national ſtate, then, as every natural right muſt be exerciſed by a ſupreme power, conſequently, *the natural right of equality* amongſt men muſt be exerciſed by *the ſupreme power* of governing the national ſtate. It is in the ſupreme power of governing, that the natural right of equality

quality is continued amongſt men, even after they are aſſociated in a national ſtate; and that right, being a divine inſtitution, is a ſubject to no changes, for there can be no alteration in the immutable laws of God. And, as every acquired right muſt be exerciſed by a ſubordinate power, conſequently, *the acquired rights of ſuperiority and ſubordination* amongſt men muſt be exerciſed by *the ſubordinate power* of governing the national ſtate. It is in the ſubordinate power of governing, that the acquired rights of ſuperiority and ſubordination are eſtabliſhed amongſt men; for, the acquirements of different men, differing in their degree, thoſe differences muſt unavoidably conſtitute a ſubordination; as to the rights of men in this ſubordinate power, and thoſe rights, being human inſtitutions, are ſubject to great and frequent changes, for there can be no ſtability in the mutable laws of men. In the ſupreme power of governing a nation, *the natural rights* of men are *equal and unchangeable*: but in the ſubordinate power of governing a nation, *the acquired rights* of men are *unequal and changeable*. And whatever changes may happen to a man, as to his rights in this ſubordinate power, or, whatever degree or place he may obtain in the ſcale of ſubordination which is unavoidable in that power, if he does not ſubmit to all the duties of that place, he moſt certainly encroaches on the eſtabliſhed laws of ſociety; but, let the place he takes be where it will, I am ſure, that no encroachment is made on the natural rights of that man. And it is with kingdoms as it is with individuals. Whenever many kingdoms are united in an imperial ſtate, then, as every natural right muſt be exerciſed by a ſupreme power, conſequently, *the natural right of equality* amongſt kingdoms muſt be exerciſed by *the ſupreme power* of governing the imperial ſtate. It is in the ſupreme power of governing, that the natural right of equality is continued amongſt kingdoms, even after they are aſſociated in an imperial ſtate; and that right, being a divine inſtitution, muſt always continue the ſame, which renders the natural rights of kingdoms as permanent as the natural rights of men. And, as every acquired right muſt be exerciſed by a ſubordinate

dinate power, conſequently, *the acquired rights of ſuperiority and ſubordination* amongſt kingdoms muſt be exerciſed by *the ſubordinate power* of governing the imperial ſtate. It is in the ſubordinate power of governing, that the acquired rights of ſuperiority and ſubordination are eſtabliſhed amongſt kingdoms; for, the acquirements of different kingdoms, differing in their degree, thoſe differences muſt unavoidably conſtitute a ſubordination, as to the rights of kingdoms in this ſubordinate power; and thoſe rights, being human inſtitutions, ſeldom continue long the ſame, which renders the acquired rights of kingdoms as ſubject to viciſſitudes as the acquired rights of men. In the ſupreme power of governing an empire, *the natural rights* of kingdoms are *equal and unchangeable*; but in the ſubordinate power of governing an empire, *the acquired rights* of kingdoms are *unequal and changeable*. And whatever changes may happen to a kingdom, as to her rights in this ſubordinate power, or, whatever degree or place ſhe may obtain in the ſcale of ſubordination, which is unavoidable in that power, if ſhe does not ſubmit to all the duties of that place, I muſt ſay of that kingdom, as I did of the individual, that ſhe does as certainly encroach on the eſtabliſhed laws of ſociety; but, let the place ſhe takes be where it will, I am ſure, that no encroachment is made on the natural rights of that kingdom. And therefore, I do aſſert, that, when one kingdom is made tributary to another, by mutual agreement, that no encroachment is made on the natural rights of the tributary ſtate, or, on the natural rights of any man in it.

Now, from theſe reaſons taken collectively, I think I may fairly draw the following concluſions, viz.

THAT Great Britain may be made independent:

THAT Great Britain, when made independent, is the propereſt kingdom in the world for the ſeat of a general imperial government:

THAT a general imperial government is conſiſtent with the eſtabliſhed laws of ſociety:

AND, That a general imperial government, were it to be eſtabliſhed

eſtabliſhed on the terms here mentioned, would effectually ſecure to the whole empire, the general power of the imperial government, as to the external government of every nation in the empire;—would effectually ſecure to every nation in the empire, the particular power of each national government, as to the internal government of their reſpective nations;—would greatly conduce to the ſafety, not only of the whole empire, but alſo to the ſafety of each particular nation; would contribute to the happineſs of individuals;—and would not in the leaſt encroach on the natural rights of any man, any nation, or any empire in the world.

Now, let us ſuppoſe ſuch a general empire as this to be eſtabliſhed, and Great Britain to be made the ſeat of the imperial government, then, it is plain, that no title, except a general title, could poſſibly be applied to this empire, it would be impoſſible to apply a local title, for then it would not be a general empire: for inſtance, were it to be called, the Britiſh empire, then, that title would certainly preclude the whole world, except the iſland of Great Britain; and, Great Britain has dominions at this time in every quarter of the world; but, if the imperial title be circumſcribed to any one part, no other part of the world, could then poſſibly be made a part of the empire. It is true, common uſage may ſtamp a meaning on words, contrary to their original and proper meaning; and it is by the authority of this cuſtom, that we call America a part of the Britiſh empire: but, if I may be allowed to deviate from this cuſtom, and to recur to the original and proper meaning of words, theſe words, Britiſh empire, muſt mean an empire over Britain; they cannot mean an empire over America; and therefore, to ſay, that America is a part of the Britiſh empire, is as abſolute a contradiction in terms, as to ſay that America is a part of Britain. America, as colonies, or appendages, may continue ſubject to a Britiſh empire, but ſhe never can be a part of the Britiſh empire, any more than ſhe can be a part of Britain. And as it is impoſſible for America to be a part of the Britiſh empire, how can we reaſonably expect, that the Americans (or any other people) will

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ever tamely ſubmit to any power, of which they themſelves do not make a part? How would an Engliſhman like to be amenable to the edicts of France? It is certainly moſt conſiſtent with the natural rights of men, *that no man ſhall be ſubject to the power of any community, unleſs he is himſelf a member of that community.* This is a natural right, that may be overruled by power, but it can never be extirpated. It is a right, that will for ever exiſt, and will for ever operate ſo powerfully on the minds of men, that no human government will ever ſtand ſafely, that is formed on any other principle.

THE common acceptation of words, is certainly a true and real meaning of words; and by common uſage, theſe words, Britiſh-empire, do certainly mean an empire over America; and that when a man ſays, Britiſh dominions, he does not mean to be confined to the dominions in Britain, but that he means alſo to include the dominions in America; that is, when a man ſays, my Yorkſhire eſtate, he does not mean to be confined to his eſtate in Yorkſhire, but that he means alſo to include his eſtate in Cornwall. And yet, excluſive of the authority of cuſtom, if the words, Britiſh empire, and Britiſh dominions, do mean, an empire and dominions in America; then the words, Yorkſhire eſtate, do moſt certainly mean, an eſtate in Cornwall. But, ſuch is the bewitching power of cuſtom! that this is certainly the common acceptation of theſe words; and I would not have here attempted to oppoſe it, or have thought it worth waſting a page in the diſtinction; but that I think, in this caſe, the common acceptation of theſe words, will always give great offence to other nations, and is thereby a real injury to the empire; and therefore, I hope, no one will be offended at my taking the liberty of uſing theſe words, Britiſh empire, not in their cuſtomary, but in what I think their original and more proper meaning. And I would not have taken this liberty, merely for a trifling diſtinction in the meaning of words, but for the ſake of uſing them in ſuch a meaning, as cannot poſſibly offend other nations, and may therefore be a real advantage to Great Britain. For, how would it hurt the pride of an Engliſhman, to have England

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called a part of a French, or a Spaniſh empire? And, why will you hurt the pride of an American, by calling America a part of the Britiſh empire? As long as national pride has any influence over the minds of men, a national title of ſuperiority, will always give offence to every man who is not of that nation which is honoured with the title; and will always be a real injury to an empire: as men will never willingly conſent to give even a title of honour to any nation, unleſs they are themſelves a part of that nation; or to aggrandize any community, unleſs they are themſelves a part of that community: and therefore, in an empire which at this very time includes a great many diſtinct nations in different quarters of the world; what title can be given, that would not offend ſome nations, or would not preclude ſome nations from the community, but either the title of the general imperial ſtate, or, the general confederacy of nations, or, ſome other *general* title? For, if any nation is, by a *local* imperial title, expreſsly precluded from the empire; it would then be impoſſible for that precluded nation to be made a part of the empire, without ſtill continuing the old cuſtom, of making the land in Cornwall into a Yorkſhire eſtate. So that, whatever nation attempts to eſtabliſh an imperial government over other nations, ſhe ought certainly, in that government, to lay aſide all offenſive national titles, and all little ſelfiſh diſtinctions and partialities; to allow every nation the honour of ranking with herſelf, in the great imperial community; to open wide her hoſpitable arms, always ready to ſupport, and always careful not to offend any other nation in the world: for how can any kingdom expect, or what right has any kingdom, to the honour of being the ſeat of an imperial government over other nations, but by acting on the liberal and unbounded principle of an impartial friend, and citizen of the world?

The Britiſh ſovereign, were his government to be confined to his regal dominions, would have no occaſion for any other title, than his preſent regal title: the Britiſh ſenate, were their government to be confined to their national dominions, would have no occaſion for any other government,

than their preſent national government: but as the Britiſh ſovereign, and the Britiſh ſenate, are the governors not only of a regal or national ſtate, but alſo of an imperial ſtate; therefore, the Britiſh ſovereign, is not only a regal, but alſo an imperial ſovereign: and, the Britiſh ſenate, is not only a national, but alſo an imperial ſenate; and, as the Britiſh regal or national ſtate ought to be governed by our regal ſovereign, and the national ſenate; ſo, the imperial ſtate, ought to be governed by our imperial ſovereign, and the imperial ſenate. For, all the branches of this imperial ſtate being as really and abſolutely a part of the empire as Great Britain; therefore, though they ought not to be ſubject to this national ſenate, yet they ought all to be really and abſolutely ſubject to this imperial ſenate; the imperial ſenate governing and giving laws to the whole imperial ſtate, as each national ſenate governs and gives laws to each national ſtate. And, though the Britiſh ſovereigns have never yet had the title of emperors, yet, as they have for ſome ages paſt exerciſed an imperial power over many imperial ſubjects, and thoſe imperial ſubjects have invariably acknowledged their right to that power; and, as the Britiſh ſovereign is in reality, and in fact, poſſeſſed both of a kingdom and an empire; therefore, the Britiſh ſovereign is in reality, and in fact, both a king and an emperor; the imperial crown preſiding over the imperial ſtate, as the regal crown preſides over the regal ſtate.

To ſeperate and diſtinguiſh particular from general power, has always been properly obſerved in the ſmaller departments of governing individuals; though theſe diſtinctions have hitherto been very much neglected, in the greater departments of governing nations; where the weight of government, and the complication of circumſtances, make them more neceſſary. Do not all colonels direct the particular command of their reſpective regiments? And when a general takes the command of a whole army, the colonels directing their particular commands, will certainly aſſiſt the general in directing his general commands; but, if this general will minutely

nutely extend his care, and will act as colonel to every regiment, I may venture to pronounce, that he muſt either have a very ſmall army, or very ſoon be in great confuſion. Now, in common life, theſe diſtinctions are very plain and obvious; and they are as certainly true, and more neceſſary, in the government of nations; for, if an emperor will minutely extend his care, to the particular government of all the nations in his empire; I may as ſafely pronounce, that he muſt either have a very ſmall empire, or very ſoon be in great confuſion.

And here, I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that cenſuring a law, does not include the leaſt degree of cenſure on a judge, who is officially bound to judge by that law. The conſtitution ſays, Great Britain has colonized America: that, therefore, infers an obligation, or a law, by which our governors are officially bound to judge and act; and, until that part of the conſtitution is altered, it is impoſſible for the governors not to exert themſelves to ſupport what the conſtitution directs, without a manifeſt neglect of their official duty; and therefore, whatever bad conſequences may attend theſe exertions, the fault is not in the governors, but in the conſtitution; and while this part of the conſtitution continues as it is, whether we ſpeak of the thirteen revolted colonies, or of all the other colonies and branches of the empire which have not revolted, I ſay, while this part of the conſtitution continues as it is, and the general, inſtead of having colonels, has only his own private ſervants to command every regiment, what can we look for but a vanquiſhed army?

Now, barring the old conſtruction of words, and allowing the ſame conſtruction of the words, Britiſh community, as of the words, Britiſh empire, that, as an American empire, is not a Britiſh empire, ſo, an American community, is not a Britiſh community: now, allowing this conſtruction of theſe words; then the truth of this caſe, and the misfortune too, may, I believe, be comprehended in a very few words, viz. The conſtitution, ſubverſive of every principle of good gene-

ralſhip and good government, has not confined the particular power of *the Britiſh government* to *the Britiſh community*; but has extended a particular power, in the Britiſh government, to all her *colonies in America*, which are all *diſtinct communities*; and, when *the ſame government* extends a particular power *to many communities*, it is making *the ſame general* to act as colonel *to many regiments*; which is extending *a particular power*, where, in the natural order of government, *a general power* can only be exerciſed: nor has the conſtitution diſtinguiſhed, between the *political colonel*, and the *political general*; that is, the conſtitution has not diſtinguiſhed, when the parliament act as a *national government*, and when they act as an *imperial government*: which is a diſtinction, that would clearly diſcriminate, when they are making, and have an undoubted right to make, *particular laws* reſpecting the *internal government* of this nation; and, when they are making, and have an undoubted right to make, *general laws* reſpecting the *external government* of every nation in the empire. And, if the principles that I have before laid down are true, viz. That an imperial government has a right to give laws externally to every nation in the empire, and to enforce obedience to the imperial laws, but that an imperial government has not a right to interfere in giving laws for the internal government of any national ſtate or kingdom whatſoever; then, ſuch a ſyſtem of government as this, were it to be eſtabliſhed and obſerved, would certainly ſecure to Great Britain, *the American dependence on this imperial government*, reſpecting the *external government* of every nation in America, which is every degree of dependence that the imperial government can have a right to claim, conſiſtent with the natural rights of nations; and, would alſo as certainly ſecure to America their *national independence*, reſpecting the *internal government* of every nation in America, which is every degree of independence that any nation in America can have a right to claim, conſiſtent with the duty and allegiance, which, as imperial ſubjects, they certainly owe to this imperial government.

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As to the cauſe of the preſent diſpute with America, I believe, that it is not a want of affection between the Britiſh and the American ſubjects, nor perhaps a want of generoſity on either ſide of the water; but, that it is a want of a better ſyſtem of imperial government, than the preſent ſyſtem, which has been the cauſe of this unhappy diſpute. The preſent conſtitution of government appears to me to be a real injuſtice both to the Britiſh and the American ſubjects: for, the conſtitution has eſtabliſhed in the *imperial government* a right (if it can be properly called a right) to interfere in the *national government* of America, and as every nation which is not ſelf-governed is certainly enſlaved; therefore, that part of the conſtitution is an injuſtice to the American ſubjects: and, the conſtitution (there being no expreſs contracts made with the Americans for the payment of ſtipulated ſums to the imperial government) has not eſtabliſhed in the imperial government *a legal right* to demand from the Americans a direct revenue for the ſupport of thoſe very fleets, and that very force, which is to defend and protect themſelves; leaving the whole load of raiſing a direct revenue (for the joint defence both of Great Britain and America) to be laid ſolely on Great Britain, and, as every part of a ſtate ought certainly, by a direct revenue, to contribute to the ſupport of that force which is to defend and protect themſelves; therefore, that part of the conſtitution is an injuſtice to the Britiſh ſubjects. I have ſaid, that the conſtitution has not eſtabliſhed a legal right to demand a revenue from the Americans, but I did not ſay, that there is no legal right to demand that revenue, for it is unqueſtionable, that the right which this imperial government has to demand ſome proportion of the property of the Americans, for their own ſupport, ſtands fairly and clearly on *the law of reaſon*, but ſtill that alone may not be ſufficient for the purpoſes of civil government; as it is well known, that in theſe caſes, the parties concerned ſometimes neglect the law of reaſon, and almoſt always differ in opinion about the proportions which ought to be paid; and therefore,

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It is certainly neceſſary, that the exact claim which this imperial government has, not only on every province in America, but alſo on all the other branches of the empire, ſhould be clearly aſcertained by expreſs contracts, and that this law of reaſon ſhould be further enforced, by thus making it the eſtabliſhed law of the land. But, ſhould any one ſtill doubt the juſtice of obliging every part of this imperial ſtate, as well as every part of this national ſtate, by a direct revenue, to contribute to the ſupport of thoſe very fleets, and that very force, which is to defend and protect themſelves, let us conſider the juſtice of that caſe ſeperately with reſpect to both thoſe ſtates. As to this national ſtate, let us ſuppoſe this national government to lay the whole load of ſupporting fleets, for the defence of this nation, on the county of Middleſex, and to exempt all the other counties in the nation from the payment of taxes for the ſupport of thoſe fleets, and I ſhould then think it impoſſible for the mind of any man, and eſpecially any man in the county of Middleſex, to be ſo darkened, as not immediately to ſee the injuſtice of ſuch a partial contribution to the common ſupport of the whole nation. And, as to this imperial ſtate, we need not form a ſuppoſition, is it not a fact, that this imperial government has, for a century paſt, laid the whole load of ſupporting fleets, for the defence of this empire, on the Britiſh nation, and has not only exempted, but ſtill continues to exempt, all the other nations in the empire from the payment of direct and ſtipulated ſums of money for the ſupport of thoſe very fleets which are to defend and protect themſelves? And, if the county of Middleſex, in ſuch a caſe as has juſt been mentioned, could ſo clearly ſee the injuſtice of laying the whole load of ſupporting this nation on that county, why cannot Great Britain, in a ſimilar caſe, as clearly ſee the injuſtice of laying the whole load of ſupporting this empire on the Britiſh nation? But, if we may judge of the minds of men by their conduct, and by their ſuffering this injuſtice to Great Britain to be continued, not only with reſpect to ſuch of the American colonies as have not revolted, but alſo with reſpect to all the other branches of the empire, thoſe colonies and

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branches being ſtill exempted from the payment of a direct and ſtipulated revenue for the ſupport of thoſe very fleets which are to defend and to protect themſelves, and the whole load of ſupporting thoſe fleets being ſtill continued on Great Britain by a direct revenue ariſing from innumerable taxes impoſed on the Britiſh ſubjects, from theſe circumſtances, though it may appear to be an aſtoniſhing ſuppoſition, yet, may we not fairly ſuppoſe, that there are, at this very time, numbers of men in Great Britain, and even men of the moſt diſtinguiſhed learning and abilities, whoſe minds are ſo darkened, that they do not ſee the injuſtice of ſuch a partial contribution to the common ſupport of the whole empire?—Did ever heaven ſo darken the minds of an enlightened people! It is certainly as direct a violation of the principle of juſtice to oblige Great Britain to ſupport this empire, as it would be to oblige the county of Middleſex to ſupport Great Britain. But we ſhould not confine our conſideration of juſtice to Great Britain. Juſtice knows no diſtinction of nations. And unleſs you will firſt obſerve the ſame principle of juſtice with reſpect to America and all the other branches of the empire, by emancipating the imperial ſubjects from their preſent ſtate of national ſlavery, you can have no right to demand tribute or any direct revenue from thoſe imperial ſubjects, it being impoſſible to have a right to demand tribute of a ſlave. As to the thirteen revolted colonies, if we are not ſuffered to be guilty of an act of injuſtice to thoſe colonies by enforcing from them the payment of an *unlimited revenue*; are we therefore to be guilty of an act of injuſtice to Great Britain by relinquiſhing a juſt claim to a *limited revenue*?—If we are not ſuffered to enforce from the thirteen revolted colonies the payment of an *unlimited intereſt* for the money which Great Britain has, perhaps with more generoſity than prudence, expended in the ſervice of thoſe colonies; are we therefore to relinquiſh a juſt claim to a *limited intereſt* for that money, and thereby to lay the whole debt both principal and intereſt on the Britiſh ſubjects?—If we are not ſuffered to enſlave the

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thirteen revolted colonies, by interfering in their *national or internal government*, are we therefore to relinquiſh an indiſputable right to an *imperial or external government* of thoſe thirteen colonies?—If we are not ſuffered to give laws to the thirteen revolted colonies, *in all caſes whatſoever*, and thereby to render thoſe colonies *totally dependent* on Great Britain; are we therefore to take pet and to declare thoſe thirteen colonies to be *unequivocally independent?* Is there no ſuch thing as a middle line of conduct between dependence in all caſes whatſoever and unequicocal independence? It is certainly poſſible for a nation to be made dependent on an imperial government with reſpect to her *external government*, and, at the ſame time, to be made totally independent of that imperial government with reſpect to her *national or internal government*. But, in this American diſpute, how has this middle line of conduct been obſerved?—In the hour of inſolence, we claimed a right to interfere in the *national or internal government* of the thirteen revolted colonies.—In the hour of humiliation, we have relinquiſhed an indiſputable right to an *imperial or external government* of thoſe thirteen colonies.—In the hour of inſolence, we claimed a right to an *unlimited* power over the property of the thirteen revolted colonies.—In the hour of humiliation, we have relinquiſhed an indiſputable right to a *limited power* over the property of thoſe thirteen colonies.—In the hour of inſolence, we demanded an unconditional ſubmiſſion to an unlimited power.—In the hour of humiliation, we have abandoned the intereſt and honour of Great Britain, by relinquiſhing an indiſputable right to a conditional and limited power.—In the hour of inſolence, we were guilty of an act of injuſtice to America.—In the hour of humiliation, we have been guilty of an act of injuſtice to great Great Britain.—In the whole proceſs of this American diſpute, in this career of political follies, are our footſteps marked, either with reſpect to Great Britain or America, with the ſmalleſt trace, with the very ſhadow of reaſon, juſtice, or even common ſenſe? And, as to the whole empire in America, whether we

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ſpeak of the revolted colonies, or, of all the other colonies which have not revolted, before the preſent diſpute with America, the Britiſh ſubjects were moſt unreaſonably loaden with taxes to ſupport both themſelves and the American ſubjects, and the American ſubjects (by the imperial government being allowed to interfere in their internal national concerns) were as unreaſonably denied their civil liberty; ſo that, previous to this diſpute, the American ſubjects were indulged ſlaves, and the Britiſh ſubjects were oppreſſed freemen;—previous to this diſpute, the ſeeds of this rebellion were implanted in your conſtitution. And, were you juſt now re-united with America, under this deſtructive ſyſtem of government, a ſyſtem, which by a complicated injuſtice, has eſtabliſhed an ignominous ſlavery on one ſide of the water, and a moſt unmerciful oppreſſion on the other;—ſuch a re-union, by not placing the Americans in a ſtate of civil liberty, would only be ſowing the ſeeds of another rebellion;—ſuch a re-union, by laying the whole load of accumalated debts, which have been contracted in the general ſervice of the empire, ſolely on this nation, inſtead of laying that load, in equitable proportions, on every nation in the empire, would have a direct tendency to cruſh and to deſtroy Great Britain, and thereby eventually to loſe all imperial government, and all *rightful* dominion over America;—ſuch a re-union, would not be recovering, but deſtroying the empire. We can never ſufficiently lament our attachment to the preſent imperial conſtitution of government; as there is too much reaſon to believe, that it is our attachment to this wretched conſtitution, which, for the preſent, has loſt America, and has ſtripped the imperial crown of one of its brighteſt diadems. But, whenever this diadem is recovered, whenever a re-union with America takes place, it is impoſſible to re-unite on any terms, but that of obliging the Americans, by expreſs contracts, to pay a direct revenue to this imperial government, for the common ſupport of the empire, without being guilty of a manifeſt injuſtice to the Britiſh ſubjects; and equally impoſſible to give the Americans civil liberty, without firſt eſtabliſhing

ſuch a ſyſtem of government, as ſhall clearly diſtinguiſh between the *particular power* of each national government, and the *general power* of the imperial government. I ſhall, therefore, endeavour to ſeparate and diſtinguiſh the particular government of the Britiſh regal or national dominions, from the general government of all the other imperial dominions; and, in order to form theſe diſtinct governments, I beg leave to ſuppoſe theſe to be the heads of an imperial Magna Charta, viz.

THAT, when the king of Great Britain is the emperor of the confederate ſtates, or, the general guardian of nations, then the Britiſh lords, ſhall be the upper ſenate; and, the Britiſh commons, ſhall be the lower ſenate, of that empire.

THAT, as the king, the lords, and the commons, do jointly conſtitute the government of this national realm; ſo, the emperor, the upper ſenate, and the lower ſenate, ſhall jointly conſtitute the government of this imperial realm.

THAT, as the joint aſſent, of the king, the lords, and the commons, is neceſſary to enact a national ſtatute law; ſo, the joint aſſent, of the emperor, the upper ſenate, and the lower ſenate, ſhall be neceſſary to enact an imperial ſtatute law.

THAT, the Britiſh lords, ſhall, whenever they pleaſe, when the houſe is conſtitutionally aſſembled, form themſelves into an imperial upper ſenate, in the ſaid houſe: but that they ſhall not form themſelves into an imperial ſenate, at any other time, or in any other place.

THAT, the Britiſh commons, ſhall, whenever they pleaſe, when the houſe is conſtitutionally aſſembled, form themſelves into an imperial lower ſenate, in the ſaid houſe; but that they ſhall not form themſelves into an imperial ſenate, at any other time, or in any other place.

THAT, the three eſtates of the Britiſh government, the king, the lords, and the commons, do bind and oblige themſelves, and all their reſpective ſucceſſors, at all times, and on all occaſions, to defend and ſupport the imperial government,

ment, with money, fleets, armies, or any other aſſiſtance, that they in their wiſdom ſhall think neceſſary and proper, for the defence and ſupport of all the branches of the empire.

THAT, in conſideration of this ſupport, the three eſtates of the imperial government, the emperor, the upper ſenate, and the lower ſenate, do bind and oblige themſelves, and all their reſpective ſucceſſors, always to be accountable to the Britiſh government, for all the tribute-money, or emoluments of any ſort or kind, that they may, at any time, receive from any of the branches of the empire.

THAT, the Britiſh government, ſhall always do and tranſact, all buſineſs reſpecting the particular government of Great Britain; but that they ſhall not, in any caſe interfere, either in the particular government of any other nation, or, in the general government of the empire.

AND, That the imperial government, ſhall always do and tranſact, all buſineſs reſpecting the general government of the empire; but that they ſhall not, in any caſe interfere, either in the particular government of Great Britain, or in the particular government of any other nation.

THUS, the particular power of the Britiſh government, and, the general power of the imperial government, might be ſeperated and diſtinguiſhed: and then, no dominions, but the Britiſh dominions, would be ſubject to the Britiſh government:—no dominions, but the imperial dominions, would be ſubject to the imperial government:—no man would be ſubject to the power of the Britiſh government, unleſs he was a Britiſh ſubject:—no man would be ſubject to the power of the imperial government, unleſs he was an imperial ſubject: and therefore, on this mode of government, no encroachment could poſſibly be made, on the natural rights, either of men, or of kingdoms; as neither men, nor kingdoms, would then be ſubject to *the power of any community*, unleſs they were themſelves *a part of that community*. And had this ſyſtem of government been adopted by Great Britain in 1776, when it was firſt publiſhed and propoſed, or, had it been adopted at the

time of ſome of the ſubſequent publications of this paper, when, year after year ſince the year ſeventy-ſix, it was repeatedly offered to the conſideration of the public, I ſay, had this ſyſtem of government been adopted by Great Britain, either in ſeventy-ſix, or, at the time of ſome of theſe ſubſequent publications, it is probable that the thirteen revolted colonies would, at this very time, have been a part of this empire—it is probable that that diadem would never have dropped from the imperial crown—it is probable that this diſpute with the Americans might long ſince have been ſettled agreeably to this ſyſtem, which (beſides its being more advantageous to Great Britain, than the preſent ſyſtem, by the receipt of the tribute money) would have ſaved both Great Britain and America, millions of money, and thouſands of lives, all which might poſſibly have been ſaved, had we not been ſo ſteadily attached to the preſent imperial conſtitution of government. A conſtitution ſo exactly *impartial* in adminiſtering *injuſtice* to all its dependents, that it has not only enſlaved the American ſubjects, by allowing the imperial governors to interfere in their national governments, but it has alſo unjuſtly oppreſſed the Britiſh ſubjects with taxes to ſupport the American ſubjects, by not having eſtabliſhed a ſtipulated tribute to be paid by the Americans for their own ſupport, which appears to me to be no leſs a degree of injuſtice, than that of draining the pockets of the Britiſh ſubjects to purchaſe chains for their fellow ſubjects in America. And, by thus exhauſting the blood and treaſure of the nation in the ſupport of this conſtitution, we have now faithfully fulfilled the promiſe of our lives and fortunes to enable his Majeſty to ſupport our *happy conſtitution* which has enſlaved one half of the empire, and, if but properly ſupported, may do a great deal towards deſtroying the other half.

As to the proſperity which Great Britain and America long experienced under the preſent imperial conſtitution of government, it was not, I think, owing to the conſtitution, but to their union, and to their mutual intercourſe by commerce, which

which muſt unavoidably produce good effects even under a bad conſtitution of government. But at the ſame time that this union, by the advantages of commerce, produced thoſe good effects to both Great Britain and America, has it not alſo, by a defect in the conſtitution, produced the bad effect of loading Great Britain with an immenſe public debt, and the conſequent weight of heavy taxes?—The good effects of ſuch an union are general. The bad effects of ſuch an union are local. The good effects of the trade are felt equally by the Britiſh ſubjects and by the American ſubjects. The bad effects of the public debt are felt ſolely by the Britiſh ſubjects. The good effects of the trade are tranſient. The bad effects of the debt are permanent. Theſe are, I think, the unavoidable conſequences of an union with America under the preſent imperial conſtitution of government, and, allowing the truth of theſe conſequences, it is impoſſible that any man ſhould wiſh for a continuance of ſuch a ſyſtem, either in the revolted colonies, or in the other colonies and branches of the empire which have not revolted. I ſay, allowing the truth of theſe conſequences, it is impoſſible that any man ſhould wiſh for the continuance of ſuch a ſyſtem, who does not wiſh to relieve America by oppreſſing Great Britain, and to raiſe all the other parts of the empire by ſinking this generous nation. But here, in ſpeaking of the proſperity of Great Britain, we ought, I think, to make a diſtinction between the proſperity of the nation, and the proſperity of individuals. For inſtance, let us ſuppoſe North America to be re-united with Great Britain on the former terms of impoſing on Great Britain, the whole expence of ſupporting fleets for the defence of the Americans, inſtead of obliging the Americans to pay a reaſonable ſhare of the expence of ſupporting thoſe fleets which are to defend themſelves, and this merely for the ſake of an advantageous commerce with America, then, by ſuch an union with America, and on ſuch terms, though it is certain, that the return of this advantageous commerce with America would give proſ-

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perity to numberleſs individuals, yet, it is equally certain, that continuing this deſtructive ſyſtem of heaping accumulated debts and the conſequent weight of heavy taxes on Great Britain for the ſupport of the whole empire would not give proſperity to Great Britain. Such an union with America, and on ſuch terms, though it would be a temporary advantage to individuals, yet, it would certainly have a direct tendency eventually to deſtroy the whole—ſuch an union with America, and on ſuch terms, would have ſo direct a tendency to deſtroy this nation, that we might ſafely defy the cabinet at Verſailles to plan a meaſure more deſtructive to Great Britain than a re-union with America on theſe terms. And, to carry the idea on this mode of imperial government with all its conſequences ſtill further, let us alſo ſuppoſe South America to be added to the empire on the very ſame terms of draining the national reſources of Great Britain for the ſupport of this immenſe empire, then, though ſuch an inundation of wealth as might be reaſonably expected from that quarter of the world would certainly increaſe the proſperity of individuals, yet, inſtead of increaſing the proſperity of Great Britain, it would as certainly increaſe the burthen of heavy taxes, and the political diſtreſſes of Great Britain, by loading this nation with the weight, I may ſay, by cruſhing this nation under the weight of a ſtill greater empire to be ſupported at her own expence. And thus, in the government of this empire, if ever we loſe ſight of the ſubſtantial advantage of tribute money, or, a direct revenue, which this imperial government ought, in juſtice to this nation, to receive from all the imperial dominions, the more we extend the imperial dominions, and the further we purſue an empty ſhadow, a phantom of imperial dignity and dominion, without the ſolid advantage of receiving a direct revenue from thoſe imperial dominions, the more we accelerate the deſtruction of Great Britain.

And, as to the future government of all the colonies and branches of this empire which have not revolted: were we

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ſtill to continue our ſupport of all theſe remaining colonies and branches, without obliging them to pay a direct revenue for their own ſupport, and were we alſo to continue the preſent imperial ſyſtem of government in all theſe remaining colonies and branches, and which ſyſtem, as I have repeatedly obſerved, has enſlaved all the branches of the empire, ſuch a line of conduct would certainly be the folly, and no leſs a degree of folly, than that of continuing to load the Britiſh ſubjects with taxes, to ſupport an illegal dominion over theſe remaining branches, and continuing to exhauſt the wealth and treaſure of Great Britain, to ſupport an empire of ſlaves—ſuch a line of conduct would certainly exceed the folly, were it poſſible to exceed the folly, of declaring the thirteen revolted colonies to be unequivocally independent.

Now, though the preſent conſtitution of government has not made the diſtinctions mentioned in this ſyſtem for a general imperial government, and has thereby omitted to limit the power of the imperial governors, and to aſcertain the relation between the Britiſh and the American ſubjects, yet it is certainly neceſſary, that not only the power of thoſe governors, but alſo the relation between thoſe ſubjects, ſhould be clearly aſcertained. And as to the relation between the Britiſh and the American ſubjects, it appears to me to be this, viz. That Great Britain and America are one and the ſame imperial ſtate, conſiſting of many diſtinct national ſtates: and, when we ſpeak of the Britiſh and the American ſubjects as national ſubjects, then, as they are the ſubjects of diſtinct national ſtates, they are therefore, as national ſubjects, aliens and foreigners to each other: but, when we ſpeak of the Britiſh and the American ſubjects as imperial ſubjects, then, as they are the ſubjects of the ſame imperial ſtate, they are therefore, as imperial ſubjects, fellow-ſubjects and fellow-citizens. And as to the power of this imperial government, either with reſpect to the government of the national ſubjects in America, or, with reſpect to the government of the imperial ſubjects both in Great Britain and America. The power of this imperial government, is,

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I think, an internal power, with reſpect to the government of the imperial ſubjects, both in Great Britain and America, and the general government of the whole empire, and, an external power, with reſpect to the government of the national ſubjects in America, and the internal government of any particular nation in the empire. This power is, I think, an internal power, when it is exerciſed in the general government of the whole, and, an external power, when it is exerciſed in the particular government of the integral parts of the whole. And therefore, when the imperial governors give laws to the imperial ſubjects both in Great Britain and America; then, they only give laws to their fellow-ſubjects and fellow-citizens, and, by only exerciſing an internal power over thoſe imperial ſubjects, they then place the whole empire in a ſtate of perfect civil liberty: but, when the imperial governors give laws to the national ſubjects of any particular nation in America, then, they give laws to aliens and foreigners, and, by exerciſing an external power over thoſe national ſubjects, they then place that nation in a ſtate of ſlavery. So that, by theſe diſtinctions, the American ſubjects, as national ſubjects, are in a ſtate of ſlavery, and, as imperial ſubjects, they are in a ſtate of perfect civil liberty. And, allowing that the conſtitution has expreſsly given to the imperial governors a power of interfering in the internal government of America, and that it has thereby enſlaved the Americans by ſubjecting them to an extraneous power, then, though it is certain that *the power* may exiſt, yet, as ſuch a power would enſlave our fellow creatures, it is equally certain that *a right* to that power cannot poſſibly exiſt, and nothing could be more ridiculous than to ſet up a claim to a right which can have *no exiſtence*, as that would only be claiming a non-entity.

As to the repreſentation of the Britiſh and the American ſubjects, as national ſubjects, in their reſpective national governments. By the Britiſh conſtitution of government, the privilege of chooſing repreſentatives in the legiſlative branch

is confined to particular perſons; but after they are choſen; as every man in the kingdom has a right to petition theſe repreſentatives, and as theſe repreſentatives are alſo in duty bound to regard thoſe petitions, how can it be reaſonably ſaid of any man in this kingdom, that he is not repreſented in parliament? It is true, the non-electors may not have the ſame degree of influence over the repreſentatives, as the electors, neither have all the electors an equal degree of influence, but that inequality of influence does not deſtroy their repreſentation, and therefore I think that every man in this kingdom is repreſented in the houſe of commons; and, that the king, the lords, and the commons, being the joint national governors, are therefore the joint repreſentatives of the Britiſh nation. And the ſame may be ſaid of the national repreſentation of America. Whatever defects might be pointed out in the conſtitutional mode of chooſing the national governors of America, it may ſtill be ſaid, That in every province in America, the governor, the council, and the aſſembly, being the national governors, are therefore the repreſentatives of their reſpective provinces or nations. Thus, I think, both the Britiſh and the American ſubjects, as national ſubjects, are clearly and diſtinctly repreſented in their reſpective national governments. And as to the joint repreſentation of both the Britiſh and the American ſubjects, as imperial ſubjects, in their imperial government. When the Americans firſt ſettled in America under charters, notwithſtanding the neglect of the firſt framers of this ſyſtem of government, in not diſtinguiſhing when the parliament act as a national government, and when they act as an imperial government, and thereby confounding all diſtinctions between the particular government of this nation, and the general government of the whole empire; and of conſequence alſo involving thoſe diſtinctions by which you might clearly diſcriminate between a national and an imperial repreſentation; and alſo the impropriety of placing a king at the head of an empire, and calling a king an imperial governor, and there-

by confounding all diſtinctions between the title of a king and the title of an emperor; yet, notwithſtanding ſo great a neglect and ſo great an impropriety, this is, I think, an indiſputable fact, viz. That, by the mutual conſent of all the parties concerned, the king, the lords, and the commons, were then conſtituted and appointed to be the imperial governors, and of conſequence to be the repreſentatives of the whole empire; and therefore, the Americans then choſe, the king, the lords, and the commons, to be their repreſentatives in this imperial government, ſo that the Americans always have been, and are at this very time, as really and as abſolutely repreſented in this imperial government, as any man in Great Britain, and by repreſentatives of their own chooſing. And, in like manner, were this ſyſtem for a general imperial government to be adopted, the Americans would then alſo continue to be thus repreſented in that general imperial government.

And as to the probability of extending an empire in any degree adequate to the title of a general empire; the preſent mode of colonizing nations (even allowing it to be conſiſtent with the natural rights of men) is certainly the very worſt method in the world, for preſerving and extending an empire; as the great difficulties of attending to the particular government of thoſe colonies, very ſoon clog and burthen an empire, and render her incapable of further extenſion, without ſinking the whole empire under the great load of government. In private life, when a man's eſtate is too large to be managed by his domeſtics, he divides it into farms; making the tenants accountable to him, only for particular ſums.—An empire that is too large to be managed by her own immediate ſervants, would find the ſame conveniency, in dividing it into tributary ſtates; allowing every ſtate the full enjoyment of their own internal government and policy, and making each ſtate accountable, only for their particular tribute-money. On this mode of government, that nation which is the ſeat of imperial government would receive *every real advantage*,

vantage, that can poſſibly be had from foreign dominions, and *every real dignity*, that it is poſſible for one nation to confer on another; and the governors of the imperial ſtate, being freed from the laborious and irkſome taſk, of minutely extending their care to the particular government of each national or legal ſtate; they would then be better enabled to preſerve, and more at liberty to take every opportunity of extending the empire: and, as it would certainly be not only ſafe and advantageous, but alſo honourable for any nation to make a part of ſo grand an empire, who can ſay to what degree the empire might be extended? Not that I have a wiſh, that either this, or any general empire, ſhould ever be extended one ſtep further than the real advantages of uniting with that empire are alſo extended—not that I have a wiſh, that either this, or any general imperial government, ſhould ever be eſtabliſhed in Great Britain on any other principle than that of the imperial governors ſpreading, to the utmoſt of their power, chriſtianity, liberty, and happineſs, in every quarter of the globe, and that the imperial governors ſhould be bound to the moſt ſtrict obſervance of this fundamental principle, viz. That the empire ſhall not be extended one ſtep further than the bleſſings of chriſtianity and civil liberty are alſo extended—not that I have a wiſh, that either this, or any *general empire*, ſhould ever be extended one ſtep further than is conſiſtent with the *general good* of ſociety; ſo far from it, I ſincerely wiſh that every empire and every power upon earth may be always circumſcribed within the bounds of its utility; and keeping within thoſe bounds, perhaps it may not be an idle vanity, but a real duty, to wiſh for the extenſion of dominion; nor does it appear to me to be a thing at all impoſſible, either on this, or ſome ſuch mode of government, and on theſe principles, not only to recover this empire, but to eſtabliſh an empire *as extenſive, more permanent, of more dignity and grandeur, and of more real advantage to ſociety*, than any empire that has ever yet been eſtabliſhed in the world.

I SHALL therefore venture to ſubmit theſe thoughts to the

inſpection and conſideration of a diſcerning public; and as I can ſafely declare, that they are delivered free from perſonal or factious influence, I hope the candour and generoſity of the public will excuſe my defects; and if theſe outlines for a general government of nations, will in any degree contribute to the general happineſs of nations, they will then anſwer every end intended, or wiſhed for, by the writer of this paper.

ON

ON THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT.

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IT is a principle inherent in the very nature of government, that in every government there are three distinct sorts of power, viz. The power of *making* laws, the power of *executing* laws, and the power of afterwards *judging*, in particular cases, whether those laws have, or have not, been properly made, and properly executed: now, by this last power of *judging*, in particular cases, I mean a power to relieve an individual, when, in a particular case, he is unjustly oppressed by a general law; which is a power indispensably necessary in all human governments, to guard the subjects against the errors and imperfections of all human governors: these are the three powers of government, and it is in a proper or improper distribution of these three powers, that all good or bad government consists. For, when those separate powers are given to separate persons, then those separate persons may mutually guard against each other's errors, both in the making, and in the executing of all laws; but, when those separate powers are given to the same person or persons, then

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this mutual guard is wanting, and the ſubjects are expoſed to all the errors and imperfections of their governors, without any guard at all: and therefore, whenever theſe diſtinct powers are united in the ſame perſon or perſons, it is a defect in the form of government, for then they cannot be a guard on each other's conduct, either in the making, or in the executing of laws; but, whenever they are perſonally ſeparated, it is the moſt perfect form of government, that human wiſdom has ever yet been able to contrive. It is true, in many ſtates, the government is ſo formed as to render a perſonal ſeparation of the powers of government an abſolute impoſſibility. For inſtance, in a ſtate where a monarchal form of government is eſtabliſhed, it is impoſſible to make a perſonal ſeparation of the powers of government: for, in ſuch a ſtate, as there is only one perſon who is inveſted with a power of governing, it is a direct conſequence, that theſe three powers of government muſt be unavoidably united in that one perſon; which is certainly expoſing the ſubjects of a monarchal government, to all the errors and imperfections of their monarch, without having eſtabliſhed any other delegated governor, or, any other delegated ſenator, to guard thoſe ſubjects againſt the ill conſequences of thoſe errors and imperfections; and which does not therefore preſent to us a very extraordinary diſplay of human wiſdom in forming a monarchal government. But, the conſtitution which has formed the Britiſh government, and which, in this part, ſeems almoſt more than human wiſdom, has plainly ſeparated theſe three powers, by giving them to ſeparate perſons: for it has given, to the houſe of commons, the power of making laws; to the king, the power of executing laws; and to the houſe of lords, the power of afterwards judging in particular caſes, whether thoſe laws have, or have not, been properly made and properly executed. And thus, this conſtitution of government having perſonally ſeparated theſe three powers of government, and having thus ſubjected our delegated ſenators to the judgment of their fellow-ſenators, it has

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thereby left the Britiſh ſubjects much leſs expoſed to the errors and imperfections of their delegated ſenators and governors, than the ſubjects of any other ſtate in the world. Indeed, beſides this diſtribution of the three powers of government to the three branches of parliament, the conſtitution has alſo given, to the king, and to the houſe of lords, a negative in the making of all ſtatute laws, and for theſe plain reaſons; if the executive power did not aſſent to the making of a law, and thereby declare that he will execute it, the law might be made in vain, as it might never be executed; nor without that aſſent, could the ſubject poſſibly know, whether he did, or did not, intend to execute it; and therefore, the executive power muſt and ought to join in every act of legiſlation. And, in like manner, if the power that has a right of judging, in particular caſes, whether laws have, or have not, been properly made, and properly executed, did not aſſent to the making of a law, and thereby declare that the law ought to be both made and executed, the law might then be made in vain; as it then might happen, that the ſubject who offends againſt that law, might be tried for that offence, by a court that would condemn the law, and not the man for breaking it: this power muſt therefore aſſent to every law, before the ſubject can tell, that that is the law by which he is to be judged; and therefore, this power alſo muſt and ought to join in every act of legiſlation: for, after aſſenting to a law, they muſt judge by that law, nor can they releaſe an offender from the force of it, but by the exerciſe of that diſcretionary power, which is the natural and inherent right of that power.

Thus, though it be unavoidably neceſſary, that the three powers of government ſhould unite in the making of all ſtatute laws, yet it is impoſſible that they ſhould be perſonally united, without taking from each power the opportunity of judging of the conduct of the other powers, as diſtinct and ſeparate agents: for, if the ſeparate powers of government are not given to ſeparate perſons, then, there are no ſeparate perſons

ſons to judge, whether laws are, or are not, properly made; nor afterwards, whether thoſe laws have, or have not, been properly executed: as ſeparate powers of judging, when lodged in the ſame man, become thereby in effect the ſame power, unleſs you can ſeparate a man from himſelf: and when ſeparate powers of judging are thus perſonally united, as it is then impoſſible for thoſe powers to be the mutual judges of each other's conduct, conſequently each power becomes its own judge; a privilege utterly ſubverſive of all law and all government.

MAN, in his original ſtate of nature, and unconnected by ſociety, has certainly a right to be his own judge; but it is impoſſible for him to carry this privilege with him into ſociety; for, other men having the ſame natural right, they alſo might chooſe to do the ſame; and when men are united in the ſame ſociety, ſhould every man be determined to continue the exerciſe of this original right, then, inſtead of finding themſelves in a well-governed ſociety, they would certainly find themſelves ſtill in their former ungoverned ſtate of nature. Men therefore ought, when they engage in ſociety, to give up the exerciſe of their original privilege of ſelf-judgment, and to ſubmit themſelves to the judgment of other men, in every thing, as far as it relates to the ſociety in general, or to any particular member of that ſociety; and it is this ſingle circumſtance, of a man giving up the right of being his own judge, and ſubmitting himſelf to the judgment of other men, which conſtitutes the difference between men in a ſtate of nature, without any delegated government at all, and men in a well-governed ſtate of ſociety. It is, I ſay, this ſingle circumſtance, of giving up the privilege of ſelf-judgment, and ſubmitting to the judgment of other men, which lays the foundation of all human government, and is the firſt and great bond of all human ſocieties.

Now, allowing it to be impoſſible, in a well-governed ſociety, for a man to be his own judge; this maxim will certainly hold good, in reſpect to thoſe who *govern*, as well as in reſpect

reſpect to thoſe who are *governed* (unleſs thoſe who govern can juſtly plead an exemption from ſelf-partiality, and the common frailties of human nature.) And agreeably to this very maxim (that our governors ſhould not be their own judges) the conſtitution has ſeparated the powers of government, in the form of the Britiſh government, and has given theſe three diſtinct powers to diſtinct perſons; for, it has given, to the houſe of commons, the legiſlative; to the king, the executive; and to the houſe of lords, the judiciary power of government; and certainly with this very intention; that theſe three diſtinct powers, being lodged in diſtinct perſons, they might thereby become diſtinct and ſeparate agents, not only in the making and executing of all ſtatute laws or laws impoſed on the ſubjects, but alſo in the making and executing of all parliamentary orders and regulations reſpecting the public national buſineſs, many of which are laws impoſed on the ſervants of government; and that by being diſtinct and ſeparate agents both with reſpect to the government of the ſubjects and the ſervants, they might then, *in all caſes whatſoever*, be the mutual judges of each others conduct; and thus, the conſtitution has ſubjected, even the governors themſelves, to that firſt and great law of all ſocieties, viz. *That no man ſhall be his own judge.*

THIS appears to me to be the language of the conſtitution; but does the practice of government ſpeak the ſame language? I wiſh I could ſay, that it did. But to compare what they ſay:—The conſtitution has given the powers of government to ſeparate perſons: the practice of government has given them to the ſame perſons. The conſtitution, by a perſonal ſeparation of the powers of government, has made the governors ſubject to the will of other men: the practice of government, by a perſonal union of thoſe powers, has made the governors ſubject to their own will. That is, the conſtitution has made the governors ſubject to the great law of all ſocieties, viz. The judgment of other men: but the practice of government has broken down that great law, and made the governors their own judges; in direct contradiction to the

great law of all ſocieties, viz. That no man ſhall be his own judge. This is, I think, the real language of them both. And this is the certain conſequence of a perſonal union of the powers of government: for in the caſe of an officer of ſtate having a ſeat in parliament; as a member of parliament he has a right to judge, not only of all laws that are made by the joint aſſent of the three powers of government: but alſo of all *orders and regulations*, reſpecting the public national buſineſs, that are made by that houſe where he has a ſeat; which, to an officer of ſtate, may be called a *law*, and which he ought to execute: now, in this latter caſe, the ſubject has no ſecurity, that this officer of ſtate will ever conſent to make any orders or regulations, but juſt ſuch as will beſt ſuit his own inclinations in the execution, which is certainly being his own law-giver, and his own judge; or, ſhould the will of parliament prevail againſt his conſent, yet even then, if he chooſes to neglect the execution, as a member of parliament, he ſtill has a right to judge, whether that will has, or has not, been properly executed: and therefore, an officer of ſtate that has a ſeat in parliament, is thereby made, not only his own law-giver, but afterwards, in the execution of thoſe very laws, he is alſo made his own judge, of his own conduct, as an officer of ſtate.—At an aſſize, held for a county, where a man is brought to be tried for an offence, we ſhould think it very odd, if the culprit were impannelled on either jury, to try his own cauſe: were he on the grand jury, he would then be his own judge, whether he ought, or ought not, to be tried for the offence: and were he on the petit jury, he would then be his own judge, whether he was, or was not, guilty of that offence. Now this appears to be a very ſtrange kind of an human tribunal; and yet, this ſtrange appearance muſt be entirely owing to our not being accuſtomed to this kind of proceeding at a county aſſize; it being the ſame thing, when an officer of ſtate has a ſeat in parliament; which, by being accuſtomed to the idea, does not appear ſo very ſtrange, though in reality theſe two caſes are the ſame: For, ſhould an officer of ſtate be

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accuſed of a neglect of his official duty; if he has a ſeat in the lower houſe, he is impannelled on the grand jury, to be his own judge, whether he ought, or ought not, to be tried for the neglect: and if he has a ſeat in the upper houſe, he is impannelled on the petit jury, to be his own judge, whether he is, or is not, guilty of that neglect. Theſe two caſes are nearly ſimilar, and are equally repugnant to every principle of good government, and in both caſes there is this plain error; that when a man is impannelled on a jury to try his own cauſe, if he is afterwards ſtruck off the jury, becauſe he has no right to be his own judge, it is a defect in the form of government, firſt to impannel a man on a jury to be a judge, and then to ſtrike him off that jury, becauſe he has no right to judge; and, if he is continued on the jury, it is a direct violation of the great law of all ſocieties, viz. That no man ſhall be his own judge. The two caſes are ſo nearly ſimilar, I can only perceive this difference, that in the caſe of the petty offender, it is only a defect in the ſmaller ſprings in the machine of government; but in the caſe of the great offender, it is a defect in the firſt, the main ſpring of government, which may deſtroy the whole machine. But ſhould any one ſtill think, that allowing an officer of ſtate to be his own law-giver, and his own judge, is not a defect in this machine of government, I only deſire him to look at the preſent ſituation of this government, and of this nation, and will he not then ſee, a diſtracted ſenate, a divided nation, and a diſſatisfied people? Now, allowing that theſe are facts, it then could not well be denied but that the machine is defective ſomewhere or other, and I believe the defect to be this, viz. The conſtitution has perſonally ſeparated theſe three powers of government, the legiſlative, the executive, and the judiciary powers; but in direct oppoſition, not only to this form of government, but alſo to the very ſpirit of the conſtitution, the long eſtabliſhed practice of allowing the king's ſervants the privilege of ſitting in parliament has perſonally united the executive, with both the judiciary, and the legiſlative powers, that is, Though this practice, not having given the

king a ſeat in either houſe of parliament, cannot be ſaid to have thereby perſonally united the executive with both the judiciary and the legiſlative powers; yet, notwithſtanding that circumſtance, perhaps on further conſideration it will appear, that the practice has really and perſonally united thoſe three powers of government. For, as to the union of the executive and the legiſlative powers, by allowing the king's ſervants the privilege of ſitting in the legiſlative branch of government, if the king has any power over thoſe ſervants, and ever exerciſes that power in an act of legiſlation, then, in that caſe, the executive and the legiſlative powers of government are thereby certainly united in effect, and not only united in effect, but, as what a ſervant does by the command of his maſter is often ſaid to be done by the maſter himſelf; ſo, in this caſe, allowing the ſame latitude of expreſſion, this practice may alſo be ſaid to have perſonally united thoſe two powers of government. Indeed, were we to allow it to be a fact, that the king has really a power over his ſervants, and that he ever exerciſes that power over thoſe ſervants in their legiſlative capacity, then that would be directly allowing, that the king has not only a power, but that he does really exerciſe that power in acts of legiſlation, and, as plain as words could ſpeak it, would be allowing, that the legiſlative and the executive powers of government, are really and perſonally united in the king. And, as to the union of the executive and the judiciary powers, the ſame that has here been ſaid of the legiſlative, may alſo be ſaid of the judiciary power of government; which, if it be true, would certainly prove, that this practice of allowing the king's ſervants the privilege of ſitting in parliament has completely effected a real and unconſtitutional union of all the three powers of government in one perſon, viz. the king. But, this union of the three powers of government in the king, depends entirely on the miniſters and ſervants of the ſtate being under the abſolute command of the king, as without this command, theſe three powers of government, even by this practice, would not be perſonally united in the king, but would be perſonally united

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in the miniſters themſelves. For inſtance, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, inſtead of obeying the commands, uſurp a power of governing the Britiſh commons, then, by thus trampling on the dignity of that honourable houſe, and, by thus taking from that houſe the real, and only leaving them the appearance of the legiſlative power of governing, they do thereby in effect diſſolve the Britiſh commons and aſſume to themſelves the legiſlative power of governing this ſtate. And, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, inſtead of obeying the commands, uſurp a power of governing the Britiſh peerage, then, by thus trampling on the dignity of that right honourable houſe, and by thus taking from that houſe the real, and only leaving them the appearance of the judicairy power of governing, they do thereby in effect diſſolve the Britiſh peerage and aſſume to themſelves the judiciary power of governing this ſtate. And, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, inſtead of obeying the commands, uſurp a power of governing the king, then, by thus trampling on the dignity of their royal maſter, and by thus taking from the king the real, and only leaving him the appearance of the executive power of governing, they do thereby in effect dethrone the king and aſſume to themſelves the executive power of governing this ſtate. So that, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, uſurp a power of governing both houſes of parliament, and only obey the king, then, in that caſe, theſe three powers of government are thereby perſonally united in the king. And, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, uſurp a power not only of governing both houſes of parliament, but alſo of governing the king, then, in that caſe, theſe three powers of government are thereby perſonally united in the miniſters themſelves. And, the conſtitution has alſo appointed the king, the lords, and the commons, to be the delegated governors of this nation, that is, the people have appointed thoſe delegated governors; but in direct oppoſition to that appointment of the people, the long eſtabliſhed practice of government has formed the king's ſervants into

to a miniſterial faction, to over-rule thoſe delegated governors, and thereby to aſſume to themſelves the reins of government, which, as far as it prevails, is deſtroying the conſtitutional and regal government of this nation, conſiſting of a parliament appointed by the people, and ſubjecting the nation to the unconſtitutional and illegal government of that faction, conſiſting of ſervants appointed by the king, and whether that faction govern ill or well, in either caſe, the government by that faction, being unconſtitutional, is therefore *illegal government*. And, by thus uſurping the delegated power of governing, theſe ſervants have almoſt deſtroyed this national conſtitution which they ought to ſupport, and have greatly injured that very government which it is their duty not to govern but to ſerve, not to command but to obey, and of conſequence have thereby alſo as greatly injured that very people from whom they receive their bread. And, as long as the people ſuffer the king's ſervants, the ſervants of government, or, the ſervants of parliament, by any of which names theſe ſervants might be called; but by whatever name they are called, as long, I ſay, as the people ſuffer theſe ſervants to continue this practice of uniting in a faction to over-rule the legal and conſtitutional power of their governors in parliament, whether they uſurp the power of their legiſlative governors in the lower houſe—the power of their executive governor on the throne, or—the power of their judiciary governors in the upper houſe; in all thoſe caſes, whenever theſe ſervants uſurp the power of any of thoſe governors, then they uſurp the power of their legal and conſtitutional governors and maſters, and, in direct violation of every true principle of civil government, and the ſacred duty of obedience which every ſervant owes to his maſter; theſe ſervants do thereby aſſume the character of their own legiſlators, their own governors, and their own maſters. And, as this practice of ſervants thus flying in the face of their maſter is a direct breach of the laws both of God and man, and a direct oppoſition to all legal government, notwithſtanding the intentions of thoſe

ſervants

ſervants to promote the public good, and their allowed abilities to ſupport thoſe good intentions, which in many I believe to be unqueſtionable; ſtill there is too much reaſon to fear, that theſe ſervants, by thus deſtroying the legal government of the parliament, and ſubſtituting in its place, the illegal government of their own faction, are almoſt ſure to do more hurt to this nation, than they can poſſibly do good by their official ſervices. Nor can we reaſonably ſuppoſe that theſe ſervants, or theſe miniſters, will ever be ſuffered to exerciſe this illegal government without oppoſition; it is certainly much more reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that, as long as the miniſtry unite in a party to oppoſe and deſtroy the *legal* government of the parliament, ſo long will the minority unite in a party to oppoſe and deſtroy the *illegal* government of the miniſtry, which is expoſing this nation to a complication of evils from thoſe contending parties, and leaving the nation without any government at all, either legal or illegal, that is not clogged by an oppoſition.—It is theſe eſtabliſhed practices which have thus divided this government againſt itſelf, and not only the government, but in conſequence of this diviſion in the government, and the unavoidable influence which thoſe governors muſt have over their reſpective connexions in every part of this kingdom: theſe practices have alſo divided the whole nation againſt itſelf, and have thereby deprived this nation of one of the greateſt political bleſſings which can poſſibly happen either to this or any nation in the world, viz. *Unanimity in the ſupport of government.*—It is theſe eſtabliſhed practices which have expoſed this government to an enemy the moſt dangerous of all enemies, viz. faction: and vainly may you glory in the conqueſt of all your external enemies, if you ſtill leave unconquered this internal enemy, faction.—It is theſe eſtabliſhed practices which have expoſed this ſtate to a grievance the moſt fatal of all political grievances, *a miniſterial faction:* and vainly may you look for ſafety by ſubduing and ſuppreſſing all your external enemies, if you do

not

not at the ſame time effectually ſubdue and ſuppreſs every miniſterial faction that ſhall diſturb and diſtract the civil government of the ſtate, if you do not effectually ſubdue and ſuppreſs your moſt dangerous enemies, your internal enemies, *the enemies of government.*—It is theſe eſtabliſhed practices which occaſion the preſent defect in this machine of government, and it is this defect which is, I believe, the principal cauſe of your national diviſions, parliamentary contentions, and moſt of the evils which are ſo much complained of; and indeed, how can we reaſonably expect any thing but diviſions, ſtrife, and contention, from ſo deſtructive an innovation in this divine conſtitution of government. In the former paper I have cenſured our attachment to the conſtitution, and here I am cenſuring our want of attachment to the conſtitution, but that this may not be miſconſtrued into a contradiction, I here beg leave to remind the reader, that in the former paper I was ſpeaking of the *imperial* government, and here I am ſpeaking of the *national* government. As to this national government, though this practice of perſonally uniting theſe different powers, and the diſtinct characters of ſenators and ſervants, has greatly injured the conſtitution, and has thereby deprived the ſubjects of the good effects which might reaſonably be expected from a ſtrict obſervance of the real ſpirit of the conſtitution, yet, to ſpeak of the frame of this national government, I think it ſcarcely within the reach of unaſſiſted human abilities to have contrived ſuch a ſyſtem; but as to this imperial government, I ſhould think it a puzzling taſk for a very ingenious man to contrive a worſe. And yet, ſuch is the perverſeneſs of human nature, that we ſeem to labour as hard to deſtroy the beauties of the national, as to preſerve the deformities of the imperial government! Is there a meaſure which would *injure* the national conſtitution? It never wants friends to honour it with the pleaſing epithet of a *ſalutary* meaſure. Is there a meaſure which would *improve* the imperial conſtitution? It never wants enemies to ſtigmatize it with the opprobrious language of *a dangerous innovation.* And I ſhould not think it a very eaſy matter to determine,

whether

whether Great Britain has ſuffered more, by preſerving the deformities of the imperial, or by deſtroying the beauties of the national government.

THE diſtribution of the three powers of government, the executive, the judiciary, and the legiſlative powers, to theſe three branches of parliament, the king, the lords, and the commons, is certainly the moſt ſtriking feature in the Britiſh conſtitution of government, and it is, I believe, univerſally allowed, that the very eſſence of this conſtitution conſiſts in the equality of power which the conſtitution has given to thoſe different branches; any practice therefore which tends either to alter this diſtribution of power, or, to deſtroy this equality of power in thoſe different branches, which the conſtitution has really eſtabliſhed, and which is allowed to be the very eſſence of the conſtitution, muſt certainly be diſapproved of by every advocate for this conſtitution, and by every friend of this government. Now, the practice of ſuffering the ſervants of government, who are appointed by the king, to be at the ſame time members of both houſes of parliament, viz. the lords and the commons, has certainly a tendency not only to alter this diſtribution of power, but alſo to deſtroy this equality of power in thoſe different branches which the conſtitution has really eſtabliſhed: for, theſe perſons, being thus placed in the diſtinct characters of ſenators and ſervants; and it being the duty of every ſenator to regard the will of the people, though contrary to the will of the king, and to receive his inſtructions for the making of laws from the people, and not from the king; and it being alſo poſſible, that the will of the people, and the will of the king, may in ſome caſes be very widely different; therefore, though theſe perſons, in the character of ſenators, ought invariably to obſerve the will of the people, independent of the will of the king; yet, having received ſuch ſingular marks of royal favour, by their appointments as ſervants, it is probable that that circumſtance may ſometimes incline them, even in the making of laws, to regard the will of the king, in conſequence of the *pecuniary favours* which they have received in the cha-

racter of ſervants, rather than to regard the will of the people, in conſequence of the *honorary favours* which they have received in the character of ſenators. It is true, theſe perſons in the character of ſervants, might, in their conduct out of doors, invariably obſerve the will of the king, in the execution of laws; and, in the character of ſenators, might alſo, in their parliamentary conduct, as invariably obſerve the will of the people, in the making of laws; and then, theſe perſons would certainly be both dutiful ſervants and faithful ſenators, and your conſtitution would not ſuffer the leaſt degree of injury from theſe complicated characters. But, is this in fact the preſent practice of this government, or, is there a probability that it ever will be the practice? Is it not much more reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that theſe perſons, on the principle of ſelf-love, will generally conſider what conſequences their ſenatorial conduct may bring on themſelves in the character of ſervants, knowing, that if through fidelity to the people their line of ſenatorial conduct ſhould not be agreeable to the king, that he has it in his power to make them ſuffer for that fidelity in the character of ſervants? And, though the conſtitution has very properly given to the king an abſolute power and dominion over theſe perſons; yet, the conſtitution has certainly given that power to the king for the ſole purpoſe of commanding them, as ſervants, in the execution of laws, and not for the purpoſe of influencing them, as ſenators, in the making of laws. But, were we to ſuppoſe the king to be miſinformed reſpecting this part of the conſtitution, and to be thereby miſled to exerciſe this power over theſe perſons, not only for the purpoſe of commanding them, as ſervants, in the execution of laws, but alſo for the purpoſe of influencing them, as ſenators in the making of laws; and to oblige theſe perſons, either to ſubmit to that power in the character of ſenators, or to ſuffer for their non-compliance in the character of ſervants, then, ſuch a practice, though it would not give the king, as I ſaid before, a ſeat in either houſe of parliament, and therefore the practice would not thereby make a perſonal union of the powers of government, yet, by giving the king an influence

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in both thoſe houſes, it would thereby unite thoſe powers in effect, and, as far as that influence prevailed, ſo far it would alter the diſtribution of the three powers of government which the conſtitution has really made,—ſuch a practice, by giving an increaſed and unconſtitutional power to the king, and at the ſame time, by leſſening the conſtitutional power of the lords and the commons, would thereby deſtroy that equality of power in thoſe three branches of government which the conſtitution has really eſtabliſhed. Now, after mentioning an increaſed power of the king, it ſhould be obſerved, that the increaſed power here mentioned is the unconſtitutional power and influence of the king over theſe perſons in the character of ſenators, in which character I think it impoſſible for the king to have a right to the leaſt degree of either power or influence, and not the conſtitutional power and dominion of the king over theſe perſons in the character of ſervants, in which character I think it equally impoſſible for the power and dominion of the king to be either too great or too abſolute. But, ſuch are the deſtructive tendencies of this practice, that it has not only an evident tendency to *increaſe* the power of the king over theſe perſons, as ſenators, in the making of laws, in which caſe the king can have no right to any power at all, but it has alſo an evident tendency to *decreaſe* the power of the king over theſe perſons, as ſervants, in the execution of laws, in which caſe it is perhaps impoſſible for the power of the king to be too great. For, theſe perſons, having the authority and dignity of ſenators, though they may in ſome degree ſubmit to that power which ought only to be exerciſed over ſervants, yet, we cannot reaſonably ſuppoſe that gentlemen who have the authority and dignity of ſenators will always ſubmit to ſuch an abſolute power and dominion as the king ought to have over every ſervant of government, and which ſubmiſſion might be more reaſonably expected from gentlemen who have not that authority and dignity, and, ſhould the ſenatorial authority and dignity of theſe perſons ever incline them, even in the ſmalleſt degree, to an undutiful reſiſtance of the king's commands, when thoſe commands are

impoſed on them in the character of ſervants, then, ſuch an undutiful reſiſtance in theſe ſervants would certainly *decreaſe* the conſtitutional power of the king in the execution of laws. So that, by this practice of allowing the king's ſervants the privilege of ſitting in parliament, the evil genius of Great Britain has certainly deviſed a method, not only to weaken the conſtitutional power of the parliament in the making of laws, but alſo to weaken the conſtitutional power of the king in the execution of thoſe laws; and which muſt therefore weaken every ſpring, clog every wheel, and greatly injure the whole machine of this government. Nor do I ſee which way Great Britain can reaſonably expect to avoid the evils which may attend this practice, without recurring to a caſe which I mentioned before only as a poſſible caſe, and ſtating that caſe as a reality, by ſaying, that theſe perſons, in the character of ſervants, will in fact, in their conduct out of doors, invariably obſerve the will of the king, without the leaſt conſideration of their own authority and dignity as ſenators, and, in the character of ſenators, will alſo in fact, in their parliamentary conduct, as invariably obſerve the will of the people, without the leaſt conſideration of their own intereſt as ſervants, or even the natural bias of ſelf-love, and then every evil here mentioned immediately vaniſhes, not leaving thoſe evils the leaſt exiſtence except in the imagination. But, how far this caſe, under theſe circumſtances, will admit of being ſtated in this poſitive manner, and how far theſe perſons do in fact realize the caſe at this very time, by riſing ſuperior to the common frailties of humanity, are queſtions which I leave to every one to judge of and determine for himſelf. This practice, therefore, of uniting the diſtinct characters of a ſenator and a ſervant in the ſame perſon, having an evident tendency to alter the diſtribution of theſe three powers of government, and to deſtroy the equality of power in theſe three branches of parliament, which the conſtitution has really eſtabliſhed, and which is allowed to be the very eſſence of the conſtitution, muſt certainly, on theſe principles, be diſapproved of

by

by every advocate for this conſtitution, and by every friend of this government.

As to the effects of precluding the king's ſervants from ſitting in parliament, and particularly with reſpect to the effect that ſuch a meaſure might have had in the late diſpute with America: inſtead of the people ſuffering the king's ſervants to continue in parliament, and thereby putting it in the power of thoſe ſervants to form themſelves into a miniſterial faction to over-rule our legal and conſtitutional governors in parliament, I ſay, inſtead of continuing this dangerous and deſtructive practice, had the people precluded the king's ſervants from their ſeats in parliament in 1776, when that meaſure was firſt propoſed to the people for their conſideration, or, had thoſe ſervants been precluded from their ſeats in parliament at the time of ſome of the ſubſequent publications of this paper, when that meaſure was repeatedly offered to the people for their conſideration, it is probable that ſuch a meaſure would have contributed very much to ſave this empire, this once glorious empire, from falling to pieces in the manner that we have ſeen it fall to pieces ſince the year ſeventy-ſix: For, were the king's ſervants to be precluded from their ſeats in parliament, it would then be impoſſible for thoſe ſervants to form themſelves into a miniſterial faction in either houſe of parliament, and, were there no ſuch thing as a miniſterial faction in either houſe of parliament, there could be no ſuch a thing as an anti-miniſterial faction, or, a party which is commonly called the minority, in either houſe of parliament, and you would of conſequence avoid the diviſions, ſtrife, and contentions, ariſing from thoſe contending parties, and which contentions are ſure to diſtract the civil government of this ſtate as long as the people ſuffer the king's ſervants to continue in parliament, and thereby ſuffer thoſe parties to exiſt; and therefore, with reſpect to this empire, as far as the contentions amongſt ourſelves have contributed to the loſs of America, and I think that we may fairly aſcribe the loſs of America much more to the violent contentions amongſt ourſelves, and particularly to the violent con-

tentions

tentions in parliament ſince the year ſeventy-ſix, then we can aſcribe that loſs to the conquering ſword of an enemy, I ſay, as far as the contentions amongſt ourſelves, and particularly the contentions in parliament, have contributed to the loſs of America, ſo far this circumſtance of the people having thus neglected to preclude the king's ſervants from their ſeats in parliament has been the real cauſe of loſing the thirteen revolted colonies——ſo far this circumſtance of the people having thus ſuffered the king's ſervants to continne in parliament to diſturb and diſtract the great council of the empire has been the real cauſe of deſtroying the moſt glorious empire in the world. And, in like manner, with reſpect to this nation, were the king's ſervants to be continued in parliament to diſturb and diſtract the great council of the nation, as the ſame cauſes will for ever produce the ſame effects, May we not ſay the ſame of this nation that we have ſaid of the empire, and that you would thereby alſo deſtroy this glorious nation, this ſtill moſt glorious nation in the world?

In the former part of this paper, I have ſaid, that the practice of allowing the king's ſervants the privilege of ſitting in parliament has perſonally united the executive, with both the judiciary, and the legiſlative powers of government, that by this practice, thoſe three powers of government, in ſome caſes, are perſonally united in the king, and that, in other caſes, thoſe three powers of government are perſonally united in the ſervants or miniſters themſelves. Now, allowing that this is a true ſtate of the caſe, we ought next to conſider *the right* that any king, or any miniſter, can poſſibly have to ſuch a perſonal union of thoſe powers. And, as to the union of theſe three powers of government, viz. the legiſlative, the executive, and the judiciary powers, I ſay, as to the union of theſe three powers of government in the making and executing all laws whether they be ſtatute laws impoſed on the ſubjects, or parliamentary orders and regulations, reſpecting the public national buſineſs, many of which are laws impoſed on the ſervants of government, in either caſe, though by the Britiſh conſtitution of government,

and

and in every well-conſtituted government, it is neceſſary that the three powers ſhould unite in the making of all ſtatute laws, yet, it is certainly as neceſſary, that they ſhould be perſonally ſeparated (as I ſaid before) not only in the making and executing of all ſtatute laws, but alſo in the making and executing of all parliamentary orders and regulations reſpecting the public national buſineſs; in order, that theſe ſeparate perſons, being diſtinct and ſeparate agents both with reſpect to the government of the ſubjects and the ſervants, may thereby, *in all caſes whatſoever*, mutually guard againſt each other's error's. And as the intention of this perſonal ſeparation is certainly to guard againſt errors, no man can juſtly claim a right to be exempt from this guard, without firſt proving himſelf free from the poſſibility of erring. And where are we to look for ſuch a character? We all know, that there is but one Being in the univerſe who can juſtly claim that title; and it is for that very reaſon, that HE has a right to make laws, and to execute laws; and who can afterwards preſume to ſay, that they have not, *in all caſes whatſoever*, been properly made and properly executed? For HE, and HE alone, has certainly a right, to determine that alſo: and this right which includes in it an union of the powers of government in the ſame perſon, and conſequently, a declaration that there is no neceſſity for thoſe powers mutually guarding againſt each other's errors, This right, I ſay, is certainly founded on the unerring perfection of the Deity: were it poſſible for him to err, he could not juſtly claim this right; for then, as with other beings who are liable to err, a guard would be neceſſary to prevent the errors; and therefore (conſiſtent with good government) it is impoſſible to unite the powers of government in any perſon that is not unerringly perfect. The perſonal union of the powers of government is A DIVINE PREROGATIVE; and let not man vainly arrogate to himſelf the prerogative of God! For though we are ordered to *imitate*, let us not preſume to *emulate* his perfections. Indeed, if we ſuppoſe a man to arrogate to himſelf a perſonal union of the powers of government

vernment *without knowing it to be a divine prerogative*, in that caſe, I can ſee nothi ng to diſturb, either the mind or countenance of ſuch a man: but, if we ſuppoſe a perſon thoroughly conſcious of the character he has aſſumed, in that caſe, it would require more confidence than one would wiſh to ſee in any man, *to aſſume this divine prerogative without a bluſh*

Now, ſhould it be ſaid, If the officers of ſtate and the officers in all the different branches of the executive power, were not allowed to ſit in parliament; then the parliament could never get the neceſſary information, in all points of buſineſs, to enable them to judge properly: 'tis true, this may be *ſaid*, but the *fact* appears to me to be exactly contrary; and that government would get better information from their ſervants, when at the bar of either houſe, than when in the houſe: for, when a man is at the bar of either houſe, and only allowed to give direct anſwers to ſuch queſtions as the houſe thinks proper to aſk him; by that method the houſe would certainly get better information from that man, both as to real facts, and his reaſoning on thoſe facts, than if he were in the houſe, with a right to ſpeak, and, if he chooſes it, to bury both facts and reaſons in a torrent of declamation; for declamation is the very grave of reaſon. Or, ſhould it be ſaid, if the legiſlative and executive powers of government were really and perſonally ſeparated, that then the legiſlative power, for want of that active principle, viz. ſelf-intereſt, which muſt always attend the executive, and which would be *loſt* to the legiſlative by this ſeparation; that in this caſe, the legiſlative power for want of this enlivening principle, would certainly ſink into a ſupine ſtate of total inactivity: ſo that, what would be a remedy for one evil, would certainly produce a much greater; for when legiſlation ſleeps, there is an *end* of all government:—But ſtill, what is all this, but to ſay, that there are not as many men to be found in this kingdom, as are neceſſary to move the firſt ſpring of government, on principles of virtue, honour, and a real regard to the welfare of mankind: which I do not believe. But ſuppoſe that a ſufficient number of ſenators could not be found,

who

who would ſerve the public, merely on a principle of virtue, independent of all preſent rewards; in that caſe, though, by this ſyſtem, the ſenators would receive no *pecuniary* rewards, yet, it does not follow, that they are to have no *honorary* rewards. For, ſhould it be his majeſty's pleaſure, to add the blue ribband to the honours of a peerage, and to inſtitute a new order of knighthood, particularly for the commons; then, each ſenator would be rewarded with the title of honourable, a ribband, and a ſtar. Or, ſhould the gentlemen of the lower houſe not chooſe to hold the title of a knight on the uncertain terms of pleaſing a county, or a borough, and at the pleaſure of capricious conſtituents, yet even then, an orange ribband, and a ſtar, might be annexed to every ſeat in the lower houſe without the title; and as the wearing of them would be merely a privilege, and not an obligation, every gentleman would be left entirely at his own option, when he would, and when he would not, wear that ribband and ſtar. And as to thoſe gentlemen who would not wear them at all, from a doubt of their not having that honour continued to them for life, it cannot be fairly ſaid, that the privilege, though uſeleſs, would do them any harm; and ſo far would it be from doing any harm to the ſtate, that, in theſe caſes, the probable effects of ſuch a privilege ſeem rather favourable to the ſtate; as thoſe gentlemen, in order to remove their doubts, might perhaps be induced to require of their conſtituents ſuch aſſurances as they might think a ſufficient teſt of their ſteadily continuing attached to their intereſt at all future elections, which, at the ſame time, would alſo give thoſe conſtituents a favourable opportunity to require of their repreſentatives ſuch aſſurances as they might think a ſufficient teſt of their political ſentiments and principles being conformable to their own, and of their ſteadily adhering to thoſe ſentiments and principles; and therefore, as I ſaid before, the effects of ſuch a privilege ſeem rather favourable to the ſtate, as ſuch mutual aſſurances might be a means of more firmly uniting the hearts and minds of the repreſentatives and their conſtituents throughout the whole kingdom. And, if we look ſtill

further into the probable effects and tendencies of thoſe mutual aſſurances, perhaps it may appear, that ſuch profeſſions on the part of the conſtituents, by expreſsly binding thoſe conſtituents in a ſteady attachment to all faithful repreſentatives, might thereby prevent ſuch frequent contentions for ſeats in the lower houſe, which muſt always, in ſome degree, diſturb the general quiet and peace of the ſtate. And, that ſuch profeſſions on the part of your repreſentatives in the houſe of commons, by expreſsly binding thoſe repreſentatives in a ſteady adherence to the ſentiments and principles of their reſpective conſtituents, might thereby more effectually aſſimilate that honourable houſe to the minds of the people, a circumſtance which by this conſtitution of government is eſſentially neceſſary to the civil liberty of the ſtate. So that the reader need not leave this ſubject with no other impreſſion on his mind, except the ſlimſy idea of a ribband. And he may alſo add theſe further conſiderations, viz. that the privilege of wearing this ribband would not only increaſe the dignity of the parliament; but, the parliament being dependent on the people for the continuance of that dignity, that circumſtance would alſo increaſe the power of the people. And, as neither the dignity of the parliament, nor the power of the people, could perhaps be increaſed to too great a degree for the purpoſes of civil government; therefore, this meaſure cannot, on that principle, be fairly condemned as an uſeleſs meaſure, having an evident tendency to the increaſe of both. Nor would ſuch inſtitutions as theſe in the leaſt degree injure this government, by rendering the two houſes of parliament dependent on the crown, were theſe dignities to be annexed to the ſeats in parliament: ſo that each ſenator ſhall be entitled to theſe dignities, in conſequence of his ſeat, and when he reſigns his ſeat, he ſhall alſo reſign the dignities. But it is high time to leave theſe dignities and ribbands, and to return to the ſubject of not ſuffering the powers of government to be perſonally united, by allowing the officers of ſtate, and the officers in all the different branches of the executive power, the privilege of ſitting in parliament. And, ſuppoſe the

worſt,

worſt, ſuppoſe it to be true, that, were they not allowed that privilege, the legiſlative power of government would not move either on principles of virtue or honour: now, as to this, or any other bad conſequences, that might be ſuppoſed to attend this alteration, I beg leave to give this general anſwer; that, if experience ſhould prove that the perſonal, perhaps I might ſay, dreadful ſeparation of the powers of government, did really injure the government, in any point of view; ſtill it is plain, the government would always have it in their power, to repair the injury, by a perſonal, and may I ſay, a comfortable re-union of thoſe powers, whenever experience had proved the neceſſity. And ſhould experience prove it really neceſſary, then all reaſoning, and eſpecially my poor reaſoning on this ſubject, muſt immediately give place to neceſſity, as I know nothing that neceſſity will not juſtify.

As to making the experiment, it cannot be a meaſure very dangerous to a ſtate, when, for only ſuppoſed evils the government have always a real and certain remedy in their own power. And ſhould this plan prove practicable, no one can doubt of the good conſequences that might attend a meaſure, which would certainly remove from the ſenate, all violent contentions that ariſe from purſuing a wrong object, for it would then leave only one *poor bone* of contention, viz. THE GOOD OF THE PEOPLE. Or, ſhould it prove impracticable, ſtill it might be attended with this ſmall advantage; that the ſubjects would then ſee, and ought to be convinced, that this machine of government, as framed by the Britiſh conſtitution, is really ſo conſtructed, that it requires more than human ſtrength to move it; and that therefore they ought to be content with a machine on a more ſimple conſtruction, and ſuch an one as really moves by human ſprings.

AND, as to the particular objection that I have mentioned, The the legiſlative power of government will not move but by *indirect* means: common charity forbids us to have that opinion of mankind, and the well eſtabliſhed character of Britiſh generoſity, particularly forbids us to apply that opinion to the Britiſh nation; let us not then entertain a doubt, but

that, in this improved, in this enlightened nation, liberal ſentiments would ſo far prevail, that, were it tried, there would always be found in this kingdom, a ſufficient number of men, to move this firſt ſpring of government, not on the ſelfiſh principle of private emolument, but on the generous principle *of making government a bleſſing to ſociety.**

* MANY are the cauſes which may deſtroy a ſtate, and ſome of them perhaps unavoidable, but of all the cauſes of deſtroying a ſtate which might be avoided, I ſhould not think it an eaſy matter to point out a cauſe which beſpeaks a greater degree of political infatuation in a ſtate, than that of a people deliberately and wilfully deſtroying themſelves by ſuch a profuſion of their public treaſure as muſt certainly occaſion a neceſſity of impoſing an unneceſſary load of taxes on their own ſubjects. Now, in this ſtate, conſiſting as it was obſerved in the former paper, of the many diſtinct national ſtates collected into one and the ſame imperial ſtate, where we to ſuppoſe each national ſtate to be poſſeſſed of a national revenue ſufficient for the particular exigencies of thoſe reſpective nations, and the imperial ſtate to be alſo poſſeſſed of an imperial revenue ſufficient for the general exegencies of the whole empire; then, under ſuch circumſtances, I ſhould think ſuch an imperial ſociety of the nations would be not only a particular bleſſing to each nation, but alſo a general bleſſing to the whole empire. But the misfortune is, in this ſtate, the real fact is exactly the reverſe of this ſuppoſition. Theſe national ſtates are not each of them poſſeſſed of a national revenue ſufficient for the particular exigencies of thoſe reſpective nations, neither is this imperial ſtate poſſeſſed of an imperial revenue ſufficient for the general exigencies of the whole empire, and it has now been the eſtabliſhed practice of ages to have recourſe to the national revenue of the Britiſh ſtate to ſupply all thoſe deficiencies, and conſequently to oblige the Britiſh ſtate to impoſe taxes on the Britiſh ſubjects in order to raiſe thoſe ſupplies, and thereby to eaſe the taxes of all the other ſubjects in the empire, and this is what I mean by a political infatuation in a ſtate, and a people deliberately and wilfully deſtroying themſelves by a profuſion of their public treaſure. And, happy would it be for Great Britain, were the infatuation of the Britiſh ſtate to be confined to this object; happy would it be for Great Britain, were the wanton diſſipation of the Britiſh national treaſure to be confined within theſe bounds! but that is not the caſe. In Great Britain the people are ſo profuſe of their public treaſure, and ſeem ſo dotingly fond of impoſing taxes on the Britiſh ſubjects to ſupport that profuſion, that they are not content with only this mode of diſſipating their treaſure, and it is very certain and very well known, that this national treaſure is not only employed

employed in the ſupport of a whole empire, but that it is alſo moſt profuſely diſſipated, even within this national ſtate for the purpoſe of ſupporting an illegal miniſterial power in direct oppoſition to the legal power of the parliament, and that any man, either in or out of parliament, by joining with a miniſterial faction to oppoſe and deſtroy the power of that branch of the parliament in whoſe hands the people have placed their public treaſure, if that faction can ſo far prevail againſt that branch, as to over-rule their power over that treaſure, and can thereby command the expenditure of that treaſure with ſuch profuſion as may ſuit their own pleaſure; it is, I ſay, very certain and very well known, that any man may, by ſuch a line of conduct, frequently ſhare in that profuſion, and in all the emoluments and ſpoils of a victorious faction. Nor is it poſſible to prevent any man, who chooſes to do it, from purſuing that line of conduct, and thereby frequently converting this public national treaſure into his own private property, by means of an illegal miniſterial power, and in direct oppoſition to the legal power of the parliament, as long as the people ſupinely neglect to ſupport the power of the ſtewards and guardians of that treaſure againſt that over-ruling miniſterial power, as long as the people neglect to ſupport the freedom and power of their *moſt faithful ſtewards and guardians* of the public treaſure, *the Britiſh commons*, on whom they can alone with ſafety depend for a juſt and equitable expenditure of that treaſure; and, as long as the people do thus neglect that duty which they owe to themſelves, viz. Self-preſervation; and do thus abandon themſelves and the care of their public treaſure, by leaving that treaſure expoſed to the rapacity of a faction. And, as in the former paper on national and imperial government, I have cenſured our attachment to the preſent imperial conſtitution, it being impoſſible to ſupport that conſtitution without ſuch a profuſion of this national treaſure as muſt certainly occaſion a neceſſity of impoſing taxes on the Britiſh ſubjects, not only to ſupport Great Britain, but alſo to ſupport the whole empire: ſo, in this paper on the powers of government, I have alſo cenſured our attachment to a miniſterial faction, it being equally impoſſible to ſupport that faction withont ſuch a profuſion of this national treaſure as muſt certainly occaſion a neceſſity of impoſing taxes on the Britiſh ſubjects, not only to ſupport Great Britaia, but alſo to ſupport that faction. Thus, by a political infatuation, and to gratify a moſt unaccountable and yet ſeemingly favourite paſſion for taxes, the people, I will not ſay the parliament, becauſe it is impoſſible for the parliament to be guilty of either this, or a protracted miſconduct of any kind, but through the criminal acquieſcence of the people, and, therefore I ſay it is not the parliament but the people, who, for a century paſt, have been conſtantly impoſing unneceſſary taxes on the Britiſh ſubjects, have been conſtantly impoſing unneceſſary taxes on themſelves, and thereby draining their own pockets and the national

tional reſources of Great Britain, not only to ſupply the wants of a whole empire, but alſo to ſatisfy, were it poſſible to ſatisfy, the inſatiable cravings of faction. And here, were it poſſible to ſtate exactly the immenſe ſums of money which Great Britain has expended in the ſupport of this empire, and particularly in the late war, in which Great Britain with unparalelled generoſity, exhauſted her reſources in the ſupport of America, and alſo to ſtate exactly the immenſe ſums of money which Great Britain, I might ſay with unparalelled folly, has expended on unneceſſary placemen and penſioners within the laſt century, and which unneceſſary expenditure can have anſwered no other political purpoſe than that of ſupporting an illegal miniſterial government in direct oppoſition to the legal government of the parliament. And, were we to deduct the aggregate ſum of theſe expences from the preſent public debt, only allowing the remainder to have been expended in the ſupport of Great Britain, I am inclined to think, that the reſult of ſuch an enquiry into the expenditure of the public money for ſome time paſt would produce a direct proof, that by far the greateſt part of the taxes which are now paid by the Britiſh ſubjects, are paid for the intereſt of money which has been expended in the ſupport of this empire, and in the ſupport of an illegal miniſterial government, and not for the intereſt of money which has been expended in the ſupport of Great Britain.

As to the practice of diſſipating this national treaſure merely in the ſupport of a miniſterial faction, excluſive of all Imperial conſiderations, were the people of Great Britain to be impreſſed with an idea, that the Britiſh ſubjects have, for ſome time paſt, and that they are, in fact, at this very time, paying taxes to ſupport an illegal miniſterial government, which is certainly paying taxes not to ſupport but to deſtroy the legal government of the parliament, it is poſſible that ſuch an idea might excite the people to ſuppreſs the future influence of every miniſterial faction, as far as that influence is derived from their having a command of the public money, though no one would wiſh to ſuppreſs the influence which they derive from their particular merit. And then, perhaps, the people might make an effectual application to their ſtewards, reſpecting the expenditure of the public money, not in the form of a prayer and an humble petition, which is certainly a proper mode of application from the ſubjects to the parliament, becauſe the ſubjects are inferior to the parliament, though it is not a proper mode of application from the people to the parliament, becauſe the people are ſuperior to the parliament, and ſuch a mode of application would be ſuppoſing the parliament to be ſuperior to the people. But, in a language which would better become the ſuperior rank and dignity of the people, whenever the people make an application to any of the three branches of parliament, to impoſe a poſitive command on the ſtewards of the public treaſure, that they

they ſhall, on point of incurring the diſpleaſure of the people, immediately adopt a ſyſtem of œconomy in the further expenditure of this national treaſure, and that this national treaſure ſhall not hereafter be expended on unneceſſary placemen and penſioners to ſupport an illegal miniſterial government, or, to ſupport the miniſterial faction of the day. And, in the adopting of this ſyſtem of œconomy, not to attempt to temporize with an injured people by any partial or trifling reformation, but to adopt the ſyſtem effectually: For, though the moſt trifling reformation in the expenditure of the public money would certainly be, in ſome degree, a relief from your preſent political grievances, yet, at the ſame time, it would alſo as certainly be a direct inſult on the good ſenſe of the people, by ſuppoſing that the people would be ſatisfied with ſuch a reformation—a direct inſult on the underſtanding of every man in Great Britain, by ſuppoſing that he cannot diſtinguiſh between an effectual and only a palliative meaſure. And alſo to adopt this ſyſtem of œconomy regardleſs of any changes which may be made as to the particular perſons who conſtitute the miniſterial faction; as the practice of a change of men, without an effectual change of meaſures reſpecting the expenditure of the public money, has too often lulled the people of this ſtate into a fatal ſecurity; and as Great Britain is certainly in much greater danger of being deſtroyed by thus waſting the public treaſure to ſupport a miniſterial faction, than of being conquered by an enemy's ſword.

And, as to the ſyſtem of œconomy which is now adopted by the preſent miniſters, were we to ſuppoſe this ſyſtem to be an effectual ſyſtem, and that it will not be ſo limited in its effects as that it might be more properly called a leſs degree of profuſion, than a ſyſtem of œconomy, and, were we alſo to ſuppoſe theſe miniſters, to have adopted this ſyſtem merely on a principle of promoting the public good, then, in that caſe, theſe miniſters would certainly merit the thanks and praiſe of the people. It would be impoſſible to confer dignities and honours on ſuch perſons ſuperior to their merit, and, in ſuch a caſe, it would be ungenerous, indeed it would be a ſpecies of injuſtice either in the people, or, in any citizen, to deny ſuch miniſters the tribute of applauſe. But, were we to ſuppoſe theſe miniſters, to have adopted this ſyſtem of œconomy on the dangerous principle of acquiring popularity for the purpoſe of promoting their own intereſt or ambition though even at the expence of enſlaving their fellow-ſubjects, then, in that caſe, theſe miniſters would certainly merit the cenſure rather than the praiſe of the people, and, in ſuch a caſe, inſtead of applauding theſe miniſters for ſuch a meaſure, it would well become the people, if they did not reject the meaſure, to receive it with indignation. I have called the principle of acquiring popularity for the purpoſe of promoting ſelf-intereſt and ambition

a dangerous principle, and the dangerous tendency of ſuch a principle muſt, I think, appear very obvious to every one by only forming this ſuppoſition. For inſtance, were we to ſuppoſe the preſent miniſters to have adopted this ſyſtem of œconomy for the purpoſe of acquiring ſuch a degree of popularity, and ſuch a degree of power, as would enable them to over-rule the power of all the three branches of parliament, and thereby to take the reins of government, together with all the honours and emoluments of office, entirely into their own hands. What is this, but the power of a ſervant over-ruling the power of his maſter? What is this, but the power of a miniſterial faction over-ruling the power of the king, the lords, and the commons? What is this, but a miniſterial faction uſurping an illegal and a deſpotic government, and tearing up all legal and free government by the very roots? It is, in fact, deſtroying the legal and free government of a parliament appointed by the people, and ſubjugating the Britiſh ſubjects to the illegal and deſpotic government of a miniſterial faction—it is, in fact, a miniſterial faction promoting their own intereſt or ambition at the expence of enſlaving their fellow-ſubjects. Nor would it be the very worſt political manœuvre that was ever exhibited to the world, were we to ſuppoſe the preſent miniſters, rather than continue to be totally precluded from the honour of ſharing in the liberal diſtributions of royal bounty——rather than continue to be totally precluded from the profit and pleaſure of ſharing in the unbounded corruption of the ſtate, to have become advocates for aboliſhing a corruption from which they had been ſo long and ſo cruelly precluded, or, for aboliſhing a conſiderable part of that corruption, if ſuch a meaſure was the only, or, the moſt probable means of ſecuring to themſelves a full enjoyment of the remainder. So that, even in the adopting of a ſyſtem of œconomy, we cannot be too cautious how we beſtow either our praiſe or our cenſure; neither can we be too cautious, leſt, along with the bleſſings of œconomy, we ſhould eſtabliſh a deſpotic power to enſlave the Britiſh ſubjects.

But, to return to the more general conſideration of œconomy, by not diſſipating this national treaſure either to ſupport an empire, or, to ſupport a miniſterial faction. And, as to the practice of diſſipating this national treaſure in the maintaining of fleets and armies, not only to ſupport Great Britain, but alſo to ſupport the whole

whole empire, though it may be a deſtructive practice to Great Britain, yet it may perhaps admit of ſome degree of palliation: perhaps we may juſtly ſay, that a bad imperial conſtitution of government has miſled Great Britain into that error, or, that the people have been miſled by that unbounded generoſity which ſo particularly diſtinguiſhes the Britiſh nation, and which, I hope, will always continue to diſtinguiſh this nation, I only wiſh to have this generoſity in ſome degree tempered by an obſervance of juſtice to the Britiſh ſubjects. But, as to the practice of diſſipating this national treaſure in the maintaining of an army of placemen and penſioners, neither to ſupport Great Britain, nor the empire, but to ſupport a miniſterial faction, in oppoſition to both your national and your imperial government, and thereby to injure both Great Britain and the whole empire, I know of no reaſonable apology that can be made for ſuch a practice. And when we alſo conſider the preſent mode of ſupporting theſe unneceſſary expenditures of this national treaſure, and that theſe unneceſſary expeditures are now ſupported by impoſing taxes indiſcriminately on both the rich and the poor, and that the pooreſt ſubjects of this ſtate, by paying thoſe taxes, do thereby contribute to that ſupport, from theſe conſiderations I am unavoidably led to draw this ſevere, though, I am afraid, too juſt a concluſion, viz. That to give or grant any ſalary, penſion, perquiſite, or gratuity whatever, to be paid to any perſon out of this national treaſure, which the ſtewards of that ſacred treaſure ſhall either deem that perſon to be totally undeſerving of, or, ſhall deem to be in any degree more than what that perſon does reaſonably merit for public ſervices, is an act of injuſtice to every other ſubject of the ſtate, and a moſt unmerciful oppreſſion of the poorer part of the ſubjects, particularly of the widow, the fatherleſs, and the orphan, from whoſe ſcanty pittance their proportion of that money muſt be extorted by unneceſſary taxes, and that every expenditure of this national treaſure, which comes within this deſcription, is giving bread to the undeſerving, and crumbling and diminiſhing the bread of indigence and poverty.

ON THE

SUPREME POWER,

AND ON THE

SUBORDINATE POWER,

OF A

STATE.

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NO political queſtion was ever more agitated than this, viz. *Whether the ſupreme power of governing a ſtate, is in the people, or in the governors of the ſtate?* Now in order to a ſolution of this queſtion, as in the paper on national and imperial government, ſo we muſt again recur to the original inſtitution of all ſocieties, or ſocial ſtates.—When men leave the ſtate of natural liberty (in which ſtate they are ſubject to no laws, but the laws of nature) and form a ſociety, or ſocial ſtate (in which ſtate they become ſubject to ſocial or civil laws) then the firſt and fundamental law of the ſociety is this, viz. *That every individual of the ſtate, ſhall be ſubject to the geral will of the ſtate.* This is the great law, from whence all ſubſequent ſocial or civil laws derive their authority. This law is not made by the aſſociating parties, it is a law that has its foundation in reaſon; it is therefore a divine law, and conſequently exiſted prior to all ſocieties: but though the aſſociating parties do not make this law, yet by the act of aſſociation they make themſelves ſubject to the law. On this

this fundamental ſocial law, is founded the original power of a ſtate, from whence all ſubordinate powers in the ſtate derive their authority, and even their exiſtence: this original power therefore, is *the ſupreme power of the ſtate.* A power which is eſtabliſhed in every ſtate, not by the weakneſs of human authority, but being a power which has its foundation in reaſon, it is an ordinance of God, and not an ordinance of man; *whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God:* for this is certainly the power which St. Paul ſpeaks of, Rom. xiii. 1. *Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers*; as in the very next ſentence we are told, *there is no power but of God: the powers that be, are ordained of God.* And the apoſtle has not here confined this command *of ſubjection unto the higher powers*, to ſocieties of any particular denomination; it is therefore as juſtly applicable to nations when they are aſſociated in an imperial ſtate, as to men when they are aſſociated in a national ſtate, only obſerving the paticular diſtinction between the power of a nation, and the power of an empire, and alſo the general exception to the power of both, which I mentioned in the former paper, viz. That the power of a national ſtate is *unlimited*, except by divine laws, there being no expreſs contracts to limit the power of the general will of the nation; and that the power of an imperial ſtate is *limited*, not only by divine laws, but there are alſo expreſs contracts to limit the power of the general will of the empire. This particular diſtinction, between the power of a nation and the power of an empire, and alſo the general exception to the power of both, ſhould be obſerved in the conſtruction of that precept, for St. Paul's precept cannot be conſtrued to lead men to a breach of either the divine laws, or their own contracts, and therefore *the higher powers* muſt be limited in theſe different ſtates, agreeably to this particular diſtinction and the general exception.

ENDLESS have been the controverſies amongſt the political writers, reſpecting this paſſage of St. Paul, and that paſſage of 1 St. Peter, ii. 13, *Submit yourſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake: whether it be to the king as ſupreme; or*

unto governors, as unto them that are ſent by him. Here St. Peter has called the king *ſupreme*, and ſo he certainly is. Every king is the ſupreme magiſtrate in the ſtate of which he is the ſovereign: and, by the Britiſh conſtitution of government, the king is the ſupreme head of the executive power of government, but it is impoſſible for the Britiſh conſtitution of government, or for any conſtitution of government, or indeed for any power on earth, to inveſt the king with the ſupreme power of the ſtate; nor are the king, lords, and commons collectively inveſted with the ſupreme power of the ſtate; they are not *the higher powers* to which St. Paul has commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject*, for they are not *ordained of God*, and therefore they are not the ſupeme power of the ſtate, or, as the apoſtle evpreſſes it, *the higher powers*. But they are *the powers* to which St. Peter has commanded us to ſubmit, for they are *an ordinance of man*, and conſequently, they are a *ſubordinate power*, deriving their authority, and even their exiſtence. i. e. their official exiſtence, from the ſupreme power of the ſtate, which is ordained of God. Theſe paſſages of St. Paul and St. Peter, as I ſaid before, have been the ſubject of endleſs controverſies, owing, as it appears to me, to the writers not having made this diſtinction. St. Paul ſpeaks of a ſtate collectively (from whence alone can be drawn the general will of the ſtate) or of a people: St. Peter ſpeaks of kings and governors, who are delegated by the people. St. Paul ſpeaks of *an original ſubject* of a ſtate, whoſe prerogative is *the ſupreme power* of the ſtate, which is an ordinance of God, and not an ordinance of man: St. Peter ſpeaks of *a delegated ſubject* of a ſtate, whoſe prerogative is *the ſubordiuate power* of the ſtate, which is an ordinance of man, and not an ordinance of God. The *original ſubject* is ordained of *God*: the *delegated ſubject* is ordained of *the people*. The *ſupreme power* is the creature of *God*: the *ſubordinate power* is the creature of *the people*.

As I believe that this is a new conſtruction of theſe paſſages, and having no better authority for it, than merely my own opinion, I beg the privilege of endeavouring to ſupport the conſtruction. I have ſaid, that the ſupreme power of a ſtate

is

is in the people, and, that the ſubordinate power of a ſtate is in the governors, who are delegated by the people.—Now, in the moral world, power is an attribute of a ſubject, which can have no exiſtence ſeparate and diſtinct from the ſubject in which it reſides; and, as it would be an affront to common ſenſe, to ſay, that a ſupreme power ought to reſide in a delegated ſubject, or, that a ſubordinate power ought to reſide in an original ſubject, conſequently every ſupreme power ought to reſide in an original ſubject, and every ſubordinate power ought to reſide in a delegated ſubject: and therefore, with reſpect to the paſſages before mentioned, I think I may ſafely draw this concluſion, viz.—When St. Paul ſpeaks of *the higher powers*, that he then ſpeaks of *a people*; for a people are certainly an original ſubject of a ſtate, whoſe prerogative is therefore the ſupreme power of the ſtate, or, as the apoſtle expreſſes it, *the higher powers*. And when St. Peter ſpeaks of *kings and governors*, that he then ſpeaks of *a ſubordinate power* of a ſtate; for a ſubordinate power of a ſtate is certainly the prerogative of the delegated ſubject of the ſtate, who are *kings and governors*.—And, with reſpect to ſocial ſtates, I think I may alſo as ſafely aſſert, that in every ſtate where there is a ſubordinate power of government eſtabliſhed, there are two diſtinct powers, viz. the ſupreme power, and the ſubordinate power; and, that *the ſupreme power* of the ſtate is the attribute and rightful prerogative of *the people*, becauſe the people are *the original ſubject* of the ſtate; and, by the Britiſh conſtitution of government, that *the ſubordinate power* of this ſtate is the attribute and rightful prerogative of *the king, lords, and commons*, becauſe the king, lords, and commons are *the delegated ſubject* of the ſtate.

Now it ſhould be here obſerved, that in the ſocial ſtate, different men ſtand in different relations to the ſociety, thoſe different relations laying them under diſtinct obligations, viz. when a man is only related to a ſtate as a ſubject, then he is only amenable to the ſtate for his conduct in that relation; but when a ſubject of a ſtate accepts of the truſt of a governor of the ſtate, then he commences a relation to the ſtate, diſtinct

tinct and different from his relation as a ſubject, and then he is not only amenable to the ſtate for his conduct as a ſubject, but alſo, by accepting of that truſt, having, in his official character, accepted of the ſubordinate power of the ſtate, he thereby becomes amenable to the ſupreme power of the ſtate, for his official conduct; the *governors* of a ſtate being amenable to the people, for their conduct as governors, agreeably to the eſtabliſhed *conſtitutional laws* of the ſtate; as the *ſubjects* of a ſtate are amenable to the governors, for their conduct as ſubjects, agreeably to the eſtabliſhed *civil laws* of the ſtate. But theſe diſtinct obligations of governors and ſubjects, muſt not be conſtrued, either to lay ſubjects under an abſolute neceſſity of ſubmitting to the capricious whims of their governors, or to lay governors under an abſolute neceſſity of ſubmitting to the capricions whims of a people; as thoſe different characters are only amenable to the ſuperior power, agreeably to the eſtabliſhed laws of their reſpective characters. And when a man is placed in different characters in a ſtate, it not only lays him under diſtinct obligations, but alſo entitles him to the diſtinct privileges of thoſe different characters: for every governor of a ſtate, in the character of a *governor*, ſhares in the prerogative of *the ſubordinate power*; and every fellow-citizen, in the character of *citizen*, ſhares in the prerogative *the ſupreme power*. The former power he may accept of, or reſign, at pleaſure; but it is impoſſible for him to give up his right to the latter power, becauſe it is the power which is to govern and protect himſelf; and the firſt law of nature, ſelf-preſervation, will not allow any man ſo far to abandon himſelf, and to neglect the care of his own ſafety, as to truſt his protection to any power, in which he has not an equal ſhare with others, who are dependent on the ſame power. The right, therefore, that every citizen has to an equal ſhare with all his fellow-citizens, in the ſupreme power of the ſtate, is *an unalienable right*.—This ſupreme power (which is eſtabliſhed amongſt mankind by the fundamental ſocial law, viz. that every individual ſhall ſubmit to the general will of the whole)

continues

continues men, after they are aſſociated, on the very ſame level and equality, that they were in before the aſſociation, while in a ſtate of natural liberty, not affording any man the leaſt pretenſion to ſuperiority over others; and that equality is certainly a very wholeſome leſſon of humility, which is a circumſtance that plainly proves the origin of *that power*.—It is after men are thus aſſociated under the protection of *this ſupreme power*, that moſt ſtates (finding the people ſo numerous that it would be difficult if not impoſſible for them to act collectively on all occaſions) are therefore obliged to delegate governors, with *a ſubordinate power*, to act for them by their authority. The *delegated governors* have no authority independent of the *people*: the *ſubordinate power* has no authority independent of *the ſupreme power*. When this ſubordinate power is eſtabliſhed, then commences the ſubordination in ſociety, and the pride of rank in this ſubordinate power; and any one who obſerves the contention and the ſtruggling there is in the world for *that rank*, cannot be at a loſs to diſcover the origin of *that power*. It is in *the ſupreme power* of governing, which is a Divine inſtitution, that *the natural right of equality* is continued amongſt men, even after they are aſſociated, and it is in *the ſubordinate power* of governing, which is an human inſtitution, that *the acquired rights of rank* are eſtabliſhed in the world.—But ſtill, a man being honoured with this ſubordinate, this faſcinating power, which men are ſo fond of, cannot releaſe him from his obligations as a ſubject; he ſtill continues a ſubject of the ſtate, and in that character he is amenable to the ſtate, for his ſubmiſſion to thoſe very laws, which he has made himſelf in his official character. Every *rightful* emperor, king, or ſovereign of what title ſoever, is as certainly a ſubject of the ſtate, as any of his fellow-citizens; for, when a ſovereign of a ſtate is not at the ſame time a ſubject of the ſtate, then he is an alien, or a foreigner, and not a fellow-citizen; and Moſes has told us, Deut. xvii. 15. *One from among thy brethren ſhalt thou ſet king over thee: thou mayeſt not ſet a ſtranger over thee, which is not thy brother.* So that, as by the doctrine of Moſes, an alien, or a foreigner is not

not a *rightful* ſovereign, and as it is impoſſible for any man to live within the dominions of a ſtate, without being ſubject to the laws of the ſtate, conſequently it is impoſſible for any man to be a *rightful* ſovereign of a ſtate, who is not a ſubject of that ſtate, of which he is the ſovereign.

Now, allowing the principles here laid down to be true, then, in the moral world, as *every delegated ſubject*, whoſe prerogative is only *a ſubordinate power*, ought therefore to be amenable for its conduct to *the original ſubject*, whoſe prerogative is *the ſupreme power*; and alſo, *every inferior ſubject*, whoſe prerogative is only *an inferior power*, ought likewiſe to be amenable for its conduct to *the ſuperior ſubject*, whoſe prerogative is *a ſuperior power*; ſo, in the ſocial world, *every delegated governor* of a ſtate, whoſe prerogative is only *the ſubordinate power* of the ſtate, ought therefore, in like manner, to be amenable for his conduct to *the people*, whoſe prerogative is *the ſupreme power* of the ſtate; and alſo, *every ſubject*, whoſe prerogative is only *an inferior power*, ought likewiſe to be amenable for his conduct to *the delegated governors* of the ſtate, whoſe prerogative is *a ſuperior power*: For, were not this ſubordination to be ſtrictly obſerved, it would entirely deſtroy the regular œconomy of both the moral and the ſocial world. In the moral world it would be ſubverting the eſtabliſhed order of nature, and by deſtroying the force of juſt authority, would eſtabliſh either impotency or uſurpation on the ruins of rightful power: and, in the ſocial world it would be ſubverting the eſtabliſhed order of ſociety, and by deſtroying the force of legal authority, would eſtabliſh either anarchy, or deſpotiſm, on the ruins of rightful government And therefore,—When a man engages in ſociety, then he is certainly amenable to the governors of the ſtate, for his conduct as a ſubject, agreeably to the eſtabliſhed *civil laws* of the ſtate, not only on theſe principles, but alſo by St. Peter's poſitive command, viz. *Submit yourſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake, whether it be to the king as ſupreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are ſent by him*: Or,—When a ſubject of a ſtate accepts of the truſt

truſt of a governor of the ſtate, then, the governor is alſo as certainly amenable to the people, for his conduct as a governor, agreeably to the eſtabliſhed *conſtitutional laws* of the ſtate, not only on theſe principles, but alſo by St. Paul's poſitive command, viz. *Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers:* Or,—When a governor of a ſtate acts agreeably to the will of the people, then, in that caſe, the governor having faithfully diſcharged his truſt, whatever may be the conſequences of ſuch conduct, he certainly merits the thanks and praiſe of the people: Or,—When a governor of a ſtate acts contrary to the will of the people, then, in that caſe, the governor having failed in the diſcharge of his truſt, the people have an undoubted right to puniſh him for neglect of official duty: And,—As the governors of a ſtate have no right to act contrary to the will of the people, or, contrary to the expreſs declaration of ſuch a proportion of the people as may fairly and reaſonably be conſidered as expreſſive of the general will of the whole; therefore, though the good of the people ought to be the only object of governors, in the diſcharge of their diſcretionary truſt, becauſe the people muſt always be ſuppoſed to intend their own good; yet, when a caſe happens, in which a people expreſsly interfere, and make known their will to their governors, ſpecifically declaring themſelves in favour of ſuch meaſures as muſt inevitably deſtroy themſelves, then, in that caſe, the people take from their governors the right of judging for them, they abſolve them from their diſcretionary truſt, and it becomes the indiſpenſible duty of thoſe governors, to adopt and execute thoſe meaſures, and to deſtroy that people; the governors of a ſtate having no right to purſue any meaſure, though even for the good of the people, which has not its foundation in the hearts of the people.—And here, I beg leave to make to this inference: in the preſent American diſpute, when the ſupreme power of this ſtate, the people, addreſſed the king in favour of the preſent conſtitution of government; offering their lives and fortunes to enable his majeſty to ſupport the conſtitution, then, in that particular inſtance, the people took from our governors the right of judging for us;

they abſolved them from their diſcretionary truſt, leaving them no other alternative, but that of either ſupporting the conſtitution, or being guilty of a direct breach of truſt, by acting contray to the known will of the people. In that particular inſtance, the people took the load of government from off the ſhoulders of our governors, and placed it upon their own. And therefore, whatever has hitherto been, or may hereafter be, the conſequence of that meaſure (as by the fundamental law of the ſociety, every individual of the ſtate is bound to be ſubject to the general will of the ſtate) no man in this kingdom has a juſt cauſe to cenſure our governors; they having, in that inſtance, acted agreeably to the will of *the ſupreme power*, by purſuing a meaſure which has its foundation in the hearts of the people. And yet, notwithſtanding ſo plain a juſtification of the conduct of our governors in this particular inſtance, nothing is more common than to hear the leading men in adminiſtration cenſured for having been the cauſe of all the calamities which this American war has brought on the Britiſh ſubjects; but the cenſure is certainly as unjuſt as it is common. For, the people, by thoſe addreſſes, having expreſsly offered their lives and fortunes to ſupport the American war, after thoſe expreſs declarations, no power on earth had a right to ſave this nation from ſuch calamities as muſt unavoidably attend that war, were we even to ſuppoſe the war to be ever ſo deſtructive, it being an indiſpenſible duty in the king, the lords, and the commons, an indiſpenſible duty in the Britiſh parliament to deſtroy Great Britain whenever the people chooſe to purſue ſuch meaſures as muſt inevitably deſtroy themſelves,--after thoſe expreſs declarations, neither the miniſtry, nor any one branch of parliament, nor even the three branches of parliament collectively, had a right to reſiſt the will of the people ſo expreſsly declared, as ſuch a reſiſtance of the ſupreme power of the people would have been a direct tranſgreſſion of St. Paul's poſitive command of *ſubjection unto the higher powers*. And therefore, it is neither the miniſtry, nor the parliament, to whom we can juſtly aſcribe the calamities of this war; but it is the people, and the people only, to whom we can fairly

aſcribe

aſcribe thoſe calamities,—it is neither the miniſtry, nor the parliament, who are now loading the Britiſh ſubjects with ſuch an additional weight of taxes to ſupport the American war; but it is the people, and the people only, who, by thoſe addreſſes, expreſsly offered their fortunes to ſupport that war, and, as if they were dotingly fond of taxes, did even ſupplicate the throne for the favour of theſe additional taxes, and who are now laying this load of additional taxes on themſelves, —it is neither the miniſtry, nor the parliament, who are now oppreſſing the Britiſh ſubjects with taxes to ſupport an imperial conſtitution of government which has enſlaved America; but it is the people, and the people only, who, by thoſe addreſſes, expreſsly offered their fortunes for that very purpoſe, and who, as I expreſſed it on a former occaſion, are now draining the pockets of the Britiſh ſubjects to purchaſe chains for their fellow-ſubjects in America. Thus, theſe addreſſes have, I think, very fairly and clearly exculpated both the miniſtry and the parliament from the leaſt degree of criminality in proſecuting this American war, and, if there be any crime in proſecuting the war, have laid the whole of that crime at the door of the people. Nor would it exculpate the people as to their conduct reſpecting thoſe addreſſes, were we to ſay, that it was the king's ſervants who were the principal inſtigators of thoſe addreſſes, and who miſled the people in that fatal buſineſs: For, even allowing that to be the fact, Why did the people ſuffer themſelves to be miſled? Why did the people place their confidence in ſervants who might poſſibly have a particular intereſt in deceiving and miſleading them, inſtead of confiding ſolely in their own good ſenſe, and in their own judgment? Is there not too much reaſon to believe, that the leading principle in too many of the king's ſervants is merely a venal principle, and that it is poſſible for a king's ſervant to be ſo far influenced by that principle, as to loſe ſight of all other conſiderations, and even to unite with a miniſterial faction, and thereby to enſlave his fellow-citizens when it will promote his own intereſt? And therefore, whenever a people

are miſled by venal ſervants, whatever degree of blame might be imputed to thoſe ſervants for miſleading the people, it would never take off the imputation of blame from the people for ſuffering themſelves to be miſled. So that, by whatever means thoſe addreſſes were obtained, after the people had, by addreſſing the king, expreſsly declared themſelves in favour of this American war, then, as not only the king, but alſo every individual in each branch of the parliament, is in duty bound to the moſt ſtrict obſervance, nay even to a blind obedience of the will of the people, when that will is thus expreſsly declared; therefore, as I ſaid before, neither the miniſtry nor the parliament can be juſtly cenſured for proſecuting this American war, in conſequence of thoſe addreſſes, thoſe addreſſes having laid the whole crime of proſecuting the war, if it is a crime, at the door of the people. Or, were we to reverſe this caſe, and to ſay, that the people did not interfere, by thoſe addreſſes, in promoting this American war, thoſe addreſſes not being ſufficiently numerous to be fairly called the people, even in that caſe, we ought, I think, to lay the chief blame of proſecuting this war on the people for not interfering to prevent the war, it being impoſſible for the parliament, whoſe power is only an inferior power of acting for the people in ſuch caſes as the people do not expreſsly interfere with their ſuperior power to over-rule and ſupercede that inferior power; it being, I ſay, impoſſible for the parliament, whoſe power is only an inferior and diſcretionary power, to have a legal right and authority to proſecute either this, or any other war, or indeed to proſecute any meaſure whatever independent of the will of the people from whom they received that inferior and diſcretionary power—it being impoſſible for the parliament, whoſe power is only a ſubordinate power, to have a legal right and authority to proſecute this American war but through the neglect of the people in not expreſsly interfering with their ſupreme and irreſiſtible power to prevent the war. In either caſe, the blame, if there is any blame in proſecuting

this

this American war, would ſtill reſt chiefly with the people. And, allowing that this ſtate is now a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed, then, in that caſe, if there are any other political grievances exiſting in this ſtate, the blame of thoſe grievances would alſo, for the very ſame reaſon, reſt chiefly with the people, for thus placing too great a confidence in a parliament of ſubordinate governors, and for thus withholding the exerciſe of their ſupreme power, and thereby neglecting to obſerve the firſt law of nature and that duty which they owe to themſelves, viz. ſelf-preſervation. In a free ſtate, it is impoſſible for a political grievance of any kind whatever to have a perminent exiſtence but through the people ſupinely neglecting the exerciſe of their ſupreme power to redreſs that grievance; and therefore, in ſuch a ſtate, the people have no one to blame but themſelves, if they do not remove all their political grievances and afflictions rather than expoſe their patience and fortitude to too ſevere a teſt in bearing thoſe grievances and afflictions. But what I chiefly mean by this long inference, is plainly this, viz. whatever afflictions we may ſuffer from this American war, that we cannot ſo juſtly aſcribe thoſe afflictions, either to our miniſters, or, to our delegated and ſubordinate governors the parliament, as to our original and ſupreme governors the people, that is, *ourſelves*, as the real authors, and the real cauſe, of all thoſe afflictions, and that it now remains to be tried, whether or no, in this inſtance, our patience and fortitude will keep pace with the afflictions which we have brought upon ourſelves.

Now, from the principles laid down in this paper, and from the conſtruction here given of theſe paſſages of the apoſtles, it appears, That,—When *the delegated governors* of a ſtate do not encroach on *the ſupreme power*, but keep within their juſt prerogative *the ſubordinate power*, then, St. Peter has given them a full power over the ſubjects of the ſtate, having expreſsly enjoined ſubmiſſion to *every ordinance of man*; he has fixed no bounds to their power, leaving it to be bounded only by reaſon. But St. Paul, well knowing the weakneſs of human reaſon, and the obliquity of the human heart, and that there

can be no ſafety in leaving men entirely to themſelves to draw the line of their own power, has guarded mankind from the oppreſſive power of their governors. For, when St. Paul commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject unto the higher powers*, then, he gave to *a people* the very ſame degree of power over *the delegated governors* of the ſtate, that St. Peter has given to *the delegated governors* of a ſtate, over *the ſubjects* of the ſtate, when he commanded all ſubjects to *ſubmit themſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake: whether it be to the king as ſupreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are ſent by him.* In theſe paſſages, St. Peter has ordered all ſubjects to ſubmit to their governors, and St. Paul has ordered all governors to be ſubject to the people; it is therefore, a Divine command, that every ſubject ſhall acknowledge the ſuperior power of his governors, and that every governor ſhall acknowledge the ſupremacy of the people. But, neither of the apoſtles have fixed any bounds to the power which they have given to thoſe reſpective parties; they have laid down general rules without exceptions; leaving it to the parties themſelves, to exerciſe their reſpective powers to ſuch a degree as they may find neceſſary on all occaſions. So that, by the doctrine of the apoſtles,——when ſubjects do not ſubmit to every ordinance of man, if the governors, neglecting the force which they have in their hands for that purpoſe, do not enforce ſubmiſſion to the eſtabliſhed *civil laws*, when they find it neceſſary, then, the ſtate muſt ſuffer for the neglect of the governors, and the governors are amenable for their conduct to the people, agreeably to the eſtabliſhed *conſtitutional laws* of the ſtate, becauſe the governors are only the ſubordinate power of the ſtate; and,—when governors oppreſs ſubjects, if the people, neglecting their Divine Inſtructor, do not relieve the ſubjects from all political oppreſſions, when they find that neceſſary, then, the ſubjects muſt ſuffer for the neglect of the people, but the people are not amenable for their conduct to any power upon earth, becauſe the people are the ſupreme power. And, by the ſame doctrine of unlimitted power, which the

the apoſtles have given to both theſe parties, it is alſo impoſſible for ſubjects to evade their duty as ſubjects, but through the negligence of the governors; and equally impoſſible for governors, either to evade their duty as governors, or to oppreſs the ſubjects, but through the negligence of the people. —Excluſive of all other proofs, the wiſdom of this conſtitution of the apoſtles ſtamps Divinity on the ordinance.—Indeed, in a free ſtate, ſubjects may ſuffer political oppreſſions, and if the people *do not chooſe* to relieve them, it is their duty tamely to ſubmit to thoſe oppreſſions, agreeably to the fundamental ſocial law, which has commanded every individual to ſubmit to the general will of the whole; nor can the governors, in that caſe, conſiſtently with their truſt, relieve the ſubjects from thoſe oppreſſions, though even to gratify their own inclinations: but it is impoſſible for the ſubjects of a free ſtate, to ſuffer the leaſt degree of political oppreſſion, of which the people, *if they chooſe to do it*, may not immediately relieve the ſubjects; neither can the governors, in that caſe, conſiſtently with their truſt, prevent the people from relieving the ſubjects from thoſe oppreſſions. For government, in its very nature, is an intermediate power, between the people and the ſubjects, inferior to the people, but ſuperior to the ſubjects;—not inſtituted to govern the people, but to govern the ſubjects;—not inſtituted to reſtrain the power of the people, but to reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of the ſubjects;—not inſtituted to execute the will of the governors, but to execute the will of the people; and to declare and make known the will of the people to the ſubjects, and to oblige every ſubject to ſubmit to that will: and in all caſes, as I ſaid before, when the people expreſsly interfere, and make known their will to their governors, then, in thoſe caſes, that will ought to be executed, whether it be for the good of the ſubjects, or for their hurt; and, in all other caſes, when the people do not expreſsly interfere, leaving the governors to the free exerciſe of their diſcretionary power, then, in all thoſe caſes, whatever meaſures the governors ſhall adopt, the people, by not interfering, do tacitly conſent

conſent to thoſe meaſures, and then thoſe meaſures alſo are the will of the people. When the ſubjects, therefore, of a free ſtate, ſuffer oppreſſions, though the governors may not always have it in their power to relieve the ſubjects, becauſe they may be reſtrained by the ſuperior power of the people; yet, the people always have it in their power to relieve the ſubjects, when they chooſe to do it, becauſe there is no ſuperior power to reſtrain them; and when they do not chooſe to do it, then nothing can be plainer, than that the ſubjects muſt ſuffer, until the ſufferings of the ſubjects ſhall have ſoftened the hearts of the people, and ſhall have taught the people to have mercy on the ſubjects, and ſhall have taught the people to have mercy on themſelves.—In a free ſtate, the ſubjects may be oppreſſed by the people, but it is impoſſible for the ſubjects to be oppreſſed by the governors; nor is it poſſible for the ſlaves of a tyrannical deſpot, to ſuffer a greater weight of oppreſſions, than what may be impoſed on the free ſubjects of a negligent people.—In every ſtate in the world, *the people* have an indiſputable right to govern *the ſubjects* of that ſtate: and, in every free ſtate, which is ſelf-governed, it is in fact the caſe; for then,-- collectively they are *the people*, and individually they are *the ſubjects*,—collectively they are *the governors*, and individually they are *the governed*,—collectively they make *all civil laws*, and individually they are *ſubject to thoſe laws* which they have made themſelves. And this doctrine of the right of ſelf-government in a people, is not only founded on the unalterable laws of reaſon, but it is alſo confirmed by a poſitive Divine law, which will, I think, appear when we further conſider this command of St. Paul, viz. *Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers.* Now, allowing that I have already proved that in this place the words *higher powers* mean *the people*, it then remains to be conſidered what conſtruction ought to be put on the words *every ſoul.* And to ſay that the apoſtle by the words *every ſoul* did not mean to include all *the governors* of a ſtate as well as the governed, would be errant nonſenſe, for that would be ſaying that the governors of a

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ſtate have no ſouls; it is therefore impoſſible that St. Paul ſhould not include the governors of a ſtate in that expreſſion. And allowing the governors of a ſtate to be included in the words *every ſoul*, then, to whom are the governors to *be ſubject?* Certainly to the people; for as it is impoſſible that there ſhould be any particular rank or order of men in a ſtate ſuperior to the governors of that ſtate, conſequently, it is impoſſible that the governors ſhould be ſubject to any power but the power of the people, who, therefore, are certainly *the higher powers*, to whom St. Paul has commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject*. And, though the ſubjects of a ſtate, by an human inſtitution, are amenable for their conduct to the ſubordinate power of their governors, yet, as thoſe governors, not only on the principle of reaſon, but alſo by a Divine precept, are amenable for their conduct to the ſupreme power of the people; therefore, the ſubjects are in effect amenable to themſelves as a people. And both the governors and the ſubjects being thus amenable to the ſupreme power of the people, that brings the precept contained in the paſſage now under conſideration to this conſtruction, viz. *That every individual in a ſtate ſhall be ſubject to the general will of the ſtate.* This appears to me to be the moſt reaſonable conſtruction of that precept, as by this conſtruction, St. Paul has here guarded all men in ſociety from that great, that intolerable evil, to which they were unavoidably ſubject whilſt in an unaſſociated ſtate, viz. *The evil of being ſubject to the rapacious will of individuals.* Nor has the apoſtle here confined this precept, as I ſaid before, to ſocieties of any particular denomination; it is as juſtly applicable to an imperial ſociety of nations, as to a national ſociety of men, it is extended to ſocieties of every denomination, and it is as benovelent as it is extenſive, it is an ineſtimable bleſſing conferred on all ſocieties, by curbing the licentious ſpirit of ſuch individuals as ſhall vainly attempt to govern multitudes of their fellow creatures by their own will; St. Paul, by the conſtruction here given of his precept, having ordained, that the individuals of a ſtate, as *ſubjects*, are only to ſubmit to themſelves collectively as *a*

people, or, that the individuals of a ſtate, as *the governed*, are only to ſubmit to themſelves collectively as *the governors*, or, that the individuals of a ſtate as *ſubjects*, are only to ſubmit to civil laws which they have made themſelves collectively as *their own legiſlators*. In fine, if I have not miſconſtrued this precept of the apoſtle, and were it to be ſtrictly obſerved, it would effectually ſecure the civil rights of all mankind upon the firm baſis of Divine authority,—it would effectually ſecure to all men, even after they are aſſociated in a national ſtate, and to all nations, even after they are aſſociated in an imperial ſtate, their right of equality in the ſupreme power which is to govern themſelves; St. Paul, by this conſtruction of his precept, having ordained, *That the citizens of a ſtate are the ſubjects of the people, and that the people are the original governors, and the ſupreme ſovereign over all their ſubjects.* As to the delegated governors of a ſtate—government, as I ſaid before, is an intermediate power, between the people and the ſubjects, not inſtituted to execute the will of the delegated governors, but to execute the will of the original governors, the people; and therefore, neither the delegated governors, nor any other individuals in a ſtate, can have a right to govern by their own will, independent of the will of the people, for that would be utterly inconſiſtent with reaſon, with a Divine precept, with civil liberty, and with all rightful government; but, on the contrary, every individual in the ſtate, of whatever rank or degree, muſt ſubmit to the general will of the whole, muſt ſubmit to the ſupreme power of the people. And allowing that St. Paul has ordained, that a people are the ſupreme ſovereign over all their ſubjects, it is then an indiſpenſible duty in the people, a duty impoſed on the people by Divine authority, to guard the civil rights of all the ſubjects, of whatever rank or degree—it is a duty in the people, in order to guard the ſtate from the dreadful effects of *deſpotiſm*, to reſtrain, by their ſupreme power, the licentiouſneſs of the governors, as the governors, by their ſubordinate power, reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of the ſubjects—it is a duty in the people, in order to guard

guard the ſtate from the dreadful effects of *anarchy*, to ſupport, by their ſupreme power, the ſubordinate power of the governors over the ſubjects, as effectually as they ſupport their own power over the governors—it is a duty in the people, to guard all the ſubjects from the oppreſſion of being governed by the particular will of individuals, and to oblige every individual to ſubmit to the general will of the whole, for that, and that alone, is perfect civil liberty and legal government. This is the caſe of a free ſtate, but in a deſpotic ſtate it is exactly the reverſe.—In a deſpotic ſtate, inſtead of every individual being made ſubject to the general will of the whole, the order of ſociety is totally inverted, and the whole is made ſubject to the particular will of an individual; thus, the fundamental ſocial law, the only origin of ſocial, or civil laws, being by an uſurper, ſuſpended in its operation and effects, in this ſtate, civil laws can have no exiſtence. A deſpot cannot be controuled by the civil laws of a people, he therefore uſurps *the ſupreme power*, leaving the people without a power of making civil laws; and as there can be no ſuch thing as an effect without a cauſe, the wily deſpot, by uſurping *the ſupreme power*, removes the cauſe, that he may not himſelf be troubled with the effect.—In a deſpotic ſtate, it is not the civil laws of a people that govern the ſubjects, it is the imperious mandates of a deſpot that govern the ſlaves.—In a large ſtate, let not a trifling faction, or a mob of ten thouſand, or of ten times ten thouſand men, imagine themſelves to be the people: they are not the people: and, againſt ſuch a faction, or ſuch a mob, the ſovereign *beareth the ſword*, by the joint authority both of God and man; and were he not to uſe that ſword, when neceſſary, it would certainly be *bearing the ſword in vain*.—In every ſtate, nothing leſs than a majority of the whole, is *the people*, or the *ſupreme power* which I have here been ſpeaking of. And a people, though they are the original governors, or, the ſupreme ſovereign of the ſtate, and are by St. Paul inveſted with a ſupreme power, for the purpoſe of governing *every ſoul* in the ſtate, whether they be ſubjects or delegated go-

vernors, and have therefore not only a right to give laws to the delegated governors of the ſtate, but have alſo a right, whenever the ſubjects are oppreſſed by thoſe delegated governors, to relieve the ſubjects from thoſe oppreſſions; and, by whatever means the people may chooſe to relieve the ſubjects from the oppreſſion of their delegated governors, provided thoſe means are not contrary to the Divine laws, thoſe means are then not *evil* but legal means, becauſe they are the will of the people, whoſe will is the fundamental law of the ſociety. Yet, after the people have created a delegated governor, or what is commonly, though perhaps not very properly called, *a ſovereign*, becauſe this delegated governor is certainly ſubordinate to his creator, the people, whereas the word ſovereign implies being *ſupreme in power*, or, *having no ſuperior*, and by that meaning of the word ſovereign, it is neither kings, emperors, nor any other delegated governors who are ſovereigns, becauſe all delegated governors are certainly *ſubordinate in power*, and are *inferior to the people*, but it is the people of the different ſtates in the world who are the only ſovereigns upon earth, becauſe it is the people alone who are *ſupreme in power*, and who *have no ſuperior*. However, as cuſtom, contrary to this eſtabliſhed meaning of the word, and in direct contradiction to poſitive facts, has given the title of ſovereign, which implies being ſupreme in power, or, having no ſuperior, to the delegated governors of ſtates, who are only ſubordinate in power, and who have a ſuperior, being certainly ſubordinate to their creator, the people; I ſay, as cuſtom, contrary to this eſtabliſhed meaning of the word, has given the title of ſovereign to a delegated governor, or, a creature, and which title can only be properly given to his creator, the people; in compliance with this cuſtom, I have called a delegated governor *a ſovereign*. But, as it is impoſſible, by the definition here given of the word ſovereign, for two ſovereigns to exiſt together in the ſame ſtate, in order to diſtinguiſh this imaginary from the real ſovereign, in order to diſtinguiſh the creature from the creator, I have called the

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real ſovereign, or, the people, being the creator, and having therefore the ſupreme power, *a ſupreme ſovereign*; and I hope the reader, when I apply the word ſubordinate to a ſovereign, will excuſe this contradiction in terms, and that he will allow me to call this imaginary ſovereign, *a ſubordinate ſovereign*, becauſe this imaginary ſovereign, or, this delegated governor, being only the creature, and having only a ſubordinate power, if he is a ſovereign, can therefore be only a ſubordinate ſovereign. And, after the people have created a ſubordinate ſovereign, that is, if it be poſſible for the ſame perſon, at the ſame time, to be both ſovereign and ſubordinate; or, in other words, if it be poſſible for the ſame perſon, at the ſame time, to be both ſuperior and inferior—after the people have created an imaginary ſovereign, that is, if an imaginary ſovereign, or, a non-exiſtence, can be called a creation; in ſhort, by giving the title of ſovereign to kings, emperors, and the delegated governors of ſtates, who are inferior in power, rank, and dignity to the people, inſtead of giving that title to the people, who are the original governors, and who are therefore ſuperior in power, rank, and dignity to all kings, emperors, and delegated governors, and thereby confounding the diſtinction between a ſuperior and an inferior; between a creature and his creator; and between exiſtence and non-exiſtence, I find myſelf ſo enveloped in a labyrinth of nonſenſe, that I ſhall be glad to get out of it. I ſay, after the people have created this imaginary ſovereign, this wonderful contradiction both of facts and terms, a ſubordinate ſovereign, and have inveſted that ſubordinate ſovereign with a ſubordinate power, for the purpoſe of governing all the ſubjects of the ſtate; then, though the will of the people (their will being the fundamental law of the ſociety) does conſtitute a legal right in the people to relieve the ſubjects from the oppreſſion of their ſubordinate ſovereign; yet, the will of the ſubjects (their will not having the force of a law) does not conſtitute a legal right in the ſubjects to relieve themſelves from the oppreſſion of their ſubordinate ſovereign, or, from the oppreſſion of his ſubordinate power, nor ought the ſubjects to be relieved from thoſe oppreſſions, by any means but legal (not *evil*) means; for, beſides

ſides the authority which the people have given to the ſubordinate ſovereign themſelves, St. Paul has confirmed that authority, when (ſpeaking of rulers) he told us, that HE IS THE MINISTER OF GOD TO THEE FOR GOOD. BUT IF THOU DO THAT WHICH IS EVIL (or *illegal*) BE AFRAID; FOR HE BEARETH NOT THE SWORD IN VAIN. And yet, as it is impoſſible that St. Paul ſhould confirm any authority in any man to bear a ſword *againſt* that very ordinance which he has himſelf eſtabliſhed; therefore, when the rulers of the earth RESIST a people in the legal exerciſe of their right of relieving the ſubjects from all political oppreſſions, or, in the legal exerciſe of their right of ſelf-government, which is founded in reaſon, and confirmed by St. Paul, then, by reſiſting an ordinance of that apoſtle, they certainly forfeit the authority which that apoſtle has given them, not to *bear the ſword in vain*, and then (having no authority left but what they received from the people) the people, on the principles here laid down, have *a legal right* either to continue, or withdraw that authority, at pleaſure. Nor can the rulers prevent the people from exerciſing that right, by directing the force of the ſtate [which they have in their hands] againſt the people, while the people keep within the *legal* exerciſe of their right of ſelf-government, without being guilty of a moſt impious uſurpation of *the ſupreme power of the ſtate*, and thereby converting millions of rational beings into wretched ſlaves; which may poſſibly be the reaſon, why St. Paul has, in this place, with more than uſual vehemence, denounced a moſt dreadful ſentence of future puniſhment, againſt EVERY SOUL who is not SUBJECT UNTO THE HIGHER POWERS, WHICH ARE ORDAINED OF GOD.

How far I am ſo fortunate, as not to have been miſtaken in principles, or not to have miſconſtrued theſe paſſages of the apoſtles, muſt be left to the candid reader to determine. I can only declare it to be my intention, neither to ſuppreſs *the rightful power of the people*, nor to ſlacken the reins of *rightful government*, but to avoid (if poſſible) both thoſe evils, which are ſo hurtful to ſociety; having endeavoured

ed to ſteer a middle courſe between anarchy and deſpotiſm, as the only means, by which ſubjects can ever attain *the ineſtimable bleſſings of civil liberty.**

* THE delegated governors of every ſtate are certainly intruſted with the force of the ſtate, not only for the purpoſe of defending the ſtate againſt the attacks of all foreign enemies, but alſo for the purpoſe of defending the ſtate againſt the outrages of all licentious ſubjects; but they are not intruſted with the force of the ſtate, for the purpoſe of directing that force againſt the people, whenever the people chooſe, by exerciſing the ſupreme power of governing, to reſtrain any unruly appetite which thoſe delegated governors may diſcover in the government of the ſubjects. And, as to the diſtinction between the people and the ſubjects, or, between a lawful aſſembly of the people whom thoſe delegated governors ought not to govern, but to obey, and a lawleſs mob of ſubjects whom thoſe delegated governors ought not to obey, but to govern. In every ſtate, all popular aſſemblies for the purpoſe of exerciſing the ſupreme power of governing, and inſtructing their delegated governors, ought certainly, by the eſtabliſhed law of the land, to be confined to perſons of a particular deſcription, ſuch as freeholders, or men who are poſſeſſed of an adequate proportion of moneyed property; for, if men who have no property are ſuffered to aſſemble for ſuch a purpoſe, nothing can be more certain, than that the property of all their fellow-citizens could never be ſecure from the outrages of ſuch aſſemblies; but if only men of property are ſuffered to aſſemble for that purpoſe, nothing can be more ridiculous, than the idea of men of property outrageouſly deſtroying their own property. And, under ſuch a regulation, whenever a number of citizens are aſſembled in any part of the ſtate, for the purpoſe of exerciſing the ſupreme power of governing, and inſtructing their delegated governors, if thoſe citizens are not freeholders, nor otherwiſe legally qualified to aſſemble for that purpoſe, then, that aſſembly is a lawleſs mob of ſubjects whom thoſe delegated governors ought not to obey, but to govern; and, in that caſe, to direct the force of the ſtate againſt ſuch an aſſembly, would not be directing the force of the ſtate againſt the people but governing the ſubjects: but, if thoſe citizens are freeholders, or otherwiſe legally qualified to aſſemble for that purpoſe, then, that aſſembly is a lawful aſſembly of the people whom thoſe delegated governors ought not to govern, but to obey; and, in that caſe, to direct the force of the ſtate againſt ſuch an aſſembly, would not be governing the ſubjects, but would be falling ſword in hand upon the people. And, it ought alſo to be further obſerved, that every lawful aſſembly of the people, who are the original governors of the ſtate, when they are aſſembled for the purpoſe of exerciſing the ſupreme power of governing, that they have then the very ſame right, as any aſſembly of delegated governors, to claim

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the force of the ſtate, to defend them from the inſults of all licentious ſubjects; and, that it is juſt as much a duty in all delegated governors, who are intruſted with the force of the ſtate, to make uſe of that force in protecting a lawful aſſembly of the people, or, the original governors, as it is their duty to make uſe of the ſame force, either in protecting a lawful aſſembly of delegated governors, or, in ſuppreſſing a lawleſs mob of ſubjects. And, in this ſtate, where the people have placed the ſword of the ſtate in the hands of our delegated governor the king, when the king directs that ſword againſt a lawleſs mob of ſubjects, then, in that caſe, the king does moſt certainly direct the force of the ſtate againſt the ſubjects whom he ought to govern, and whenever a ſword is neceſſary in the government of lawleſs ſubjects, it is an indiſpenſible duty in the king to govern ſuch ſubjects with the ſeverity of a ſword. But, were we for argument ſake to ſuppoſe, and it is merely for argument ſake that I ſhall here ſtate this ſuppoſition, I ſay, were we to ſuppoſe the king to direct the ſword of the ſtate againſt a lawful aſſembly of the people, then, in that caſe, the king would moſt certainly direct the force of the ſtate againſt the people whom he ought to obey, and whenever the people chooſe to aſſemble in any part of the ſtate, for the purpoſe of exerciſing the ſupreme power of governing, it would be ſuch a breach of truſt in the king, and might be attended with ſuch dreadful conſequences, that I could wiſh to call it an impoſſibility for any king ever to direct the ſword of the ſtate againſt ſuch lawful aſſemblies. In the firſt caſe, the king would not fall ſword in hand upon the people, but would legally and conſtitutionally govern the ſubjects. In the latter caſe, the King would not legally and conſtitutionally govern the ſubjects, but would fall ſword in hand upon the people. And, in this latter caſe, that is, in the caſe of a king miſtaking a lawful aſſembly of the people for a lawleſs mob of ſubjects, and then falling ſword in hand upon the people inſtead of governing the ſubjects with a ſword, I ſay, in this latter caſe, ſuch a forcible reſiſtance of the ſupreme power and legal authority of the people would be not only a direct tranſgreſſion of St. Paul's command of *ſubjection unto the higher powers*, but it would alſo be an act of rebellion on the part of the king, and the very firſt ſoldier who ſhould draw a trigger in ſuch a cauſe would thereby ſubject the king to all the pains and penalties of a rebel.——That the king ſhall command the army is neceſſary for the ſafety of the ſtate, and to defend the ſtate againſt the outrages of lawleſs ſubjects.——That the people ſhall command the king is alſo neceſſary for the ſafety of the ſtate, and to defend the ſtate againſt the much more dreadful outrages of lawleſs governors.——That the king ſhall command the army is neceſſary for the ſafety of the ſtate, and to defend the ſtate from anarchy.——That the people ſhall command the king is alſo neceſſary for the ſafety of the ſtate, and to defend the ſtate from deſpotiſm. ——That the king ſhall command the army is the prerogative of the king. ——That the people ſhall command the king is the prerogative of the people.

POSTSCRIPT.

IN this paper I have ſaid that St. Paul, Rom. xiii. 1. by the words *higher powers* means a people, but I did not ſay that the Apoſtle has confined thoſe words ſolely to that meaning; and though I have hitherto uſed thoſe words only to mean a people, for fear of perplexing the ſubject by ſometimes applying them to the people, and ſometimes to the governors; yet at the ſame time I cannot help thinking, that the words *higher powers* are as juſtly applicable to the delegated governors of a ſtate, as to the people. For, though the people are certainly *the higher powers* with reſpect to the governors, yet, the governors are alſo as certainly *the higher powers* with reſpect to the ſubjects; and therefore, I think that St. Paul has here included both the people and the delegated governors in that general expreſſion. And theſe words may certainly be allowed to have this further meaning without contradiction or confuſion, which will, I think, appear by applying this command of St. Paul, viz. *Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers*, to the Britiſh ſtate, agreeably to this further conſtruction, viz. Let every ſubject of the Britiſh ſtate ſubmit to the *higher powers* of the delegated governors, the king, the lords, and the commons; and, let every delegated governor of the Britiſh ſtate ſubmit to *the higher powers* of the original governors, the people, and then it could not very well be denied, but that *every ſoul* in the Britiſh ſtate would *be ſubject unto the higher powers*. And the ſame conſtruction, which has here been applied to the word governor, may alſo be applied to the words miniſter or ruler, which are mentioned in the third and fourth verſes of this chapter, viz. Let every

ſubject of the Britiſh ſtate ſubmit to *the higher powers* of the delegated miniſters or rulers, the king, the lords, and the commons; and, let every delegated miniſter or ruler of the Britiſh ſtate ſubmit to *the higher powers* of the original miniſters or rulers, the people.

As to the power to which ſubmiſſion is enjoined by the general expreſſion *higher powers*, it ſhould be obſerved, that this precept of St. Paul differs materially from that of St. Peter, where he enjoins *ſubmiſſion to every ordinance of man*, in this reſpect, viz. St. Peter by mentioning *a king and governors that are ſent by him*, has there expreſsly mentioned a delegated ſubject, and has thereby confined the reader in his application of a power, becauſe he can only of right apply a ſubordinate power to a delegated ſubject: but St. Paul has not mentioned either *a people*, or, *a king and governors that are ſent by him*, or any ſubject whatever, either original or delegated, to which the reader can apply a power; and power being only an attribute, and having no ſelf-exiſtence independent of a ſubject; therefore, the reader is obliged to make choice of a ſubject to which he applies the word power before that word can have any meaning; and after he has choſen a ſubject, that choice will determine what power he is then ſpeaking of. For inſtance, ſhould the reader chooſe to apply the word power to the king, lords, and commons, that would plainly determine that he is then ſpeaking of a ſubordinate power, becauſe the king, lords, and commons are a delegated ſubject, and therefore they can of right have no power but a ſubordinate power: or, ſhould he chooſe to apply the word power to the people, that would alſo as plainly determine that he is then ſpeaking of a ſupreme power, becauſe the people are an original ſubject, and therefore have an unalienable right to a ſupreme power. St. Peter, in his precept, has expreſsly mentioned *a king and governors that are ſent by him*; and therefore, the reader can only apply the powers contained in that precept to the power of delegated governors over their ſubjects: but St. Paul, in his precept, has neither mentioned *a people*, nor *a king and governors that are*

are ſent by him; and therefore, I think that the reader may with equal propriety apply the words *higher powers*, either to the power of a people over the delegated governors, or, to the power of the delegated governors over the ſubjects. St. Peter has only confirmed the power of an human inſtitution; but St. Paul has confirmed the power of inſtitutions both divine and human. St. Peter has only enjoined *ſubmiſſion to every ordinance of man*; but St. Paul has enjoined ſubmiſſion to the ordinances both of God and man. St. Peter's command is *limited*, and has only confirmed the power of governors of a particular deſcription over their ſubjects, and of conſequence it has alſo only enjoined the duty of ſubjects of a particular deſcription to their governors: but St. Paul's command is *unlimited*, and has confirmed the power of governors of every deſcription over their ſubjects, and of conſequence it has alſo enjoined the duty of ſubjects of every deſcription to their governors. I believe, that St. Paul has here confirmed, not only the power of a people over the delegated governors, but alſo the power of the delegated governors over the ſubjects; and I alſo believe, that the Apoſtle has here enjoined, not only the duty of the ſubjects to the delegated governors, but alſo the duty of the delegated governors to the people; in ſhort, were I obliged to make a confeſſion of all that I believe reſpecting this precept of St. Paul, viz. *Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers.* This ſhould be my creed, viz.—This ſhort but comprehenſive ſentence has not only guarded all mankind from civil ſlavery, but it has alſo bound all mankind to the performance of their civil duties. This ſingle ſentence contains more political information, and more inſtruction in the ſcience of civil government, than is to be met with in many a large volume on the ſame ſubject. This ſhort ſentence is a library of political knowledge.—So much for my creed—but to return to the ſubject. In every ſtate in the world, the people conſtitute the original government of that ſtate, and were we to ſuppoſe a ſtate in which there is no delegated government eſtabliſhed, and conſequently, in which their are no delegated

ſubject of the Britiſh ſtate ſubmit to *the higher powers* of the delegated miniſters or rulers, the king, the lords, and the commons; and, let every delegated miniſter or ruler of the Britiſh ſtate ſubmit to *the higher powers* of the original miniſters or rulers, the people.

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governors, which muſt certainly have been the caſe of every ſtate, previous to the eſtabliſhment, and muſt alſo as certainly be again the caſe of every ſtate, whenever a diſſolution of that eſtabliſhment takes place; then in that caſe, the original governors, the people, would be the ſole governors over all their ſubjects. Indeed, ſuch a ſtate, eſpecially if it were a large ſtate, would certainly be defective in its civil government, but I am not here ſpeaking of *the efficiency* of government, I am only ſpeaking of *the right* of governing; and therefore I ſtill ſay, that were we to ſuppoſe a ſtate in which there are no delegated governors eſtabliſhed, then, in that ſtate, the people would be the ſole governors over all their ſubjects, the ſword of the ſtate would be in the hands of the people, who are the original miniſters of God, and who, in that caſe, would have an undoubted right to be *a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.* And, in ſuch a ſtate, the people not having ordained a delegated ſubject, it would be impoſſible for a ſubordinate power to have any exiſtence, becauſe a ſubordinate power can only exiſt in conſequence of the people having ordained a delegated ſubject; and therefore, as I ſaid before, the delegated ſubject is ordained of the people, and the ſubordinate power is the creature of the people: and yet, as it would be impoſſible for a ſubordinate power to exiſt, but by being derived from a ſupreme power, which is ordained of God; therefore, *there is* alſo *no power but of God: the powers that be, are ordained of God.* And, the people are not only the ſole governors of every ſtate in which no delegated government has ever been eſtabliſhed, but they are alſo the ſole governors of every ſtate in which an eſtabliſhed delegated government loſes its exiſtence by a diſſolution, though for ever ſo ſhort a period of time, even ſhould that non-exiſtence of a delegated government continue for only one hour. But, in a ſtate in which there is a delegated government eſtabliſhed and really exiſting, then, there are theſe two diſtinct governments exiſting together in that ſtate, viz. the original government, and the delegated government; for, we cannot reaſonably ſay, that the original government loſes its exiſtence

ence by the eſtabliſhment of the delegated government, as that would be the abſurdity, not to call it the impiety, of ſaying, that the weakneſs of man, by an inſtitution of his own, has deſtroyed an inſtitution of Omnipotence. The original government of a ſtate cannot be diſſolved, without a diſſolution of the ſtate, becauſe it is a Divine inſtitution, and that origin plainly declares its immortality: but the delegated government of a ſtate may be diſſolved, without a diſſolution of the ſtate, becauſe it is only an human inſtitution, and that origin as plainly declares its mortality.

As to the real exiſtence of the ſupreme power of a people, and not only the real, but alſo the viſible exiſtence of the original government of a ſtate, in which that ſupreme power ought to reſide. The many county aſſociations which you have lately had in this ſtate, have not only given you a proof of the real and viſible exiſtence of that original government, but they have alſo given you an inſtance of the real exiſtence and exerciſe of the ſupreme power of the original governors, the people, who, excluſive of the rights inherent in their ſupreme ſovereignty, could not perhaps have legally aſſembled in the manner in which they did aſſemble, but who had, by virtue of that ſupremacy, an undoubted right ſo to aſſemble and aſſociate. And, the people, being the original government of this ſtate, have not only an undoubted right to aſſociate for the purpoſe of exerciſing the ſupreme power of governing, but, allowing that I have not miſconſtrued St. Paul's doctirne reſpecting the power of a people over the delegated governors, then, as it is impoſſible for Infinite Wiſdom to eſtabliſh a power which ought not to be *effectually* exerciſed; and, as aſſociating is certainly *the moſt effectual method* for the people to exerciſe that power over the delegated governors; it is therefore at leaſt a neceſſary meaſure in the people, if it is not a poſitive duty impoſed on the people by Divine authority, thus to aſſociate, to make known their will to the delegated government, and to ſignify their pleaſure to the ſubordinate ſovereignty, the king, the lords, and the commons; nor can the ſubordinate ſovereignty, being merely the creature of the people, reſiſt the will of the people, when that will is clearly and

and expreſsly made known to the ſubordinate ſovereignty, without being guilty of a direct breach of truſt, and eſtabliſhing deſpotiſm on the ruins of rightful government.

As to the free exerciſe of the original government and ſupreme power of the people, and which alſo includes in it the free exerciſe of the delegated government and ſubordinate power of the parliament—which alſo includes in it the freedom and independence of all the three branches of parliament, becauſe the parliament is the only conſtitutional medium by which the people can exerciſe their power of governing, I ſay, as to the free exerciſe of the original government and ſupreme power of the people, when we conſider the preſent ſituation of Great Britain, the ſame that was ſaid in the former paper on the powers of government, reſpecting the exerciſe of the delegated government of the parliament, may alſo be ſaid, reſpecting the exerciſe of this original government of the people, viz. That, as the long eſtabliſhed practice of forming the king's ſervants into a miniſterial faction has certainly divided the delegated government againſt itſelf, and has thereby greatly impeded the free exerciſe of the delegated government of the parliament: ſo, in like manner, that practice, by the unavoidable influence which thoſe governors muſt have over their reſpective connexions in every part of this kingdom, would as certainly divide the original government againſt itſelf, and would thereby as greatly impede the free exerciſe of the original government of the people. It is therefore in vain to look for a free exerciſe of either of thoſe governments—It is therefore in vain to look for a free exerciſe of either the ſupreme, or, the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, unleſs the people, as I ſaid before, will firſt ſuppreſs that faction and every faction that ſhall diſturb and diſtract the civil government of the ſtate—unleſs the friends of government will firſt ſuppreſs every diſaffection to government, and every factious oppoſition, not only to the legal government of our delegated governors the parliament, but alſo to the legal government of our original governors the people. But, were we to ſuppoſe every faction to be thus ſuppreſſed,

preſſed, perhaps it would not then be an eaſy matter to point out ſuch motives as could prevent the Britiſh ſubjects from uniting, not only in the ſupport of the delegated government of the parliament, but alſo in the ſupport of the original government of the people, or to point out ſuch motives as could induce the Britiſh ſubjects ever to loſe ſight of or deviate from this principle, which, having been repeatedly mentioned before, I am afraid that the reader will be tired with reading it, though I ſhould not very ſoon tire with writing it, for it is my favourite principle, viz. *Unanimity in the ſupport of government.* Indeed, there cannot be a doubt but that the king's ſervants approve of the principle of ſupporting the government as much as it is poſſible for any one to approve of it, but the miſchief is, the government which the king's ſervants have hitherto invariably endeavoured to ſupport is an *illegal government* of a miniſterial faction in direct oppoſition to the *legal government* of a parliament appointed by the people, and conſequently, in direct oppoſition to the people, or, in direct oppoſition to both the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate; whereas the government which I am here endeavouring to ſupport is the *legal government* of both the people and the parliament in direct oppoſition to the *illegal government* of a miniſterial faction, or, in direct oppoſition to the uſurped power of that faction. And thus, while all parties and all perſons approve of the principle of ſupporting the government, as long as they differ in opinion, whether they ought to ſupport the *legal government* of both the people and the parliament, or, ought to ſupport the *illegal government* of a miniſterial faction, as long, I ſay, as they thus differ in opinion as to the object of their attachment, and whether they ought to ſupport a legal or an illegal government, though they agree as to the principle of ſupporting the government, yet, it is impoſſible that they ſhould ever be unanimous in the ſupport of any government whatever either legal or illegal. And, as the king's ſervants may thus be conſidered as advocates for the ſuppott of government, only differing in opinion from ſome of their fellow-citizens as to the

object

object of their attachment: So, in like manner, it may be ſaid, That the king's ſervants are *the friends of government*, only differing in opinion from ſome of their fellow-citizens as to the object of their friendſhip. For inſtance, whenever the king's ſervants unite in a miniſterial faction, and, inſtead of obſerving the obedience of ſervants, uſurp an *illegal power* of governing this ſtate, then, in that caſe, though the king's ſervants are not friends to the *legal government* of either the people or the parliament, but are the enemies of all *legal government*, yet, they are certainly friends to the *illegal government* of their own faction, and as long as they thus continue united in a faction, and continue to uſurp this *illegal power* of governing, they would do well, were they always to add the word *illegal* to their title, whenever they ſtile themſelves the friends of government, in order, that thoſe who are friends to the *illegal government* of the miniſterial faction, may, by having the word *illegal* added to their title, be clearly diſtinguiſhed from thoſe who are friends to the *legal government* of the people and the parliament, and to prevent many honeſt though ignorant fellow-citizens from being miſled, for want of this diſtinction, to unite with the enemies inſtead of the friends of *legal government*, and thereby ignorantly to deſtroy, not only *the legal and ſupreme power* of the people, but alſo *the legal and ſubordinate power* of the parliament—and thereby ignorantly to deſtroy that very government which they honeſtly intend to ſupport. And this diſtinction between a legal and an illegal government may alſo be uſeful to prevent many unwary citizens from being miſled by popular phraſes to act contrary to their own intentions, and thereby to *weaken* the hands of government at the very time that they intend to *ſtrengthen* the hands of government. For inſtance, nothing is more common, than for a man to unite with a miniſterial faction, and from that circumſtance to plume himſelf on his obſerving this truly commendable principle. viz. The principle of *ſtrengthening the hands of government.* Nor can it be denied, that ſuch a man does, in fact, ſtrengthen the hands of government, but then, this is alſo a fact, viz.

That

That this man, by uniting with a miniſterial faction, though he does certainly *ſtrengthen* the hands of the illegal government of that faction, yet, he does as certainly *weaken* the hands of the legal government of both the people and the parliament, which he perhaps never intended. And, without obſerving this diſtinction between a legal and an illegal government, it is far from impoſſible, that ſome of theſe unwary citizens may be ſo far miſled by this and ſuch like popular phraſes, as to purſue a line of conduct in direct oppoſition to their own intentions. But, their own intentions are certainly beſt known to themſelves, and let thoſe be what they may, my intention is plainly this, viz. To *ſtrengthen*, to the utmoſt of my power, the hands of the legal government of both the people and the parliament, or, to ſtrengthen, to the utmoſt of my power, both the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, and, as I endeavoured to do by the late miniſterial faction, to *weaken*, to the utmoſt of my power, the hands of the illegal government of the preſent and every ſucceeding miniſterial faction, or, to *weaken*, to the utmoſt of my power, every uſurped power of governing this ſtate. Or, to apply the ſame mode of reaſoning to another very common political phraſe. viz. The phraſe of *clogging the wheels of government*. And, with reſpect to this phraſe, I muſt alſo beg leave to declare, that, as far as this machine of government is moved by the power of either the preſent or any miniſterial faction in oppoſition to the power of either the people or the parliament, ſo far it is my intention to clog, to the utmoſt of my power, the wheels of government, and that, as far as this machine of government is moved by the power of either the people or the parliament in oppoſition to the power of either the preſent or any miniſterial faction, ſo far it is my intention, to facilitate, to the utmoſt of my power, the movement of thoſe wheels, that is, it is my intention to clog the wheels of government as far as thoſe wheels are moved by *the illegal and uſurped power* of either the preſent or any miniſterial faction, and to facilitate the movement of thoſe wheels as far as they are moved either by *the legal and ſupreme*

power of the people, or, by *the legal and ſubordinate power* of the parliament. And thus we may trifle for ever with words and phraſes, if, in the application of thoſe words and phraſes, we do not take care to diſtinguiſh whether we apply them to *the legal government* of the people and the parliament, or, to *the illegal government* of a miniſterial faction. It is true, it is now ſaid, that we have an adminiſtration in whom *the people have placed their confidence.* This is the faſhionable language of the day. And, by this language, if it is meant, that the people have placed their confidence in the preſent miniſters, when acting in the character of ſervants, and under the abſolute command of their maſter the parliament, then, in that caſe, I ſubſcribe with both my hands to every degree of confidence that the people may chooſe to place in the preſent miniſters, and I ſhould juſt as willingly place the very ſame degree of confidence in the late miniſters, when under the command of the parliament, and, in both theſe caſes, my confidence would certainly be founded on having the higheſt opinion of the knowledge and abilities of both the late and the preſent adminiſtration. But, inſtead of placing our confidence in the preſent miniſters, when acting in the character of ſervants, and under the abſolute command of their maſter the parliament, if, by the word confidence, it is meant, that we are to place our confidence in the preſent miniſters, when united in a faction, and when acting, by the uſurped power of that faction, in direct oppoſition to the ſubordinate power of the parliament, then, in that caſe, I think it impoſſible for any citizen of this ſtate to continue his confidence in the preſent miniſters, conſiſtently with his duty to the people who created the parliament, and who have, by the conſtitution, placed their confidence in that parliament, as far as that confidence reſpects the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate. And, though it is ſaid, that the people have placed their confidence in the preſent miniſters, yet, as the people have neither declared the throne vacant, nor have they diſolved either of the other

two

two branches of parliament, from that circumſtance we muſt conclude, that the people do ſtill continue to place their confidence in all the three branches of parliament for the exerciſe of their reſpective powers, and conſequently that it is not the people, but a faction, who have now placed their confidence in the preſent miniſters for the exerciſe of this ſubordinate power of governing. And, as long as the people chooſe to continue their confidence in the parliament, or, as long as the people chooſe to continue the ſubordinate power of governing in the three branches of parliament, I think it my duty, in obedience to the ſupreme power of the people, to continue my confidence in the ſame parliament, as far as that confidence reſpects the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, which ſubordinate power the people have inveſted in the parliament, and not to transfer that confidence to the miniſters and ſervants of the ſtate, or, to transfer that confidence to a miniſterial faction. Or, in other words, as long as the people chooſe to continue the preſent form of government, and thereby to continue the ſubordinate power of governing in the king, the lords, and the commons, I think it my duty, in obedience to the ſupreme power of the people, to continue my allegiance and loyalty to the king, the lords, and the commons, and not to transfer that allegiance and loyalty to the miniſters and ſervants of the ſtate, or, to transfer that allegiance and loyalty to a miniſterial faction. And, on the ſame principle of allegiance and loyalty to the king, the lords, and the commons, I muſt conſequently think it my duty to oppoſe, to the utmoſt of my power, not only the preſent but every miniſterial faction that ſhall have the effrontery to uſurp an unconſtitutional power of governing this ſtate, and thereby to diſturb the conſtitutional government of either all or any of the three branches of parliament appointed by the people, and more eſpecially, as every citizen of this ſtate who neglects this duty is certainly guilty not only of neglecting his duty of allegiance and loyalty to the parliament, but he is of

conſequence alſo guilty of neglecting an indiſpenſible duty of allegiance and loyalty to the people who created that parliament, and, as every citizen of this ſtate who joins with the preſent or any miniſterial faction in oppoſition either to the king, the lords, or the commons, is certainly guilty, not only of the odious crime of diſaffection to the king, the lords, or the commons, but he is of conſequence alſo guilty of the no leſs, not to call it, the more odious crime of diſaffection to the people who created the king, the lords, and the commons. Indeed, as to the free exerciſe of the delegated government of the parliament, or as to the free exerciſe of the ſubordinate power of the parliament, it is impoſſible to ſupport the three branches of parliament in the free exerciſe of their reſpective conſtitutional rights and powers, unleſs the people, by their ſupreme power, will not only defend all the three branches of parliament againſt the encroachments of a miniſterial faction, but will alſo defend each of the three branches of parliament againſt the encroachments of either of the other two branches, and unleſs the people will not only defend both the lords and the commons againſt the unconſtitutional power and influence of the king, but will alſo defend the king againſt the unconſtitutional power and influence of either the lords or the commons; which is the only means whereby you can poſſibly ſupport all the three branches of parliament in the free exerciſe of their reſpective conſtitutional rights and powers; and which is therefore the only means whereby you can poſſibly, under this form of government, ſupport the civil liberty of the citizens. And, as to *the free exerciſe* of theſe three governments, viz. the government of the people, the government of the parliament, and the government of a miniſterial faction, it may alſo be ſaid, That while the king's ſervants are endeavouring to promote the free exerciſe of the government of the miniſterial faction, I am here endeavouring to promote the free exerciſe of the government of both the people and the parliament: And that, as far as either the ſupreme power of the people,

people, or, the ſubordinate power of the parliament, does really over-rule the uſurped power of the miniſterial faction in the government of this ſtate, ſo far the Britiſh ſubjects do certainly live under a legal and a free government, and are in a ſtate of perfect civil liberty: But, on the contrary, as far as the uſurped power of the miniſterial faction does really over-rule either the ſupreme power of the people, or, the ſubordinate power of the parliament in the government of this ſtate, ſo far the Britiſh ſubjects do as certainly live under an illegal and a deſpotic government, and are in a ſtate of ſlavery. So that the unhappy diviſions which have ſo long characterized the people of this ſtate as a reſtleſs people, and which do now diſtract the civil government of the ſtate, may be very fairly imputed to a violent contention and ſtruggle between the ſupreme power of the people, the ſubordinate power of the parliament, and the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction, or, between the legal government of the people and the parliament, and the illegal government of a miniſterial faction, and our reſtleſs ſpirit may alſo be very fairly imputed to our thus vibrating between a free and a deſpotic government, between liberty and ſlavery.

As to the exerciſe of both the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate by the members of all the three branches of parliament, who, in the character of members of parliament or delegated ſenators, have an acquired right of ſharing with their fellow-ſenators in the delegated government of the parliament, and in the ſubordinate power of governing the ſtate, and who, in the character of citizens or original ſenators, have alſo a natural right of ſharing with their fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators in the original government of the people, and in the ſupreme power of governing the ſtate, I ſay, as to the exerciſe of both the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate by the members of all the three branches of parliament.——When a member of the houſe of commons finds his ſubordinate power of giving laws, either to the ſubjects or the ſervants

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of the ſtate, to be over-ruled by the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction formed within that houſe, then, Where ought this delegated ſenator, this member of the houſe of commons, to look for ſupport? Certainly in the original ſenators, the people. Certainly by joining with his fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators, both in and out of parliament, in the original government of the people, and in the exerciſe of the ſupreme power of governing this ſtate, and by that ſupreme power of the people to ſuppreſs the uſurped power of that faction and every faction that ſhall oppoſe him in the exerciſe of his ſubordinate power of giving laws to every ſubject, and to every miniſter or ſervant of the ſtate. And, as the ſame may be ſaid of a member of the upper houſe, as to his judiciary power of governing this ſtate, the caſe being exactly the ſame, it may perhaps be unneceſſary to repeat the ſame words reſpecting a member of that right honourable houſe. And——When a king finds his ſubordinate power of executing laws, either with reſpect to the ſubjects or the ſervants of the ſtate, to be over-ruled by the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction formed in either houſe of parliament, then, Where ought this delegated ſenator, the king, to look for ſupport? Certainly in the original ſenators, the people. Certainly by joining with his fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators, both in and out of parliament, in the original government of the people, and in the exerciſe of the ſupreme power of governing this ſtate, and by that ſupreme power of the people to ſuppreſs the uſurped power of that faction and every faction that ſhall oppoſe him in the exerciſe of his ſubordinate power of executing laws on every ſubject, and on every miniſter or ſervant of the ſtate. In the character of members of parliament or delegated ſenators, the king, the lords, and the commoners, have an acquired right of ſharing with their fellow-ſenators in the delegated government of the parliament, and in the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, and in the character of citizens or original ſenators, they have alſo a natural right of ſharing with

with their fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators in the original government of the people, and in the ſupreme power of governing the ſtate.—In the character of members of parliament or delegated ſenators, the king, the lords, and the commoners, have a conſtitutional right of ſharing with their fellow-ſenators in the ſubordinate power of governing every ſubject, and every miniſter or ſervant of the ſtate, and, in the character of citizens or original ſenators, they have alſo a natural right of ſharing with their fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators in the ſupreme power of governing themſelves. And, whenever a member of any of the three branches of parliament, whenever a king, a lord, or, a commoner, finds the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction, or, the uſurped power of any faction, making the leaſt degree of encroachment on his liberty, on his property, or, on any of his civil rights, and alſo finds that his ſubordinate power, with which he is inveſted as a delegated ſenator, is inſufficient to ſupport himſelf againſt thoſe encroachments, in ſuch a caſe, ſhould this delegated ſenator neglect to make his appeal to the original ſenators, the people, for their ſupport, then, Where ought he to place the blame? Certainly in his own neglect. Certainly in himſelf, for having thus neglected to join with his fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power of governing himſelf, and for having thus abandoned himſelf and the care of his own ſafety and property, by not joining with his fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators, both in and out of parliament, in the original government of the people, and in the exerciſe of the ſupreme power of governing this ſtate, and by that ſupreme power of the people to ſupport himſelf againſt all ſuch encroachments; and it is by that means, and by that means alone, that a member of any of the three branches of parliament, that a king, a lord, or a commoner, can ever effectually ſupport himſelf againſt the encroachments of faction, and can ever effectually ſecure to himſelf the full enjoyment of his liberty, his property, and all his civil rights.

And

AND, as to the neceſſity of theſe two diſtinct governments, viz. the original government, and the delegated government, exiſting together in the ſame ſtate, perhaps ſome circumſtances which have lately happened in this ſtate, may, in ſome degree, evince that neceſſity. For inſtance, as to the neceſſity of the original government of this ſtate—when the aſſociated counties applied to parliament for a redreſs of grievances, if thoſe aſſociations were ſufficiently numerous to be fairly called *the people*, then, in that caſe, thoſe aſſociations were in fact, what I have here called, an original government of Divine inſtitution, having, by virtue of that inſtitution, an inherent right to the ſupreme power of the ſtate; and therefore, it is impoſſible that the delegated government of this ſtate, or, the parliament, conſiſting of the king, the lords, and the commons, being only an human inſtitution, and having therefore no right to any power but a ſubordinate power, it is, I ſay, impoſſible that the parliament could have a right to reſiſt thoſe applications and prayers of the people, as ſuch a reſiſtance of the ſupreme power of the people, and from a ſubordinate power of their own creating, would certainly be trampling on the rights and ſovereignty of the people, and a direct eſtabliſhment of a temporary deſpotiſm in the ſtate. And, if we allow that all applications from the people to the parliament ought to be effectually ſupported, and alſo allow that it is right to guard the ſtate againſt all acts of deſpotiſm, how can we reaſonably deny the neceſſity of the original government of the people? it being impoſſible for any power, except the ſupreme power of the people, effectually to ſupport their own applications, and to reſtrain deſpotic governors. Indeed, as to the reſiſtance which was made in parliament to thoſe applications and prayers of the people, it ſhould be conſidered, whether it was in fact the ſubordinate power of the parliament, or the uſurped power of the late miniſterial faction, which reſiſted thoſe applications from the aſſociated counties, and conſequently did thereby reſiſt the ſupreme power of the people: For, if

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it was the power of the miniſterial faction, which, in that particular inſtance, did really ſo far over-rule the power of the parliament as to obviate the effects of thoſe applications, then, in that caſe, it was not the parliament, but the late miniſterial faction, who were guilty of that act of deſpotiſm. And, as to the neceſſity of the delegated government of this ſtate,—when the whole capital was endangered by an ungovernable mob, which did certainly eſtabliſh a temporary anarchy in the ſtate, then, in ſuch a caſe, I think no one will deny the neceſſity of the delegated government of the parliament to reſtrain ſuch licentious ſubjects. Thus, theſe two inſtances may perhaps, in ſome degree, evince the neceſſity of theſe two diſtinct governments, viz. the original government of the people, and the delegated government of the parliament, exiſting together in this ſtate; but though it may not be improper to mention particular inſtances in the ſupport of this argument in favour of the neceſſity of theſe two diſtinct governments, yet, we ſhould not reſt the truth of the argument on proofs to be deduced from particular inſtances, as thoſe proofs may always be controverted, and may alſo, at the ſame time, leave the truth of the argument in favour of the neceſſity of the two governments incontrovertible. And therefore, allowing that the ſubjects of this ſtate do not always act on principles of virtue and honour, that plainly proves the neceſſity of the delegated government, or, the ſubordinate power of the parliament, to reſtrain thoſe licentious ſubjects. And, in like manner, allowing that the delegated governors of this ſtate do not always act on principles of virtue and honour, that alſo as plainly proves the neceſſity of the original government, or, the ſupreme power of the people, to reſtrain thoſe licentious governors. Indeed, it is unqueſtionable, that Great Britain can at this time boaſt of many many exemplary and diſtinguiſhed characters of virtue and honour amongſt her delegated governors, but ſtill that ought not to have the leaſt degree of influence in forming conſtitutional laws. All laws are certainly founded on a ſuppoſition, that men, if they are not reſtrained by thoſe laws, will deviate from the principles of

and honour. And as we could not juſtly extol the wiſdom of our delegated governors, were they not to form *the civil laws* on this ſuppoſition, viz. That the ſubjects of the Britiſh ſtate will not ſcruple to injure, and even to deſtroy the ſtate for their own emolument, and to gratify their private paſſions, provided the delegated governors will tamely look on and ſuffer them to do it: ſo, in like manner, we could not juſtly extol the good ſenſe of the people, were they not to form *the conſtitutional laws* on this ſuppoſition, viz. That the delegated governors of the Britiſh ſtate will not ſcruple to injure, and even to deſtroy the ſtate for their own emolument, and to gratify their private paſſions, provided the people will tamely look on and ſuffer them to do it. And, were we here to take into conſideration the principles that govern human nature, and the ſecret ſprings that move the human heart, and at the ſame time, were we either to ſuppoſe this ſtate to be ſo far deſerted by the delegated governors, as to be left an eaſy prey to the open violence of the ſubjects, or, were we to ſuppoſe the ſtate to be ſo far deſerted by the people, as to be left an eaſy prey to the ſecret intrigues of thoſe governors, then, under ſuch circumſtances, the conſideration of thoſe principles, and of thoſe ſecret movements of the heart, would preſent a mortifying proſpect of *the unavaidable deſtruction* of Great Britain from plain and natural cauſes, which, without a miracle, could not poſſibly produce any other conſequence: but, on the other hand, were we to ſuppoſe the licentiouſneſs of the ſubjects to be carefully guarded againſt by the delegated governors, and alſo the licentiouſneſs of thoſe governors to be as carefully guarded againſt by the people, and both the people and the governors, with unremitting attention, to guard the ſafety and welfare of the ſtate from the encroachments of their reſpective ſubjects; then, under ſuch circumſtances, the conſideration of thoſe principles, and of thoſe ſecret movements of the heart, would preſent a pleaſing proſpect of *the unavoidable proſperity* of Great Britain, and that alſo from plain and natural cauſes, which, with Divine permiſſion, could not poſſibly produce any other conſequence. Now this doctrine

doctrine ſeems to place the proſperity or adverſity of nations a good deal in their own power, and, after placing our dependence on Divine Providence, who alone can determine the effects of even natural cauſes, perhaps it may not be very far from the real truth; nor does it appear to me to be inconſiſtent with the wiſdom and goodneſs of an all-ruling Providence to leave the proſperity or adverſity of nations to depend a good deal on ſuch natural cauſes as are within their own power, viz. *The good or bad government of themſelves.* And allowing this doctrine to be true, then, ſhould either the delegated governors of the Britiſh ſtate neglect to exerciſe a proper dominion over the ſubjects, or, ſhould the people neglect to exerciſe a proper dominion over thoſe governors, that is, ſhould there be a neglect in the exerciſe of either the ſupreme or the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, in either caſe, this ſtate would certainly be defective in the government of itſelf, and, by thus neglecting the natural cauſe of proſperity, viz. *good government*, would conſequently be left with no other alternative, but that of either ſuffering the evils which are the natural conſequences of ſuch a neglect, or, hoping, and perhaps vainly hoping, to be ſheltered from thoſe evils by a miracle. It is true, the neglects of our delegated governors might not be attended with ſuch fatal conſequences to the ſtate as the neglects of the people. For, as to our delegated governors neglecting an effectual exerciſe of their ſubordinate power and a proper dominion over the ſubjects, as in the caſe juſt mentioned, when the whole capital was endangered by an ungovernable mob, which did certainly eſtabliſh a temporary anarchy in the ſtate: I ſay, as to our delegated governors neglecting an effectual exerciſe of their ſubordinate power and a proper dominion over the ſubjects, either by not making ſuch *civil laws* as are neceſſary to reſtrain licentious ſubjects, or, by not executing thoſe laws properly after they are made, in either caſe, ſuch neglects, on the part of thoſe governors, though they may injure the ſtate by ſuch ſcenes of anarchy and confuſion as this ſtate has lately experienced, yet, the neglects of our delegated governors

cannot totally deſtroy the ſtate, but through the additional neglect of the people; becauſe thoſe governors are amenable for their conduct to the people, and it is conſequently impoſſible for thoſe neglects of the delegated governors to be either of a long continuance, or frequently repeated, unleſs the people, on their part, neglect to exerciſe a proper dominion over thoſe governors; nor can the neglects of our delegated governors poſſibly happen in caſes very fatal to the ſtate, but through a manifeſt neglect in the people not having eſtabliſhed ſuch conſtitutions as do not leave it in the power of thoſe governors to do any very material injury to the ſtate. But, as to the people neglecting an effectual exerciſe of their ſupreme power and a proper dominion over our delegated governors, as in the caſe juſt mentioned, when the aſſociated counties applied to parliament for a redreſs of grievances, which applications met with a reſiſtance in parliament, and which reſiſtance, if we allow thoſe aſſociations to be called the people, did as certainly eſtabliſh a temporary deſpotiſm in the ſtate: I ſay, as to the people neglecting an effectual exerciſe of their ſupreme power and a proper dominion over our delegated governors, either by not making ſuch *conſtitutional laws* as are neceſſary to reſtrain licentious governors, or, by not executing thoſe laws properly after they are made, in either caſe, ſuch neglects, on the part of the people, may not only injure but totally deſtroy the ſtate; becauſe the people are amenable for their conduct to no power on earth, and there is conſequently no power on earth to prevent either the continuance or repetition of thoſe neglects of the people, or, to prevent the fatal conſequences of thoſe neglects from falling on the ſtate with a full and unreſtrained force, and thereby totally deſtroying the ſtate. And therefore, as to the political grievances of this ſtate, inſtead of aſcribing them *ſolely*, and as it is moſt uſual, to the pride of kings, the intrigues of miniſters, or, the venality of parliaments, we ought certainly to aſcribe them *chiefly* to our own weakneſs, our own indolence, and our own neglects. Inſtead of aſcribing thoſe grievances *ſolely* to the neglect of our delegated governors, the parliament,

liament, we ought certainly to aſcribe them *chiefly* to the neglect of our original governors, the people, that is, if we allow that Great Britain is at this time a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed; then, though Great Britain may, in that caſe, be in ſome degree aggrieved by the neglect of her delegated governors, the parliament, yet, it is impoſſible for Great Britain, being a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed, and the original governors, or, the people, having therefore a command over their delegated governors, the parliament; it is, I ſay, impoſſible in that caſe, for Great Britain to be materially aggrieved by the neglect of either kings, miniſters, or parliaments, without the concurrent neglect of the people; and, as long as Great Britain continues to be a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed, ſhould ſhe ever receive a fatal and a deciſive blow, that ſhe muſt certainly, in conſequence of that ſelf-government, receive that blow, not from *the ſubordinate*, but from *the ſupreme power* of governing the ſtate,—not from the hands of the parliament, but from the hands of the people. And, for the very ſame reaſon, as to the many great and valuable bleſſings which this ſtate receives from her civil government, if we allow that Great Britain is at this time a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed; then, though Great Britain may, in that caſe, receive many great and valuable bleſſings from the wiſdom and care of her delegated governors, the parliament, yet, as it is impoſſible for the delegated governors of a free ſtate to act independent of the will of the people; therefore, we ought certainly to aſcribe thoſe bleſſings alſo, not *ſolely to the ſubordinate*, but *chiefly to the ſupreme power* of governing the ſtate,—not *ſolely* to the wiſdom and care of our delegated governors, the parliament, but *chiefly* to the good ſenſe and ſuperintending care of our original governors, the people. In ſhort, whether we ſpeak of the grievances or bleſſings which this ſtate derives from her civil government, we are certainly apt to be not only too laviſh both of the cenſure and applauſe of our delegated governors, the parliament, but alſo too ſparing both of the cenſure and applauſe of our original governors, the people; that is, we are apt to aſcribe many political effects

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(whether good or bad) to the parliament, as the cauſe, which we ought not to aſcribe to the parliament, but to the people, as the real cauſe of thoſe effects; owing probably to our having no idea of there being any civil government exiſting within this ſtate, except the delegated government of the parliament, to which we can aſcribe political effects, and our not having duly conſidered, that there is alſo an original government of the people exiſting within this ſtate to which we may aſcribe ſuch effects, which is an error that muſt unavoidably miſlead us to aſcribe all effects (whether good or bad) to one cauſe, viz. the parliament: and conſequently, to aſcribe many grievances as well as bleſſings to the parliament, which this ſtate does not derive from the civil government of the parliament, but from the civil government of the people,—which this ſtate does not derive from *the ſubordinate*, but from the *ſupreme power* of governing the ſtate. And, as in ſome caſes, by aſcribing thoſe *grievances* to the parliament which we ought to aſcribe to the people, we may increaſe our political grievances, by thus miſtaking the object of our cenſure, ſo, in other caſes, by aſcribing thoſe *bleſſings* to the parliament which we ought to aſcribe to the people, we may decreaſe our political bleſſings, by thus miſtaking the object of our applauſe. And this error, this dangerous error, of our not having duly conſidered the real exiſtence of this original government of the people, and the conſequent ſuperiority of the people over the parliament, muſt alſo unavoidably miſlead us to imagine the parliament to be ſuperior to the people in power, dignity, and conſequence, which is certainly injuring, not to call it inſulting, all our other fellow-citizens, by a direct encroachment on their natural rights, becauſe that ſuperiority which we thus give to our *inferior governors*, the parliament, is the natural right and unalienable prerogative of our *ſuperior governors*, the people. And this error muſt alſo miſlead us to confine our attention to the leſs important object, viz. the conduct and government of the parliament, inſtead of extending our attention to the much more important object, viz. the conduct and government of the people, and to place our

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chief dependence on the *ſuppoſed ſovereignty* of the parliament, inſtead of placing that dependence on the *real ſovereignty* of the people, But, while we are thus endeavouring, not only to explain the neceſſity, but alſo to adjuſt the ſuperiority and ſubordination of theſe two legal governments, viz. the original government of the people, which is a divine inſtitution, and whoſe power is of conſequence, a ſupreme power, and, the delegated government of the parliament, which is only an human inſtitution, being created by the people, and whoſe power is of conſequence only a ſubordinate power; I ſay, while we are thus endeavouring, not only to explain the neceſſity, but alſo to adjuſt the rights of theſe two legal governments, we ſhould not forget that there is alſo another government exiſting within this ſtate, viz. the government of a miniſterial faction, which we may be very ſure is not a Divine inſtitution, neither was it created by the people, it is a *ſelf-created* government, and neither has, nor can poſſibly have, the leaſt degree of power in the government of this ſtate which is not fouuded on *uſurpation*. And, in all adminiſtrations, it has been the invariable practice of this ſelf-created government to *uſurp* the power of both the people and the parliament,—it has been the invariable practice of this ſelf-created government to *uſurp* both the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate. And, in any adminiſtration, ſuch a line of conduct is, in fact, ſubverting all legal and rightful power of governing by the ſervant *uſurping* the power of his maſter,—ſuch a line of conduct is, in fact, deſtroying the *legal and free government* of the people and the parliament, and eſtabliſhing *an illegal and a deſpotic government* of a miniſterial faction. Nor would it make the leaſt difference as to the nature of a miniſterial government, were we to ſay, or even to prove, that ſuch an adminiſtration purſued wiſe and wholeſome meaſures, and that ſuch an adminiſtration purſued dangerous and deſtructive meaſures. It is neither the proſperity nor the adverſity of a ſtate which determines the nature of its government, uor does the nature

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of its government depend on the meaſures which are purſued. A free government may purſue ſuch bad meaſures as will deſtroy all their ſubjects, and a deſpotic government may purſue ſuch good meaſures as will promote the intereſt of all their ſlaves. And, in this ſtate, as far as the Britiſh ſubjects are governed, as I ſaid before, either by the ſupreme power of the people, or, by the ſubordinate power of the parliament, whether the people and the parliament purſue good or bad meaſures, ſo far the Britiſh ſubjects do certainly live under a free government and are in a ſtate of perfect civil liberty: But, on the contrary, as far as the Britiſh ſubjects are governed by the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction, whether that faction purſues good or bad meaſures, ſo far the Britiſh ſubjects do as certainly live under a deſpotic government and are in a ſtate of ſlavery. In the government of ſtates, the exerciſe of a deſpotic power is not always confined to thrones or palaces. A deſpotic power may be exerciſed either by a king, or, by miniſters, the very ſervants of a ſtate. And, in this ſtate, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, inſtead of obſerving the obedience of a ſervant to his maſter, inſtead of obſerving their duty of obedience to the king, the lords, and the commons, uſurp a power of governing the lords and the commons, and only obey the king, that is, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, uſurp the judiciary and the legiſlative branches of the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, and only obey the executive branch, then, theſe miniſters having the government of the lords and the commons, and being under the command of the king, it may reaſonably be ſuppoſed that they govern both lords and commons agreeably to the will of the king, and having thus, in effect, concentrated all the three powers of government in the king, in direct violation of the conſtitution which has veſted thoſe three ſubordinate powers of governing in the three branches of parliament, and conſequently, in direct oppoſition to the ſupreme power of the people who eſtabliſhed that conſtitution, or, in direct oppoſition to *the higher powers* to which

which St. Paul has commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject*, that is, in direct defiance of all laws both divine and human; I ſay, having thus, in effect, concentrated all the three powers of government in the king, in this caſe, not only the Britiſh ſubjects, but alſo the lords and the commons, are thereby ſubjugated to the power of a royal deſpot;—in this caſe, it is not only the Britiſh ſubjects who are enſlaved by their royal maſter, but alſo the lords and the commons, who are, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, *ſlaves*. And, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, acquire ſuch a degree of popularity, as to enable them to uſurp, not only a power of governing the lords and the commons, but alſo a power of governing the king, that is, whenever the miniſters, or, the ſervants of the ſtate, uſurp not only the judiciary and the legiſlative branches of the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, but alſo the executive branch, then, theſe popular miniſters having the government of the lords and the commons, and diſdaining the commands of the king, we need not ſuppoſe, but may be very ſure, that they govern all the three branches of parliament agreeably to their own will, and having thus, in effect, concentrated all the three powers of government in themſelves, in direct violation, as I ſaid before, of the conſtitution which has veſted thoſe three ſubordinate powers of governing in the three branches of parliament, and conſequently, in direct oppoſition to the ſupreme power of the people who eſtabliſhed that conſtitution, or, in direct oppoſition to *the higher powers* to which St. Paul has commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject*, that is, in direct defiance of the very ſame laws both divine and human; I ſay, having thus, in effect, concentrated all the three powers of government in themſelves, in this caſe, not only the lords, the commons, and the Britiſh ſubjects, but alſo the king, are thereby ſubjugated to the power of theſe miniſterial deſpots;—in this caſe, it is not only the lords, the commons, and the Britiſh ſubjects, who are enſlaved by theſe miniſterial deſpots, but alſo the king, who is, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, *a ſlave*. And, let not the Britiſh ſenators, let not the Britiſh ſubjects, under the fair

appearance of diminiſhing the influence of the crown, ever increaſe the influence of a miniſterial faction,—under the fair appearance of diminiſhing the illegal and unconſtitutional influence of the king in both houſes of parliament, ever increaſe the illegal and unconſtitutional influence of a miniſterial faction in both thoſe houſes,—under the fair appearance of reſtraining the deſpotic power of the king, ever bend their necks to the deſpotic power of a miniſterial faction! If we are to be enſlaved, let us at leaſt have the honour of being ſlaves to a royal maſter, and not render ourſelves the moſt contemptible ſlaves upon earth by crouching to a deſpicable faction! A faction, which, ſupported by a ſucceſſion of different miniſters, has, for ages paſt, been preying on the very vitals of this nation. And, as long as the people ſuffer the dignity of the Britiſh ſenate, or, the two houſes of parliament, to be degraded by the admiſſion of the very ſervants of the ſtate within thoſe venerable walls,—as long as the people withhold the exerciſe of their ſupreme power, and thereby neglect to ſupport the ſubordinate power of the parliament,—as long as the people withhold the exerciſe of that plenitude of power which they derive from divine authority, and thereby neglect to ſupport the inefficiency of that power which the parliament derive from the people,—as long as the people ſo far neglect their duty to themſelves as to ſuffer the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction to oppoſe and diſturb the free exerciſe of either the ſupreme or the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, it is next to impoſſible that the civil government of the ſtate ſhould not be divided and diſtracted, as I ſaid before, by a violent contention and ſtruggle between the ſupreme power of the people, the ſubordinate power of the parliament, and the uſurped power of a miniſterial faction, or, between the legal government of the people and the parliament, and the illegal government of a miniſterial faction. And, in this ſituation, it is alſo next to impoſſible that the people of this ſtate ſhould not continue a reſtleſs people— it is next to impoſſible that the parliament ſhould not continue a reſtleſs parliament—it is next to impoſſible that the citizens of this ſtate,

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of every deſcription, ſhould not continue their reſtleſs ſpirit —it is next to impoſſible that they ſhould not continue a violent contention and ſtruggle between a free and a deſpotic government, between liberty and ſlavery—it is next to impoſſible that they ſhould enjoy the bleſſings of peace and harmony; nor would it be conſiſtent with the duty of benevolence which we owe to our fellow-citizens, were we to wiſh either the people or the parliament ever to enjoy the bleſſings of peace and harmony, until the advocates for the *ſupreme power* of the people, and the *ſubordinate power* of the parliament, ſhall have effectually ſubdued and ſilenced the advocates for the *uſurped power* of a miniſterial faction,—until the advocates for the *legal government* of both the people and the parliament ſhall have effectually ſubdued and ſilenced the advocates for the *illegal governmont* of a miniſterial faction—until the advocates for the *free government* of both the people and the parliament ſhall have effectually ſubdued and ſilenced the advocates for the *deſpotic government* of a miniſterial faction—until the advocates for *civil liberty* ſhall have effectually ſubdued and ſilenced the advocates for *ſlavery*, and ſhall have thereby effectually eſtabliſhed that greateſt of all human bleſſings, CIVIL LIBERTY.

Now, allowing that in every ſtate in which there is a delegated government eſtabliſhed, that there are two diſtinct and legal governments really exiſting, yet, in drawing a concluſion from what has been ſaid, as a means of endeavouring to expreſs myſelf intelligibly, I muſt deſire the privilege to ſpeak of a ſtate in which there is no delegated government, in the uſual manner, by calling it a ſtate in which there is no government at all, and notwithſtanding the allowed exiſtence of an original government, to ſay of that ſtate, as it is always ſaid, that it is in a ſtate of *anarchy*; and then, where we to apply all that has been ſaid in this paper to the Britiſh ſtate, it would amount to this concluſion, viz. That the ſubjects of the Britiſh ſtate, by an human inſtitution, are amenable for their conduct to the ſubordinate power of the delegated governors, the king, the lords, and the commons—That the

delegated governors of the Britiſh ſtate, the king, the lords, and the commons, not only on the principle of reaſon, but alſo by a divine inſtitution, are amenable for their conduct to the ſupreme power of the original governors, the people; and—That the deſtroying of this eſtabliſhed and neceſſary ſubordination of power, either by the ſubjects illegally reſiſting the ſubordinate power of the delegated governors, or by the delegated governors illegally reſiſting the ſupreme power of the original governors, would certainly be deſtroying all legal government, and involving the ſtate in the dreadful effects of either anarchy or deſpotiſm. For, ſhould any perſon ſeditiouſly ſtir up the ſubjects to rebel againſt and deſtroy the ſubordinate power of the delegated governors, the king, the lords, and the commons, then, by deſtroying *the ſubordinate power* of thoſe delegated governors, he would certainly eſtabliſh *anarchy:* or, ſhould he ſeditiouſly ſtir up, either the delegated governors or the ſubjects, to rebel againſt and deſtroy the ſupreme power of the original governors, the people; then, by deſtroying *the ſupreme power* of thoſe original governors, he would as certainly eſtabliſh *deſpotiſm.* And, in either caſe, that perſon, by thus either alienating the hearts of the ſubjects from their loyalty to the delegated governors, or, by alienating the hearts of either the delegated governors, or the ſubjects, from their loyalty to people, and thereby fomenting a rebellion either againſt the original or the delegated government, would certainly be guilty of one of the greateſt crimes that it is poſſible for a man to be guilty of in ſociety, viz, the crime of fomenting a rebellion. And, whether we were to ſuppoſe the ſubjects to be deluded into a rebellion againſt the delegated governors, or, were we to ſuppoſe, either the delegated governors, or the ſubjects, to be deluded into a rebellion againſt the people, in either caſe, ſhould either the governors, or the ſubjects (miſled by a wanton and unreſtrained ſpirit of licentiouſneſs) audaciouſly break out into an open rebellion againſt *the higher powers* to which St. Paul has commanded them to *be ſubject*; then, whatever lives might be loſt in ſubduing thoſe rebels, the Apoſtle has plainly told us, in

both

both thoſe caſes, at whoſe hands that blood would be required, by expreſsly declaring, that there is a future puniſhment which awaits EVERY SOUL (whether he be a governor, or a ſubject) who is not *ſubject unto the higher powers which are ordained of God.* But, it is not alone ſufficient for the purpoſes of civil government, that the reſpective powers of the people and the delegated governors ſhould not be deſtroyed; it is equally neceſſary that thoſe diſtinct agents ſhould not neglect a proper exerciſe of their reſpective powers, for, whether an agent is diſpoſſeſſed of power, or, being poſſeſſed of power, does not make a proper uſe of it, in either caſe, as the effects muſt ſtill be wanting; therefore, it is impoſſible, either to deſtroy *the ſubordinate power* of the delegated governors, the king, the lords, and the commons, or, to neglect a proper exerciſe of that power, without eſtabliſhing *anarchy*, and thereby expoſing this ſtate to the dreadful depredations of *a mob of lawleſs ſubjects*; and equally impoſſible, either to deſtroy *the ſupreme power* of the original governors, the people, or, to neglect a proper exerciſe of that power, without eſtabliſhing *deſpotiſm*, and thereby expoſing the ſtate to the leſs turbulent but more deadly depredations of *a junto of lawleſs governors.* I believe it to be impoſſible, either to weaken the legal force of the ſubordinate power of governing, or to withhold the proper exerciſe of that power, *even in the ſmalleſt degree*, without introducing anarchy *in the very ſame degree*; and I alſo believe it to be equally impoſſible, either to weaken the legal force of the ſupreme power of governing, or to withhold the proper exerciſe of that power, *even in the ſmalleſt degree*, without introducing deſpotiſm *in the very ſame degree*; and therefore, with that deference which I owe to the public, aud with that humility which beſt becomes a trifling individual when he preſumes to ſpeak to the public, I here beg leave to declare, That I think it the duty of every citizen to contribute to the ſupport of both thoſe eſtabliſhed and neceſſary powers—to contribute to the ſupport, not only of the ſubordinate power of the delegated government, the parliament, but alſo to the ſupport of the ſupreme power

of

of the original government, the people; and if it is not an unpardonable preſumption, I would add, That I think it the duty of the delegated governors, neither to reſiſt the ſupreme power of the people, as that would eſtabliſh deſpotiſm, nor to neglect the exerciſe of their ſubordinate power over the ſubjects, as that would eſtabliſh anarchy: That I think it the duty of the people, neither, by unneceſſary reſtraints, to check the ſubordinate power of the delegated governors over the ſubjects, as that alſo would eſtabliſh anarchy, nor, by neceſſary reſtraints, to neglect the exerciſe of their ſupreme power over thoſe governors, as that alſo would eſtabliſh deſpotiſm: and, That I think it the duty of both the people and the delegated governors to attend to the exerciſe of their reſpective powers; the people, by their ſupreme power, giving laws to the governors; and the governors, by their ſubordinate power, giving laws to the ſubjects; and both the people and the governors to attend alſo to the execution of thoſe laws which they have given to their reſpective ſubjects, and thus to ſupport both the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of governing—thus to ſupport, not only the ſubordinate power of governing, which, by an human inſtitution, is inveſted in the parliament, in order to guard the ſtate from anarchy, but alſo the ſupreme power of governing, which, by a divine inſtitution, is inveſted in the people, in order to guard the ſtate from deſpotiſm; it being an abſolute impoſſibility, without an effectual ſupport of both thoſe powers, to prevent either this, or any ſtate in the world, from ſinking under the dreadful effects of either anarchy or deſpotiſm. But, were we to ſuppoſe this political line of conduct to be invariably obſerved in the Britiſh ſtate, then, in that caſe, as far as natural cauſes can operate to produce effects, I may ſafely aſſert, that this ſtate would unavoidably enjoy theſe three great bleſſings of ſociety, viz. *peace*, *harmony*, *and civil liberty*; and that you might ſafely bid defiance to theſe three great evils of ſociety, viz. *rebellion*, *anarchy*, *and deſpotiſm*. This is, I think, a true concluſion from theſe premiſes. And, as the diſtinctions mentioned in this paper may be neceſſary, in order

to

to a right underſtanding of the whole of St. Paul's political doctrine contained in the firſt ſeven verſes of the thirteenth chapter of the Epiſtle to the Romans, and in order to a right application of that doctrine, either to the Britiſh or any other ſtate, I ſhall therefore here endeavour to paraphraſe thoſe ſeven verſes agreeably to theſe diſtinctions.

TEXT.

Verſe 1. Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be, are ordained of God.

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 1. *Let* every ſubject of a ſtate ſubmit to the ſubordinate power of the delegated rulers of that ſtate; and, *let* every delegated ruler of the ſtate ſubmit to the ſupreme power of the original rulers, the people; and then *every ſoul* will *be ſubject unto the higher powers. For*, as every ſubordinate power muſt be derived from a ſupreme power, which it ordained of God; therefore, *there is no power but of God: the powers that be, are ordained of God.*

TEXT. *Ver.* 2. Whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God: and they that reſiſt, ſhall receive to themſelves damnation.

PARAP. *Whoſoever therefore*, as a ſubject, *reſiſteth the* ſubordinate *power* of the delegated rulers, or, as a delegated ruler, *reſiſteth the* ſupreme *power* of the original rulers, in either caſe, whoſoever reſiſteth the power, *reſiſteth the ordinance of God, and they that reſiſt*, do thereby ſubject themſelves to the wrath of God.

TEXT. *Ver.* 3. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame.

PARAP. *For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou* as a ſubject *then not be afraid of the* ſubordinate *power* of the delegated

delegated rulers? Or, *Wilt thou* as a delegated ruler *then not be afraid of the* ſupreme *power* of the original rulers? *Do that which is good, and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame.*

TEXT. *Ver.* 4. For he is the miniſter of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the ſword in vain: for he is the miniſter of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.

PARAP. *For he* who beareth the ſword of the ſtate, whether it be in a ſtate in which there is no delegated adminiſtration exiſting, and in which ſtate the ſword muſt of conſequence be in the hands of the original miniſter, or, in a ſtate in which there is a delegated adminiſtration exiſting, and in which ſtate the ſword muſt of conſequence be in the hands of the delegated miniſter, in either caſe, he who beareth the ſword *is the miniſter of God to thee for good, but if thou do that which is evil,* or illegal, *be afraid; for he beareth not the ſword in vain: For he* who beareth the ſword *is the miniſter of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.*

TEXT. *Ver.* 5. Wherefore ye muſt needs be ſubject, not only for wrath, but alſo for conſcience ſake.

PARAP. *Wherefore ye muſt needs be ſubject,* not only in the character of ſubjects to avoid the wrath of the delegated miniſter, but alſo in the character of delegated miniſters, to avoid the wrath of the original miniſter: in both theſe characters ye muſt be ſubject *,not only for wrath, but alſo for conſcience ſake.*

TEXT. *Ver.* 6. For, for this cauſe pay you tribute alſo: for they are God's miniſters, attending continually upon this very thing.

PARAP. *For, for this cauſe pay you tribute alſo, for they* who bear the ſword of ſtate, whether they are original or delegated miniſters, in either caſe, they *are God's miniſters, attending continually upon this very thing.*

TEXT. *Ver.* 7. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute

bute to whom tribute is due, cuſtom to whom cuſtom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour.

PARAP. *Render therefore to all their dues: tribute when tribute is due* to a foreign ſtate, *cuſtom when cuſtom is due* to the ſtate of which you are a ſubject, *fear when fear is due*, either from the ſubjects to the delegated rulers, or, from the delegated rulers to the original rulers, *honour when honour is due* to all your rulers.*

* Every one knows, that it is impoſſible for the ſubjects of this ſtate to take up arms and rebel againſt the ſubordinate power of the king, the lords, and the commons, and it is equally certain, and ought for the ſafety of the ſtate to be as generally known, that it is juſt as poſſible for the king, the lords, or the commons, to take up arms and rebel againſt the ſupreme power of the people, and, that either all or any of thoſe delegated governors might be joined by the ſubjects in ſuch a rebellion. And, I ſhould not think it prudent to attempt a reformation in the civil government of this ſtate, without firſt guarding the ſtate, with equal care, againſt both thoſe dangers; without firſt guarding the ſtate, not only from the danger of the ſubjects rebelling againſt the parliament, but alſo from the danger of the parliament rebelling againſt the people. All rebellion does certainly conſiſt in this, and this only, viz. In an inferior power taking up arms, and by force of arms reſiſting the legal commands of a ſuperior power; and therefore, it is juſt as poſſible for the parliament, being an inferior power to the people, to rebel againſt the people, by forcibly reſiſting the legal commands of the people, as it is for the ſubjects, being an inferior power to the parliament, to rebel againſt the parliament, by forcibly reſiſting the legal commands of the parliament; and, for the very ſame reaſon, it is alſo juſt as impoſſible for the people, being a ſuperior power to the parliament, to rebel againſt the parliament, as it is for the parliament, being a ſuperior power to the ſubjects, to rebel againſt the ſubjects. Indeed, in the caſe of the ſubjects rebelling againſt the parliament, ſuch an act of rebellion is alſo an act of rebellion againſt the people, becauſe the ſubordinate power with which the parliament is inveſted is certainly derived from the ſupreme pewer of the people, and he that rebels againſt thoſe who are inveſted with only a ſubordinate power rebels alſo againſt thoſe from whom that ſubordinate power is derived, ſo that, by this conſtruction, it is impoſſible for a rebellion to exiſt, either in this, or in any other ſtate in the world, which is not an act of rebellion againſt the people, who are the origin and fountain of all human power. And, by the ſame conſtruction it follows, that, as he who re-

bels againſt the authority of the king and the two houſes of parliament rebels alſo againſt the authority of the people from whom the king and the two houſes of parliament derive their authority, ſo, he who rebels againſt the authority of the people rebels alſo againſt the authority of the king of kings from whom the people derive their authority; and therefore, it is impoſſible for any man to rebel againſt the authority of either the people or the parliament without rebelling againſt the authority of the king of kings who is the origin and fountain of all authority. However, as the people and the parliament do conſtitute *diſtinct ſubjects*, and are inveſted with *diſtinct powers*, in order to preſerve thoſe diſtinctions, I have here called a forcible reſiſtance of the legal commands of the people an act of rebellion againſt the people, that is, an act of rebellion againſt *the ſupreme power* of the people, and I have called a forcible reſiſtance of the legal commands of the parliament an act of rebellion againſt the parliament, that is, an act of rebellion againſt *the ſubordinate power* of the parliament. And there is alſo another danger which does not amount to what is called a rebellion, and yet cannot be too carefully guarded againſt in every attempt to reform the civil government of this ſtate, and that is, the danger of inſurrections. I mean ſuch inſurrections as diſgraced this nation in June 1780. And, in order to prevent any further inſurrections of the ſame kind, not only the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe inſurrections, but alſo the cauſe or cauſes of the increaſe and continuance of thoſe inſurrections, ought certainly to be fairly and clearly inveſtigated. And for this purpoſe it may be neceſſary to make a diſtinction between the cauſe of a mob being raiſed and aſſembled, and the cauſe of a mob being ſuffered to continue aſſembled after it has been raiſed. Now, in the caſe of theſe inſurrections. That thoſe perſons who did really aſſemble and raiſe the mobs at that time were the ſole cauſe of thoſe inſurrections cannot, I think, be fairly denied. But, after thoſe mobs had been thus raiſed and aſſembled by thoſe perſons, Were thoſe perſons the only perſons who were the cauſe of thoſe mobs continuing ſo aſſembled? Were thoſe perſons the only perſons who were the cauſe of thoſe inſurrections increaſing to ſuch an alarming degree as they did really increaſe, and continuing for ſuch a length of time as they did really continue? When a tumultuous mob is aſſembled in any part of this ſtate, Are there no laws now in force by which the civil magiſtrates may legally and immediately diſperſe and ſuppreſs that mob? Are there no laws now in force to prevent inſurrections, but merely ſuch laws as are neceſſary to puniſh the inſurgents by a ſlow proceſs in the courts of juſtice, and are the inhabitants to depend ſolely on that ſlow proceſs of puniſhing inſurgents as the only means to defend them from the dangers of an inſurrection? And, if there are any laws exiſting at this time by which the civil magiſtrates may legally

ly and immediately diſperſe and ſuppreſs a mob, Are the civil magiſtrates inveſted with a ſufficient power to carry thoſe laws into execution? And, whenever the conſtables are inſufficient for ſuch a purpoſe, Are the civil magiſtrates inveſted with a power of calling in the ſoldiery to their further aſſiſtance, who, in ſuch caſes, are often though very improperly called the military power, becauſe a ſoldier when he is under the command of a civil magiſtrate is then certainly the civil power, and not the military power, I ſay, Are the civil magiſtrates, either by means of conſtables, ſoldiers, or, by any means whatever, inveſted with a ſufficient power to carry thoſe laws into execution? And, if there are not only laws exiſting at this time by which the civil magiſtrates may legally and immediately diſperſe and ſuppreſs a mob, but the civil magiſtrates are alſo inveſted with a ſufficient power to carry thoſe laws into execution, then, in the caſe of thoſe inſurrections, Was the power with which the civil magiſtrates are inveſted, properly, or, improperly exerciſed, for the purpoſe of carrying thoſe laws into execution, and thereby ſuppreſſing thoſe inſurrections? Theſe are enquiries that the people have a right to make. The people have a right to enquire into the conduct of all the civil officers in the ſtate, from the firſt civil magiſtrate, the civil magiſtrate on the throne, down to a common conſtable. The people have a right to inveſtigate, as far as they can poſſibly do it, not only the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe inſurrections, but alſo the cauſe or cauſes of the increaſe and continuance of thoſe inſurrections, in order, that they may endeavour to guard themſelves againſt ſuch like dangers for the future. The people have the very ſame right to make all theſe enquiries as they have to ſeek their own ſafety. But how are the people to make theſe enquiries? The anſwer is obvious. As to enquiring into the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe inſurrections, the people have already made thoſe enquiries, or however the inferior courts of juſtice have already made thoſe enquiries by the authority of the parliament, and the parliament having no authority which is not derived from the people, conſequently, thoſe enquiries were made by the authority of the people, as well as by the authority of the parliament, that is, thoſe enquiries were made by the authority of *the ſubordinate power of the parliament*, which ſubordinate power the parliament derives from the *ſupreme power of the people*, and can only hold by the authority and at the pleaſure of the people, and without which authority of the people, neither the parliament, nor thoſe inferior courts of juſtice, could have had a right to make thoſe enquiries, I ſay, as to enquiring into the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe inſurrections, the people have already made thoſe enquiries, by the inferior courts of juſtice having enquired into the conduct of the inſurgents,

and having made thoſe enquiries by the authority of the parliament, and conſequently, by the authority of the people. And, as to enquiring into the cauſe or cauſes of the increaſe and continuance of thoſe inſurrections, and whether that increaſe and continuance was owing ſolely to the inſurgents, or, it was owing partly to the inſurgents, and partly to a neglect in the civil magiſtrates not immediately ſuppreſſing thoſe inſurrections, or, it was owing to a defect in the laws not having given the civil magiſtrates a ſufficient power immediately to ſuppreſs thoſe inſurrections. How are the people to make theſe enquiries? The anſwer is, I think, equally obvious. By this conſtitution of government, the conſtitution has eſtabliſhed a judiciary power of governing, that is, the people have eſtabliſhed a judiciary power of governing, viz. the peerage, who, by the authority of the people, are competent to judge of, and anſwer, all theſe queſtions, and to determine theſe enquiries, becauſe the peerage have a conſtitutional right to judge of all laws, and to determine, in particular caſes, whether thoſe laws have, or have not, been properly made, and whether they have, or have not, been properly executed. And thus, the people, by virtue of their ſupreme power, and by means of this ſuperior court of juſtice, may legally and conſtitutionally enquire, not only into the conduct of all the inferior civil magiſtrates, but alſo into the conduct of the firſt civil magiſtrate, the civil magiſtrate on the throne; as the parliament, by virtue of their ſubordinate power, and by means of the inferior courts of juſtice, may legally and conſtitutionally enquire into the conduct of the ſubjects. But, in the caſe of theſe inſurrections, How has this proceſs of adminiſtring juſtice been obſerved? In this caſe, the ſubjects have been amenable for their conduct to the ſubordinate power of the parliament, by the inferior courts of juſtice having enquired into the conduct of the inſurgents. And, what was the conſequence the dreadful conſequence of thoſe enquiries? The inſurgents had tranſgreſſed the law, and they have paid the penalty. But, the firſt civil magiſtrate, and many inferior civil magiſtrates, have not been amenable for their conduct to the ſupreme power of the people, by this ſuperior court of juſtice having made and determined all theſe enquiries, and having thereby determined, whether thoſe civil magiſtrates were, or were not, *an additional cauſe* of the increaſe and continuance

tinuance of thoſe inſurrections, or, having thereby determined, whether the executive branch of government, in that particular inſtance, did, or did not, let go the reins of government, or ſo far ſlacken thoſe reins as to expoſe the citizens to the depredations of a lawleſs mob——In this caſe, the ſubjects have been amenable for their conduct to the ſubordinate power of the parliament, by the inferior courts of juſtice having inveſtigated the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe mobs being raiſed and aſſembled; but the firſt civil magiſtrate, and many inferior civil magiſtrates, have not been amenable for their conduct to the ſupreme power of the people, by this ſuperior court of juſtice having inveſtigated the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe mobs being ſuffered to continue aſſembled after they had been raiſed—In this caſe, the ſubjects have been amenable for their conduct to the parliament, by the inferior courts of juſtice having inveſtigated the cauſe or cauſes of thoſe inſurrections; but the firſt civil magiſtrate, and many inferior civil magiſtrates, have not been amenable for their conduct to the people, by this ſuperior court of juſtice having inveſtigated the cauſe or cauſes of the increaſe and continuance of thoſe inſurrections. And, until theſe enquiries are made and determined by the conſtitutional authority of the peerage, which is alſo by the authority of the people, and without which authority of the people, it is impoſſible for the peerage to have the leaſt degree of authority to enquire into the conduct of any civil officer, or any perſon whatever, I ſay, until theſe enquiries are made and determined by the conſtitutional authority of the peerage, we cannot, I think, juſtly ſay, that we have taken every neceſſary precaution to prevent ſuch like inſurrections for the future—we cannot, I think, juſtly ſay, that the real cauſe or cauſes of the increaſe and continuance of thoſe inſurrections have been ſo properly and fully inveſtigated, as might perhaps be neceſſary for the ſafety of this ſtate previous to any attempt of an effectual reformation in the civil government of the ſtate. And, conſcious that the doctrines of placing the ſupreme power of governing in the people, and obliging the king, in the caſe of an inſurrection, to be amenable for his conduct to the people, who, in ſuch a caſe, have a right to know, whether the king does, or does not, *bear the ſword in vain*; and impoſing on all our delegated governors a duty of allegiance and loyalty to our original governors, or, impoſing on the king, the lords, and the commons,

mons, a duty of allegiance and loyalty to our moſt gracious ſovereign lord the people; and that the king, the lords, and the commons, either individually or even collectively, being inferior to the people in rank and dignity, and having only a ſubordinate power which they certainly derive from the ſupreme power of the people, are therefore in duty bound, in their official or parliamentary character and conduct, ſo to demean themſelves to the people, as ſhall plainly ſpeak the language of paſſive obedience to the will, the irreſiſtible fiat of the people; and alſo the poſſibility of either all or any of our delegated governors taking up arms againſt our original governors; or the poſſibility of the king, the lords, and the commons, either jointly or ſeparately, taking up arms againſt our ſupreme ſovereign, and engaging in an actual rebellion againſt the ſupreme power of the people:—conſcious, I ſay, that theſe doctrines may not meet with a very favourable reception from thoſe gentlemen, who, in their political arrangements of power, have been accuſtomed to place the ſupreme power of governing in their delegated governors, I muſt beg the favour of thoſe gentlemen to conſider, that by the conſtruction here given of St. Paul's political writings, theſe doctrines are the doctrines of that apoſtle, and, that the conſtruction here given of theſe writings muſt be fairly refuted before the truth of theſe doctrines can be fairly denied. If this conſtruction be fairly refuted, I ſhall always be open to conviction, and ſhall readily acknowledge my error; but, without ſuch a refutation, I ſhall be obliged to continue my belief in the truth of this aſſertion, viz. when St. Paul commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject unto the higher powers*, then, he ſaid every ſyllable that I have ſaid in this paper, and ten thouſand times more than my weak pen is able to extract from that ſtill undiminiſhed, that inexhauſtible fountain of political knowledge.

ON THE

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT

OF

GREAT BRITAIN.

[*First publiſhed in* 1779.]

THOUGH I believe the internal government of Great Britain to be, in general, the moſt perfect ſyſtem of government that is now in the world; yet I am far from thinking it to be, in every reſpect, ſo extremely perfect, that it will not admit of the leaſt degree of improvement: for, allowing the principle that I have laid down in the former paper to be true, viz. *that the people have a right to govern*; then, that principle plainly points out a very great defect in the preſent conſtitution of this government, where a great many ſmall boroughs ſend repreſentatives to parliament, who are not immediately dependent on the people: which is a circumſtance in this conſtitution, that might render it difficult, though perhaps not impoſſible for the people to govern. However, if the people are to govern, the parliament ought to be made entirely dependent on the people: for to place the right of governing in the people, without a power to exerciſe that right, would be mere mockery, and a moſt unpardonable

able inſult on the good ſenſe of the people: but, in the preſent ſituation of Great Britain, when we conſider the ill conſequences that it might be of to this ſtate, for the people to endeavour to ſupport an undoubted right, with a doubtful power, and how apt ſome men are to judge of the reallity of a right, merely by the power which there happens to be to enforce it, I ſhould think it impolitic, if not highly imprudent, for the people of this kingdom ever to attempt to exerciſe the right of ſelf-government, without firſt eſtabliſhing a parliament more dependent on themſelves; perhaps, on this, or ſome ſuch ſimilar plan.—Suppoſe England to be divided into one hundred and eighteen counties or ſhires, and the towns mentioned in the annexed map to be the county towns of thoſe ſhires, and every ſhire to conſiſt of all the townſhips that lay the neareſt to the county town, unleſs impaſſable rivers, or ſome other reaſon, make it more convenient to throw ſome particular townſhips into other ſhires, on account of the eaſier acceſs that the inhabitants of thoſe townſhips might have to ſome other county towns; then, Where would be the difficulty of making ſuch a diviſion of counties? The gentlemen in every part of this kingdom, or proper officers appointed on purpoſe to do it, might very eaſily determine which townſhips from the edge of each county, and, as the boundary of every townſhip in the kingdom is known with certainty by the inhabitants of the reſpective townſhips, ſo, the boundary of every county in the kingdom would alſo be known with the ſame degree of certainty. Now, allowing this ſuppoſed diviſion of counties to be thus made, then, as to the right of electing repreſentatives in parliament, let us ſuppoſe one general rule to take place throughout the whole kingdom, viz. that every freeholder of forty ſhillings *per annum* within the county, ſhall have a right to vote for the repreſentatives of that county; and, excepting the particular diſtinction and privilege of the two Univerſities, that the whole repreſentation in the houſe of commons ſhall conſiſt of county members; and, in order to render that branch of the parliament more dependent on the people, let us ſuppoſe

Berwick
Wooler
Workworth
Billingham
Carlisle
Newcastle
Hexham
Kirkswald
Whitehaven
Durham
Keswick
Appleby
Stockton
Kendal
Whitby
Richmond
Scarborough
Lancaster
Kirby Moorside
Settle
Ripon
York
Preston
Leeds
Hull
Blackburn
Halifax
Selby
Liverpool
Doncaster
Grimsby
Warrington
Manchester
Northwich
Sheffield
Gainsborough
Chester
Alford
Lincoln
Nampt wich
Chesterfield
Boston
Derby
Nottingham
Shrewsbury
Stafford
Burnham
Litchfield
Yarmouth
Bridgnorth
Birmingham
Leicester
Oakham
Lynn
Coventry
Norwich
Ludlow
Peterborough
Warwick
Southwold
Worcester
Huntingdon
Brandon
Hereford
Northampton
Cambridge
St Edmundsbury
Stow
Bedford
Ipswich
Monmouth
Gloucester
Buckingham
Colchester
Newport
Berkley
Aylesbury
Hertford
Oxford
Chelmsford
Bristol
Westminster
London
Reading
Rochester
Bath
Marlborough
Southwark
Canterbury
Warminster
Wells
Guilford
Tunbridge
Winchester
Dover
Salisbury
Southampton
Horsham
Rye
Stalbridge
Chichester
Dorchester
Newhaven
Pool
Portsmouth
Newport

Carlisle
Kirkswald
Whitehaven
Keswick
Appleby
Kendal
Lancaster
Settle
Preston
Blackburn
Liverpool
Warrington
Chester
Shrewsbury
Bridgnorth
Birmingham
Ludlow
Worcester
Hereford
Monmouth
Newport
Gloucester
Berkley
Bristol
Bath
Dunster
Bridgwater
Wells
Warminster
Hartland
Hatherly
Launceston
Wellington
Salisbury
Stalbridge
Exeter
Dorchester
Pool
Bodmin
Plymouth
Dartmouth
Falmouth
Pensance

poſe the parliaments to be changed from ſeptennial to triennial parliaments: and for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing in the ſtate a greater equality in the choice of repreſentatives, than what now ſubſiſts, let us alſo ſuppoſe, that inſtead of the places which now ſend repreſentatives to parliament, that the one hundred and eighteen counties mentioned in this map ſhall have the privilege of ſending repreſentatives to parliament in this proportion, viz.

	Members.
The county of Weſtminſter, - - - - - -	9
The county of London or Middleſex, - - -	8
The 116 remaining Counties to ſend 4 members from each county, - - - - - - -	464
Univerſity of Oxford, - - - - - - - - -	4
Univerſity of Cambridge, - - - - - - -	4
	489

And, ſhould ſuch an alteration as this be made, then the repreſentatives choſen by each place would bear ſome degree of proportion to its conſequence, and the weight that each place ought to have in government, or, however, ſuch a repreſentation would be nearer to that proportion than the preſent mode of ſending repreſentatives from ſo many trifling boroughs. Nor would ſuch an alteration affect the comparative weight of England, Wales, and Scotland, in the ſcale of government: For, the whole repreſentation of England, would ſtill continue to bear the very ſame proportion, with the whole repreſentation of Wales, and Scotland, that exiſts at this time, a proportion, which, without the mutual conſent of the parties concerned, ought never to be altered.

As to the circumſtance of increaſing the number of counties, this increaſe of counties would not only increaſe the conveniency of the citizens, with reſpect to their private concerns, by bringing the citizens in general nearer to the

county towns, and which county towns would certainly be the general centre of buſineſs for their reſpective counties: But, were it to be tried, I think, that thus dividing England into one hundred and eighteen very ſmall counties would alſo facilitate the public buſineſs, and that it would thereby improve this machine of government.

As to the neceſſity of annual parliaments, of which ſo much has been ſaid of late years, were not ſuch a conſtitution to be attended with more than neceſſary trouble both to the repreſentatives and their conſtituents, I ſhould very readily acknowledge, that annual parliaments would be a better conſtitution of government than triennial parliaments, my chief reaſon for mentioning triennial parliaments being to avoid the ſeemingly unneceſſary trouble of annual elections. And, as to the neceſſity of an univerſal right of ſuffrage in the choice of our repreſentatives in the houſe of commons, which has likewiſe been ſometimes mentioned, were this ſyſtem a practicable ſyſtem, or, were it not to be attended with too many difficulties in the execution, I ſhould alſo as readily acknowledge, that an univerſal right of ſuffrage in the choice of our repreſentatives in the houſe of commons would be a better conſtitution of government than confining the choice to freeholders, my chief reaſon for confining the choice to freeholders being to avoid the ſeeming difficulty of having that privilege exerciſed by every citizen in ſo large and ſo populous a ſtate as the Britiſh ſtate. But, as to the doctrine which we have been taught to believe, that not only the preſent partiality in the privilege of chooſing repreſentatives in the houſe of commons, but alſo ſeptennial parliaments, are utterly incompatible with our civil liberty, with all due defference to the gentlemen who hold theſe political tenets, I cannot help ſaying, that the civil liberty of every citizen of this ſtate does not, I think, conſiſt either in the duration of parliaments, or, in his having the privilege of ſharing with his fellow-citizens in the choice of our repreſentatives in the houſe of commons; but that the civil liberty

berty of every citizen of this ſtate conſiſts in his having the privilege of ſharing with his fellow-citizens in the original government of the people, and in the ſupreme power of commanding thoſe repreſentatives after they have been choſen, either for a ſhort or for a long period of time, and by whomſoever they have been choſen, and not only thoſe repreſentatives in the houſe of commons, but alſo all our repreſentatives in the other two branches of parliament. And, as to the exerciſe of this privilege, though different forms of government, and different conſtitutions, may be more or leſs favourable to the citizens in the exerciſe of this privilege, and conſequently more or leſs favourable to the civil liberty of the ſtate, and may therefore render good conſtitutions neceſſary to the ſupport of our civil liberty, yet, we cannot, I think, juſtly ſay, that any form of government, or, any conſtitution, is *utterly incompatible* with our civil liberty, there being certainly a natural and an inherent right in the people of every ſtate to command all their delegated governors under every form of ſubordinate government that can poſſibly be conſtituted, and there being alſo as certainly a power in the people to exerciſe that right, provided the citizens are unanimous in their duty of allegiance and loyalty to the people, and are unanimous in ſupporting the people in their original government, and thereby ſupporting the people in their power of exerciſing that right. So that the civil liberty of a ſtate does not depend entirely on the conſtitutions that are eſtabliſhed in their delegated government, but on thoſe conſtitutions together with the conduct of the citizens reſpecting their attachment to the original government of the people. Neither does the civil liberty of a ſtate depend entirely on the conduct of particular adminiſtrations, it being impoſſible for the moſt artful adminiſtration to invade the civil liberty of a ſtate, as long as the citizens are unanimous in their loyalty to the people, as long as the citizens are unanimous in their attachment to themſelves. And, in this ſtate, were we to ſuppoſe the citizens to be unanimous in their loyalty to the people, or, to be unanimous in their attachment to

the original government of the people, nothing can be more certain, than that the civil liberty of this ſtate might be preſerved in ſpite of the moſt artful, nay, in ſpite of the moſt deſpotic miniſters and the very worſt conſtitutions that could poſſibly be eſtabliſhed in our parliamentary or delegated government: But, on the contrary, were we to ſuppoſe this duty of loyalty and attachment to the people and their original government to be wanting, and ſuch numbers of citizens, both in and out of parliament, from motives of ſelf-intereſt, ſo far to attach themſelves to particular perſons, and to particular parties, or, ſo far to attach themſelves to the ſelf-created government of particular miniſters, and particular adminiſtrations, as to obſtruct the free exerciſe of the original government of the people—ſo far to ſupport the government of individuals as to obſtruct the government of the whole—ſo far to ſupport the government of miniſters, who have the diſpoſal of places, as to obſtruct the government of the people, who only pay the ſalaries, it is equally certain, that the civil liberty of this ſtate could not be preſerved by the very beſt conſtitutions that could poſſibly be eſtabliſhed in our parliamentary or delegated government—it is equally certain, that Great Britain muſt be enſlaved, if ſuch numbers of her citizens of every deſcription from the prince to the peaſant will thus renounce their duty of allegiance and loyalty to the people, and will thus betray their country and themſelves. Nor would it make the leaſt difference as to the civil liberty of this ſtate, whether we were to ſuppoſe the ſelf-created government of a favourite miniſter to be ſupported, and the original government of the people to be deſerted, by a number of needy citizens from motives of ſelf-intereſt, or, were we to ſuppoſe this favourite miniſter to be ſupported, and the people to be deſerted, by a prince on the throne from motives of ambition, in either caſe, and in all caſes, from whatever motives, by whatever means, and in whatever degree, the power of any particular miniſter or miniſters is ſo far ſupported as to over-rule the power of the people.

people in the government of this ſtate, or, what amounts to the ſame thing, is ſo far ſupported as to over-rule the power of the parliament, which is alſo in effect over-ruling the power of the people, becauſe the parliament is the only conſtitutional medium by which the people can exerciſe their power of governing, or, is ſo far ſupported as to over-rule the power of either houſe of parliament, by the miniſter having what is called a majority in the houſe, I ſay, in either caſe, and in all caſes, from whatever motives, by whatever means, and in whatever degree, the power of any particular miniſter or miniſters is, either directly or indirectly, ſo far ſupported as to over-rule the power of the people in the government of this ſtate, in the very ſame degree, the civil liberty of this ſtate is thereby moſt certainly invaded. And, if we regard our civil liberty and our civil rights, it may not be amiſs to pay ſome attention to theſe conſiderations, viz. It is neither on this ſelf-created government, nor on our delegated government, but on our original government, that is, it is neither on particular adminiſtrations, nor on the parliament, but on the people, that we ought to place our dependence for the ſupport of our civil liberty—It is neither on theſe ſelf-created governors, nor on our delegated governors, but on our original governors, that is, it is neither on miniſters of ſtate, nor on members of parliament, but on ourſelves, it is not on individuals, but on the whole, that we ought to place our dependence for the ſupport of all our civil rights. And, whenever the leaſt degree of encroachment is made on our civil liberty, or, on any of our civil rights, whether that encroachment is made by the miniſters of ſtate, by the members of any of the three branches of parliament, or, by ſuch of our fellow-citizens as are not in parliament, we ought certainly to place the blame, not ſo much on thoſe who make the encroachment, as on ourſelves for ſuffering that encroachment to be made, and for thus neglecting to obſerve the firſt law of nature and that duty which we owe to ourſelves, viz. ſelf-preſervation. And, if we ſay that Great Britain is not at this time a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed,

then,

then, in that caſe, each citizen of this ſtate, both in and out of parliament, ought certainly to blame himſelf, ſhould he ſo far abandon himſelf and the care of his own ſafety, as not to join with his fellow-citizens to emancipate himſelf from that ſtate of ſlavery, and thereby to recover his natural and unalienable right of ſharing with his fellow-citizens in the original government of the people, or, of ſharing with his fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power of governing himſelf. And, if we ſay that Great Britain is at this time a free ſtate, or, ſelf-governed, then, in that caſe, each citizen of this ſtate, both in and out of parliament, ought certainly to blame himſelf, ſhould he ſo far abandon himſelf and the care of his own property, as not to join with his fellow-citizens in the original government of the people, and in the ſupreme power of commanding all our delegated governors, in all the three branches of parliament, whenever he thinks it his own particular intereſt to exerciſe that privilege, I have ſaid, that each citizen of this ſtate ought to blame himſelf if he does not join with his fellow-citizens in the original government of the people whenever he thinks it his own particular intereſt to exerciſe that privilege; nor could we, I think, in this caſe, juſtly cenſure any man for purſuing his own intereſt, however, this is a caſe in which I wiſh every man invariably to purſue his own intereſt: For, were we to ſuppoſe the leading principle of the former paper to be adopted in this ſtate, viz. That every individual in the ſtate ſhall be governed by the general will of the whole, and, were we alſo to ſuppoſe every individual in this ſtate, both in and out of parliament, to join in the original government of the people whenever he thiuks it his own particular intereſt to exerciſe that privilege, and, as far as he interferes in that government, invariably to purſue his own particular intereſt, then, as the majority of theſe individuals would conſtitute the general will of the whole, it is a plain and a direct conſequence, that the general will of the whole would produce *the general good of the whole*; which is the very object that I

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am here labouring to accompliſh. And, though a government of individuals is certainly neceſſary in this and in every ſtate for the purpoſe of exerciſing a ſubordinate power of governing, yet, for the purpoſe of exerciſing *a ſupreme power of governing*, if you eſtabliſh *a government of individuals*, inſtead of *a government of the whole*, then, the particular intereſt of thoſe individuals may be contrary to the general good of the whole, and the whole may ſuffer by thoſe individuals purſuing their own particular intereſt: But, if you eſtabliſh *a government of the whole*, with a ſupreme power of ſuperintending and controuling the ſubordinate power of thoſe individuals, and every individual in this ſtate, both in and out of parliament, will join in that government of the whole whenever he thinks it his own particular intereſt to exerciſe that privilege, and, as far as he interferes in that government, will invariably purſue his own particular intereſt, then, the general will of the whole, and the general good of the whole, would be ſynonimous terms, and the general good of the whole would of conſequence be promoted by every individual purſuing his own particular intereſt. Or, in other words, though a parliamentary government is certainly neceſſary in this ſtate for the purpoſe of exerciſing a ſubordinate power of governing, yet, for the purpoſe of exerciſing *a ſupreme power of governing*, if you eſtabliſh *a parliamentary government*, inſtead of a *government of the people*, then, the particular intereſt of the parliament may be contrary to the general good of the people, and the people may ſuffer by the parliament purſuing their own particular intereſt: But, if you eſtabliſh *a government of the people*, or rather, if you will obſerve your duty of allegiance and loyalty to a government already eſtabliſhed by divine authority, viz. the original government of the people, by ſupporting that government in their ſupreme power of ſuperintending and controuling the ſubordinate power of the parliament, and every citizen of this ſtate, both in and out of parliament, will join in that government of the people whenever he thinks it his own particular intereſt to exerciſe that

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privilege, and, as far as he interferes in that government, will invariably purſue his own particular intereſt, then, the general will of the people, and the general good of the people, would be ſynonimous terms, and the general good of the people would of conſequence be promoted by every citizen purſuing his own particular intereſt; which is the very baſis on which I wiſh the Britiſh government and all civil government to be eſtabliſhed.

In the former paragraph, I have ſaid, that no form of government is utterly incompatible with civil liberty, or rather, that no form of *delegated* government is utterly incompatible with civil liberty; neither is any particular form of delegated government a certain ſecurity againſt ſlavery. The citizens of a ſtate may either enjoy a ſtate of civil liberty or may be enſlaved under any form of delegated government whatever. For inſtance, in a ſtate where a monarchal form of government is eſtabliſhed, ſhould the monarch govern the ſtate by his own will, independent of the will of the people, then, in that caſe, the citizens of that ſtate would be in a ſtate of ſlavery: But, on the contrary, ſhould the monarch, in governing the ſtate, invariably obſerve the will of the people, then, in that caſe, the citizens of that ſtate would enjoy a ſtate of civil liberty, though under the very worſt form of delegated government in the world. And, the ſame may be ſaid of a ſtate where either an ariſtocratical or a democratical form of government is eſtabliſhed, as under either of theſe two forms of government the civil liberty of the citizens depends alſo on the very ſame circumſtance, and that is, whether the delegated ſenators govern the ſtate by their own will, or, by the will of the people. And, in this ſtate, where a form of government is eſtabliſhed which is plainly a mixture of all theſe three different forms, the king repreſenting a monarchal, the peerage an ariſtocratical, and the commons a democratical form of government, I ſay, in this ſtate, were we to ſuppoſe theſe three branches of parliament, in governing the ſtate, invariably to obſerve the will of the people, then, in that caſe, the citizens

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of this ſtate would enjoy a ſtate of civil liberty: But, on the contrary, were we to ſuppoſe the three branches of parliament to govern the ſtate by their own will, independent of the will of the people, or, what is much more probable, were we to ſuppoſe a miniſterial faction to over-rule the power of the parliament, and conſequently to over-rule the power of the people, and to govern the ſtate by their own will, in direct oppoſition to the will of both the people and the parliament, then, in either caſe, the citizens of this ſtate would be in a ſtate of ſlavery, though under the very beſt form of delegated government in the world. And thus, the citizens of a ſtate, as I ſaid before, may either enjoy a ſtate of civil liberty or may be enſlaved under any form of delegated government whatever. Not that it is poſſible for the citizens of a ſtate to be enſlaved under any of theſe four different forms of government, or, under any other form of delegated government whatever, but through their own neglect: For, in every ſtate in the world, beſides the governors who are appointed by the people, and who conſtitute the delegated government of the ſtate, there are alſo original governors of Divine appointment, who conſtitute a republican government, or, what I have called an original government of the people, and theſe original governors being the citizens themſelves, and being alſo, by Divine authority, inveſted with a ſupreme power over all their delegated governors, it is therefore impoſſible for the citizens of any ſtate to be enſlaved, under any form of delegated government, but through their own neglect, or, to be enſlaved, under any form of delegated government, but through their neglecting an effectual exerciſe of that ſupreme power and a proper dominion over all their delegated governors. I have here called the republican government of a people a Divine appointment, and I have ſo called it, becauſe this republican government of a people is certainly the very government which St. Paul eſtabliſhed in every ſtate in the world when he commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject unto the higher powers.* And, the citizens of a ſtate are not only in-

veſted with a ſupreme power over all their delegated governors, but, in the republican government of every ſtate in the world, infinite wiſdom has alſo given to every citizen *an equal ſhare* with his fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power with which thoſe republican governments are inveſted, and has thereby given to every citizen *an equal ſhare* with his fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power of governing himſelf. And, as infinite wiſdom has thus given to every citizen of a ſtate an equal ſhare with his fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power of governing himſelf, it is therefore an incontrovertible truth, that, in the republican government of a ſtate, or, in the ſupreme power of governing a ſtate, a beggar in a ſtreet is as much his own governor and his own legiſlator as a prince on a throne. And, in the republican government of this ſtate, the rich, the poor, the prince, the peer, the peaſant, and even the beggar in the ſtreet, are all placed on the very ſame level, they are all members of this republican government—they are all fellow-ſenators—they are all inveſted with an equal degree of power—they have all an equal ſhare in the ſupreme power with which this republican government is inveſted—they have all an equal ſhare in the ſupreme power of governing themſelves, and ſo far every citizen of this ſtate is, in fact, his own governor and his own legiſlator—ſo far every citizen of this ſtate, and the pooreſt citizen, even a beggar in the ſtreet, is equal in power, dignity, and conſequence, to the prince on the throne. As to the great *inequality of power* which is very diſtinguiſhable amongſt our fellow-citizens. In the paper on national and imperial government, I have ſaid, That it is in the ſubordinate power of governing, that the acquired rights of ſuperiority and ſubordination are eſtabliſhed amongſt men. And, as to the *equality of power* amongſt our fellow-citizens. In the ſame paper, I have alſo ſaid, That it is in the ſupreme power of governing, that the natural right of equality is continued amongſt men, even after they are aſſociated in a national ſtate. And, agreeably to this diſtinction between a ſupreme and a ſubordinate

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power of governing, and between a natural and an acquired right, in *the ſubordinate power* of governing this ſtate, or, in the parliamentary government of this ſtate, the king, the lords, and the commoners, have an acquired and indiſputable right to *a ſuperiority* over all their fellow-citizens, and it is the duty of every citizen to acknowledge their right to that ſuperiority—they have an acquired and indiſputable right to a ſubordinate power of governing all the ſubjects of this ſtate, and it is the duty of every ſubject tamely to ſubmit to that ſubordinate power of governing, and tamely to ſubmit to the ſubordinate power of all our delegated and ſubordinate governors in parliament. But, in the *ſupreme power* of governing this ſtate, or, in the republican government of the people, the loweſt rank of our fellow-citizens, the very beggars in the ſtreets, have a natural and indiſputable right to join with their fellow-citizens and fellow-ſenators in the ſupreme power of commanding all our delegated and ſubordinate governors in both houſes of parliament, and even our delegated and ſubordinate governor the prince on the throne—they have a natural and indiſputable right to *an equality* with all their fellow-citizens, and even citizens of the higheſt rank, in the republican government of the people, and it is the duty of every citizen to acknowledge their right to that equality—they have a natural and indiſputable right to ſtand on *a level* with the proudeſt of their fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power of governing the ſtate, and in the ſupreme power of governing themſelves; nor is there a citizen of this ſtate, of any deſcription whatever, who has not the ſame right to *an equality* with his fellow citizens of every deſcription in the republican government of the people, and in the ſupreme power of governing the ſtate, and it is the duty of every delegated and ſubordinate governor tamely to ſubmit to that ſupreme power of governing, and tamely to ſubmit to the republican government of the people. And, however unpalatable this doctrine of a republican government and theſe levelling principles may be to thoſe, who, either by the acquire-

ment of wealth, or, by the acquirement of ſubordinate powers, are, in thoſe reſpects, raiſed above their fellow-citizens, yet, let them remember, that the doctrine of a republican government is the doctrine of St. Paul, and let them alſo remember, that in the republican government of this ſtate, every citizen of the ſtate is, by a Divine appointment, placed on the very ſame level with all his fellow-citizens—that in the ſupreme power of governing this ſtate, every citizen of the ſtate is, by Divine authority, inveſted with an equal degree of that power, and is thereby inveſted with an equal ſhare with all his fellow-citizens in the ſupreme power of governing himſelf, and that it would therefore be the very height of human folly, not to call it a moſt unpardonable degree of arrogance, in any citizen of this ſtate, vainly to attempt to alter *a level*, or, vainly to attempt to deſtroy *an equality*, which infinite wiſdom has eſtabliſhed. And the ſame that has here been ſaid of the Britiſh ſtate may alſo be ſaid of all other ſtates. In every ſtate in the world, it is the duty of the ſubjects tamely to ſubmit to the ſubordinate power of their delegated governors, and it is alſo the duty of the delegated governors as tamely to ſubmit to the ſupreme power of the original governors, the people. For, as it was ſaid in the former paper on the ſupreme and the ſubordinate power of a ſtate, when St. Paul commanded *every ſoul to be ſubject unto the higher powers*, then, he gave to *a people* the very ſame degree of power over *the delegated governors* of the ſtate, that St. Peter has given to *the delegated governors* of a ſtate, over *the ſubjects* of the ſtate, when he commanded all ſubjects to *ſubmit themſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake: whether it be to the king as ſupreme, or unto governers, as unto them that are ſent by him.* And, therefore, it is a Divine command, that the ſubjects of every ſtate in the world ſhall tamely ſubmit to the ſubordinate power of their delegated governors, and that the delegated governors of every ſtate in the world ſhall alſo as tamely ſubmit to the ſupreme power of the original governors, the people—ſhall alſo as tamely ſubmit to the republican government of the

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people. But, ſhould any one ſtill doubt the real exiſtence of this republican government of the people, and alſo the viſible exiſtence of that government in this ſtate, let us conſider that caſe by placing the republican government in a comparative point of view with our parliamentary government. For inſtance—when the parliament is aſſembled, we may ſay, that there is then a viſible exiſtence of the parliamentary government of this ſtate. And, in like manner—when the aſſociates for the different counties are aſſembled, I ſhould ſay—when the MOST HONOURABLE the aſſociates for the different counties are aſſembled, we may alſo ſay, that there is then a viſible exiſtence of the republican government of this ſtate. And—when the parliament is prorogued, though we cannot ſay, that there is then a viſible exiſtence of the parliamentary government, yet, we cannot fairly deny the real exiſtence of that government merely becauſe the parliament has prorogued its meetings. And, in like manner—when the county aſſemblies are prorogued, or, when the republican government is prorogued, though we cannot ſay, that there is then a viſible exiſtenee of the republican government, yet, we cannot fairly deny the real exiſtence of that government merely becauſe the republican government has prorogued its meetings, or, merely becauſe the county aſſemblies, which is the republican government of this ſtate, have prorogued their meetings. And, as to a diſſolution of both or either of theſe two governments, I may here repeat what I ſaid before, on a ſimiliar occaſion, and in nearly the ſame words. viz. That the republican government of this ſtate, or, the republican government of the people, cannot be diſſolved, without a diſſolution of the ſtate, becauſe the republican government of the people is a Divine inſtitution, and that origin plainly declares its immortality: But, the parliamentary government of this ſtate, or, the three branches of parliament, may be diſſolved, without a diſſolution of the ſtate, becauſe the parliamentary government of the ſtate is only an human inſtitution, and that origin as plainly declares its mortality. So that, with reſpect to the exiſtence of the republican government of this ſtate, there is an abſolute impoſſibility of the republican government loſing

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its exiſtence by a diſſolution, without a diſſolution of the ſtate, and, by the comparative view that we have taken of the republican and the parliamentary governments, the exiſtence of the republican government of this ſtate appears to be juſt as real and as viſible as the exiſtence of our parliamentary government. But, whatever may be the appearance, the fact is plainly this. viz. That the king, the lords, and the commons, do not conſtitute the whole of the civil government of this ſtate, nor are they inveſted with a full power of governing the ſtate; they only conſtitute a part of the civil government of the ſtate, and the leſs conſiderable part, being only inveſted with a ſubordinate power of governing, and that it is theſe two diſtinct governments, viz. The republican government of the people, and the parliamentary government, which do jointly conſtitute the whole of the civil government of this ſtate, and the people being inveſted with a ſupreme power, and the parliament with a ſubordinate power, that it is the people together with the king, the lords, and the commons, who are jointly inveſted with a full power of governing the ſtate. And, the diſtinct offices or functions of theſe two diſtinct governments are as plain, and as clear, as their diſtinct exiſtence. For inſtance—The parliamentary government, by their ſubordinate power, may, and ought to govern the ſubjects.—The republican government of the people, by their ſupreme power, may, and ought to govern the parliament.—The parliamentary government, by their ſubordinate power, may, and ought to correct and reſtrain the unruly appetites of all the ſubjects of this ſtate who are not in parliament.—The republican government of the people, by their ſupreme power, may, and ought to correct and reſtrain the unruly appetites of all the ſubjects of this ſtate who are in parliament—may, and ought to correct and reſtrain the unruly appetites of kings, lords, and commoners.—The parliamentary government, by their ſubordinate power, may, and ought to defend the ſtate from the outrages of licentious ſubjects.—The republican government of the people, by their

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ſupreme power, may, and ought to defend the ſtate from the violence and more dangerous outrages of licentious governors.—The parliamentary government, by their ſubordinate power, may, and ought to defend the ſtate from anarchy.—The republican government of the people, by their ſupreme power, may, and ought to defend the ſtate from deſpotiſm. Thus, I think, the diſtinct offices or functions of theſe two diſtinct governments may be very plainly and clearly diſtinguiſhed. And, ſhould it ever be the general opinion amongſt the citizens of this ſtate, that this republican government of the people ought to be ſupported, and effectually ſupported, in the exerciſe of a ſupreme power over the parliament, in the exerciſe of a ſupreme power over the king, the lords, and the commons, I muſt beg leave to exhort, earneſtly to exhort, nay, humbly to entreat every citizen, that he will be equally careful, and equally ſolicitous, to ſupport the parliament in the exerciſe of their ſubordinate power over the ſubjects, and for this very obvious reaſon, becauſe the parliament, as I ſaid before, is the only conſtitutional medium by which the people can exerciſe their power of governing. And, as the parliament is the only conſtitutional medium by which the people can exerciſe their ſupreme power of governing, nothing can be more certain, than that by deſtroying that medium you would thereby prevent the people from exerciſing that power. Were you to deſtroy the ſubordinate power of the parliament, it would be impoſſible for the people to exerciſe the ſupreme power of governing without eſtabliſhing another medium, that is, without eſtabliſhing another form of government; and therefore, you muſt ſupport the parliament, as the only means by which you can poſſibly ſupport the people—you muſt ſupport *the ſubordinate power* of the parliament, as the only means by which you can poſſibly, under this form of government, ſupport *the ſupreme power* of the people—you muſt ſupport the conſtitutional rights and prerogatives of the king—you muſt ſupport all the three branches of parliament, the king, the lords, and the commons, in their reſpective

reſpective conſtitutional rights and prerogatives, as the only means by which you can poſſibly ſupport the natural rights and prerogatives of the people—as the only means by which you can poſſibly ſupport this great prerogative of the people, viz. THE SUPREME POWER OF GOVERNING.

But, to return to the plan for a new diviſion of counties, and thus far we have conſidered this plan merely as it affects the privilege of chooſing repreſentatives in the houſe of commons and our civil rights, but I do not ſee the neceſſity of being obliged to confine the conſideration of this ſuppoſed diviſion of counties entirely to theſe objects. I believe it to be far from impoſſible to make it uſeful to the ſtate in other reſpects, and convenient for other purpoſes of government. For inſtance.—Were the aſſizes to be held in each of theſe county towns, then the inhabitants in general would be nearer the ſeat of juſtice, for the convenience of the ſubjects. Or,—Were the militia to be raiſed in theſe counties, then, being in ſmaller diſtricts, they might be more eaſily aſſembled, on ſudden emergencies, for the ſafety of the ſtate. Indeed, with reſpect to aſſembling and regulating the militia: Inſtead of the preſent method of collecting the militia of a county from all the different parts of the county, were the militia to conſiſt of the ſettled inhabitants of the county towns, and of thoſe inhabitants only, then, the militia of each county would be always ſo far aſſembled that they would be in the ſame town, and might, without inconveniency, be called out once or twice a week to go through their military exerciſe, or, might be called out as often as would be neceſſary to make them as regular and as perfect in their exerciſe as a ſtanding army. And, inſtead of diſbanding the militia every third year, were you to hold out ſuch terms to the common men as would induce them to enliſt into that ſervice for life, they would then always continue a regular body of men, on whoſe ſervices you might ſafely place your dependence, ſhould they ever be wanted for any real ſervice. And, perhaps a very numerous, well regulated, and well diſciplined militia,

militia, in London, Portſmouth, Plymouth, Briſtol, Liverpool, Whitehaven, Newcaſtle, Hull, and ſome other ſea-port towns, for the purpoſe of defending this iſland againſt the invaſion of foreign enemies, and conſiſting of ſuch a number of men as the people might think neceſſary and ſufficient for that purpoſe; and alſo a very ſmall, but well regulated militia, in every other county town, conſiſting of only ſuch a number of men as might be thought neceſſary for the ſafety of each county, or, conſiſting of only ſuch a number of men as might be thought neceſſary to ſupport the civil magiſtrates in the execution of laws, and thereby to defend every county from the danger of mobs and inſurrections, I ſay, perhaps a militia under theſe or ſuch like regulations might be the beſt and the cheapeſt method of defending this ſtate againſt both foreign and domeſtic enemies. As to your defence againſt the invaſion of foreign enemies. At preſent, I believe, your navy is conſidered as your beſt ſecurity againſt ſuch invaſions. But are you not dependent on foreign nations for your naval ſtores?—And as long as that is the caſe—Where is your independency? You cannot be totally independent of other nations without eſtabliſhing ſuch a defence as is entirely within your own power. The eſtabliſhment of a militia is entirely within your own power. And, I believe it to be not only poſſible, but that it would not be a very difficult matter, by a very numerous, well regulated, and well diſciplined militia, to render Great Britain, with reſpect to her defence againſt other nations, totally independent of the whole world. And, as to the number of men to be raiſed in each county town, let us ſuppoſe the number to be in this proportion, viz.

	Private Men.		Private Men.
In Berwick,	1,000	*Brought over*	1,060
Wooler,	20	In Carliſle,	30
Workworth,	20	Newcaſtle,	2,000
Billingham,	20	Hexham,	20
	1,060		3,110

	Private Men.
Brought over	3,110
In Kirkoſwald,	20
Whitehaven,	2,000
Keſwick,	20
Durham,	30
Appleby,	20
Stockton,	20
Kendal,	20
Whitby,	1,000
Richmond,	20
Lancaſter,	1,000
Kirby Moorſide,	20
Scarborough,	1,000
Rippon,	20
Settle,	20
York,	30
Preſton,	20
Leeds,	50
Blackburn,	20
Hallifax,	30
Selby,	20
Hull,	4,000
Liverpool,	6,000
Warrington,	30
Mancheſter,	100
Doncaſter,	20
Grimſby,	20
Gainſborough,	20
Sheffield,	30
Northwich,	20
Cheſter,	30
Alford,	20
	18,780

	Private Men.
Brought over,	18,780
In Cheſterfield,	20
Lincoln,	30
Namptwich,	20
Boſton,	1,000
Nottingham,	20
Derby,	20
Burnham,	20
Stafford,	20
Shrewſbury,	30
Litchfield,	20
Bridgnorth,	20
Okeham,	20
Lynn,	20
Yarmouth,	1,000
Lieceſter,	20
Birmingham,	100
Peterborough,	20
Norwich,	50
Ludlow,	20
Coventry,	30
Warwick,	20
Brandon,	20
Southwald,	20
Worceſter,	30
Huntingdon,	20
Hereford,	20
Northampton,	20
Cambridge,	20
St. Edmundſbury,	20
Bedford,	20
Ipſwich,	1,000
	22,490

Stow,

	Private Men.
Brought over	22,490
In Stow,	20
Monmouth,	20
Gloceſter,	30
Buckingham,	20
Colcheſter,	20
Newport, *in Monmouthſhire*,	20
Berkley,	20
Ayleſbury,	20
Hertford,	20
Oxford,	20
Chelmsford,	20
Weſtminſter,	6,000
London,	6,000
Rocheſter,	20
Canterbury,	20
Dover,	1,000
Rye,	1,000
Tunbridge,	20
Newhaven,	1,000
Horſham,	20
Guilford,	20
Chicheſter,	20
Reading,	20
Wincheſter,	20
	37,880

	Private Men.
Brought over	37,880
In Portſmouth,	6,000
Newport, *in the Iſle of Wight*,	1,000
Southampton,	20
Marlborough,	20
Saliſbury,	20
Pool,	1,000
Warminſter,	20
Bath,	30
Stalbridge,	20
Dorcheſter,	20
Wells,	20
Briſtol,	6,000
Bridgwater,	20
Wellington,	20
Exeter,	20
Dunſter,	20
Hatherley,	20
Dartmouth,	1,000
Plymouth,	6,000
Launceſton,	20
Hartland,	1,000
Bodmin,	20
Falmouth,	1,000
Penſance,	20
	61,210

And, it ſhould be here obſerved, that as this militia would conſiſt of the ſettled inhabitants of their reſpective towns, and would not be raiſed for the purpoſes of either garriſon duty or foreign ſervice, but would be raiſed for the expreſs purpoſes of defending this ſtate againſt the invaſion of foreign

enemies, and againſt mobs and inſurrections at home, they ought not to be called upon to leave their families, their own houſes, and their own homes, on any other occaſions, or, on any other pretence whatſoever. A militia ought not to dance round the kingdom like marching regiments, without a real or even an apparent cauſe, as ſuch a practice will always prevent both officers and commen men, of the moſt reputable kind, from engaging in that ſervice, and will thereby obviate the very end of the inſtitution. And as I have now mentioned the internal policy of this nation, before I finiſh my political budget, I beg leave to trouble the reader with ſome obſervations on the public funds.—At preſent, the circulation of all the public funds is confined to the city of *London*. The intereſt on the whole ſtock, which is ſome millions *per annum*, muſt be paid there, and the principal, whenever it changes hands, muſt be there transferred, which is making *London* the only place of general circulation both of principal and intereſt, and thereby confining the ſupport of public credit to that limited circulation: but ſuppoſe theſe funds, inſtead of being confined to *London*, were eſtabliſhed in the ſame manner, and by the ſame authority, in every town mentioned in this map, allowing every perſon who is poſſeſſed of ſtock, to tranſpoſe that ſtock from *London* to any of theſe places, and afterwards, to allow the ſtock to be transferred from one perſon to another, in any of theſe branches, the ſame as in *London*, then, that more extenſive and general circulation of the public ſtock, would certainly be productive of a more extenſive and general ſupport of the public credit. And ſuch an eſtabliſhment as this, would not complicate and perplex the buſineſs, were the buſineſs to be regulated by this reſtriction, viz. that the proprietors of ſtock ſhall only be allowed to tranſpoſe that ſtock from *London* to any of theſe places, or, from any of theſe places back to *London*, but that they ſhall not be allowed to tranſpoſe ſtock from one branch to another: for, as in the natural body, the blood is confined to ſuch channels, that it can only flow from the heart to the extremities, and from the extremi-

ties

ties back to the heart; ſo, in the political body, the ſtock ought alſo to be confined to ſuch channels, that it could only flow from the fountain to the branches, and from the branches back to the fountain; by which means, theſe branches could never be productive of the leaſt confuſion in the public accounts, as the officers at the fountain might then always know exactly the quantity of ſtock that is in each branch, which would enable them at all times to know with certainty how to provide for the dividends. And, at preſent, the intereſt on the ſtock is paid by taxes impoſed indiſcriminately on both the rich and the poor, and the poor of this kingdom, who of conſequence cannot be proprietors of ſtock, and cannot thereby receive in the intereſt of that ſtock any part of the money which they have paid in taxes, are, notwithſtanding that circumſtance, obliged to pay their proportion of thoſe taxes. Neither can the poor derive any advantage from the circumſtance of the public funds being a convenient lodgement, if it is only a temporary lodgement, for private property, for they have no private property to lodge; and yet, by the taxes which are now impoſed on the poor, they are thereby compelled to ſupport thoſe public funds from which they can derive no advantage. And, what is worſe than that, a very conſiderable proportion of the intereſt on ſtock is now paid to foreigners, who are allowed to be proprietors of this ſtock, and Great Britain is of conſequence drained of all that money to be expended in foreign nations. A public debt, thus regulated, and thus conducted, and eſpecially when we conſider the enormity of the debt, may well be called a national burthen, and a national load. But, inſtead of thus conducting this immenſe public debt, let us ſuppoſe the intereſt on that debt to be paid by taxes impoſed *ſolely on the rich*, and for that purpoſe, I ſhall, at the end of this pamphlet, mention ſome taxes which might perhaps enable the people to confine the future payment of taxes *ſolely to the rich*. And, let us alſo ſuppoſe no foreigners to be allowed to be proprietors of this ſtock, and for that purpoſe, I ſhall alſo ſtate thoſe taxes on

the

the rich at *ſuch extravagant rates*, as would be ſure, with economy in the expenditure of the public wealth, to produce a ſuperfluity of that wealth. And, perhaps this ſuperfluity of the public wealth, together with the money which might alſo be raiſed by the ſale of all the crown lands in the kingdom, and by all the crowns lands in the kingdom, I mean, not only ſuch of the crown lands as have never yet been appropriated to the uſe of individuals, but alſo ſuch of the crown lands as have, at any time, through the ignorance of former kings, been given and granted to individuals, and particularly ſuch of the crown lands as have been given and granted to bodies corporate, becauſe the crown lands are the property of the people, and becauſe it is impoſſible for any king to have a right to give and grant the people's property to individuals, I ſay, perhaps this ſuperfluity of the public wealth ariſing from *the enormous taxes on the rich* which the reader will meet with at the end of this pamphlet, together with the money which might alſo be raiſed by the ſale of all the crown lands in the kingdom, would enable the people to purchaſe all the ſtock which is now in the hands of foreigners, and thereby to confine the future payment of the intereſt on ſtock to your fellow-citizens, and which would of conſequence ſecure the expenditure of that money at home. And, after we have thus ſuppoſed the proprietorſhip of ſtock to be confined to your fellow-citizens, and have alſo ſuppoſed the intereſt on that ſtock to be paid ſolely by the rich, as theſe *enormous taxes* on the rich might alſo enable the people to reduce the remaining ſtock, which would then be in the hands of your fellow-citizens, to a very moderate ſum; let us next ſuppoſe this remaining moderate ſum to be ſpread all over the kingdom, agreeably to this plan of eſtabliſhing branches for the public funds in every county town, which branches would certainly conſtitute a great many very convenient repoſitories of wealth, where the citizens at large might always ſafely lodge their wealth, from the time of acquiring that wealth, to the time of diſpoſing of it in the purchaſe of lands or other property, and then, under ſuch regulations, inſtead of calling this

this remaining moderate ſum, *a national evil*, and *a national burthen*, perhaps it might be more properly called, *a national good*, and *a national bleſſing*.

As to the advantage that government would receive from ſuch an inſtitution as this, nothing can be plainer, than that by eſtabliſhing branches for the circulation of the public funds, in every county town here mentioned, you would moſt certainly raiſe the price of ſtock, and improve the public credit, by introducing a great many new purchaſers of ſtock; who are now diſcouraged from buying it, on account of the many difficulties that attend the buying of ſtock, by thoſe who live at a great diſtance from the market: for if the ſums be large, the danger of truſting agents, is no ſmall objection, and if they are only ſmall ſums, to that conſideration muſt be added, ſometimes the want of agents, and always the great expence of making ſmall purchaſes. Theſe objections, taken together, amount almoſt to an abſolute preclusion of ſmall ſums that are at a great diſtance from *London*. But if theſe obſticles were either removed or leſſened, and people at a diſtance from *London* were allowed other markets, were they might with more ſafety and conveniency purchaſe ſtock, and where they might not only ſee the tranſaction themſelves without truſting to a broker, but afterwards might alſo receive the intereſt of that ſtock with their own hands, without being at the expence of an agent; then theſe advantages would moſt certainly introduce a great many new purchaſers of ſtock, which would as certainly raiſe the price of it, and thereby materially ſtrengthen the hands of government. And as to the advantage that individuals would receive from ſuch an inſtitution as this, it is no more than common juſtice, to ſpread theſe advantages of the circulation of ſtock, amongſt thoſe who muſt ſhare in its burthen as a national load. Now, ſhould the public think it not only reaſonable thus to accommodate thoſe who live at a diſtance from the capital, but that it is alſo neceſſary to improve the ſtrength of public credit, by widening the baſis of this immenſe ſuperſtructure

of

of public debt; though I have here only mentioned England, yet the ſame reaſons would hold with equal force, and it would be productive of the very ſame effects, both public and private, were there a ſtill further extention of this plan to ſome proper towns in Wales and Scotland.

As to the choice that I have made of ſome of the ſmaller towns which are mentioned in this map, in that reſpect, I own the plan to be imperfect, indeed it is next to impoſſible that it ſhould be otherwiſe, not having been in every part of the kingdom to know which are the propereſt towns; but if the principle of the plan for chooſing repreſentatives in parliament be approved of, any particular towns may eaſily be changed, and their number either leſſened or increaſed at the pleaſure of the people, without the leaſt deviation from the principle of equaliſing the privilege of chooſing repreſentatives in parliament; and I ſhall acknowledge it as a favour, if gentlemen who are better acquainted than I am with all the different parts of this kingdom, will be ſo obliging as to change the improper towns, and to alter and correct the plan at their own pleaſure.

THUS much for the internal government of Great Britain with reſpect to her civil government, which is one branch, but not the only branch of the internal government of this ſtate. The words *internal government* which I have uſed in the title of this paper, are as juſtly applicable to the eccleſiaſtical as to the civil government of this ſtate, and there is perhaps as much reaſon, and as great a neceſſity, for a reformation in the eccleſiaſtical as in the civil government of the ſtate,

Now, the evils which are moſt generally complained of in the eccleſiaſtical government of this ſtate, are theſe:

I. AN unequal and inconvenient diviſion of the ſtate into parochial diſtricts or circuits.

II. AN unequal and inconvenient diviſion of the ſtate into epiſcopal diſtricts or circuits.

III. AN

III. An unequal and inconvenient diviſion of the ſtate into two archiepiſcopal diſtricts or circuits.

IV. An unpopular and often litigeous mode of providing for the clergy by a revenue ariſing from tythes.

V. And an unreaſonable partiality in the diſtribution of the revenue of the church amongſt her clergy.

These are, I think, the evils which are moſt generally complained of in the eccleſiaſtical government of this ſtate. And, far be it from me to pretend to point out ſatisfactory or ſufficient remedies for theſe evils. I acknowledge my incapacity to do it. But, at the ſame time, impreſſed with a deſire of endeavouring at leaſt to promote the real intereſt and welfare of the church, I am thereby induced again to ſolicit the readers patience while I add a few words on this ſubject; not conſidering any thing that I am capable of ſaying on ſo difficult a ſubject as being worthy even of the name of a propoſition, but conſidering it merely as a hint to the public ſhould they think it worth their notice.

As to the preſent unequal and inconvenient diviſion of the ſtate into parochial diſtricts or circuits. Inſtead of the preſent diviſion of pariſhes, were we to ſuppoſe a new divſion of pariſhes to be made in the ſame manner that we have already ſuppoſed a new diviſion of counties to be made, and that is, by fixing upon certain churches and chapels, or by fixing upon the principal churches and chapels in England and Wales to be parochial churches, and all the other churches and chapels to be chapels of eaſe. And, as in the new diviſion of counties, we have ſuppoſed every county town to be the centre of a county, and every county to conſiſt of all the townſhips that lay the neareſt to the county town, unleſs impaſſable rivers, or ſome other reaſon, make it more convenient to throw ſome particular townſhips into other counties, on account of the eaſier acceſs that the inhabitants of thoſe townſhips might have to ſome other county town. So, in the new diviſion of pariſhes, were we to ſuppoſe every parochial church to be the centre of a pariſh, and every pariſh to conſiſt of all

the lands that lay the neareſt to the parochial church, unleſs impaſſable rivers, or ſome other reaſon, make it more convenient to throw ſome particular lands into other pariſhes, on account of the eaſier acceſs that the inhabitants might have to ſome other parochial church, then, would not ſuch a new diviſion of the ſtate into parochial diſtricts or circuits be more equal and more convenient than the preſent diviſion?

As to the preſent unequal and inconvenient diviſion of the ſtate into epiſcopal diſtricts or circuits. Inſtead of the preſent diviſion, were we to ſuppoſe a new diviſion of epiſcopal diſtricts to be made in the ſame manner that we have already ſuppoſed a new diviſion of counties and pariſhes to be made. And, for this purpoſe, we muſt alſo ſuppoſe twenty-four towns in England and Wales, at nearly equal diſtances, to be fixed upon as the places of reſidence for the twenty-four biſhops, and each town to be a centre-town of a diſtinct dioceſs, and every dioceſs to conſiſt of all the pariſhes that lay the neareſt to the centre-town, or, the biſhop's place of reſidence, unleſs impaſſable rivers, or ſome other reaſon, make it more convenient to throw ſome particular pariſhes into another dioceſs, on account of the eaſier acceſs that the pariſhioners might have to ſome other centre-town, or, the place of reſidence of ſome other biſhop, then, would not ſuch a new diviſion of the ſtate into epiſcopal diſtricts or circuits be more equal and more convenient than the preſent diviſion?

As to the preſent unequal and inconvenient diviſion of the ſtate into two archiepiſcopal diſtricts or circuits. Inſtead of the preſent diviſion, were we to ſuppoſe the twelve moſt ſouthern epiſcopal diſtricts to conſtitute the ſee of the archbiſhop of the ſouthern department, and the twelve moſt northern epiſcopal diſtricts to conſtitute the ſee of the archbiſhop of the northern department, then, would not ſuch a new diviſion of the ſtate into two archiepiſcopal diſtricts or circuits be more equal and more convenient than the preſent diviſion? But, the reſidence of the two archbiſhops ought to be always in the capital, for the purpoſe of having an immediate intercourſe

courſe with the civil government of the ſtate whenever the government of the church ſhould require it, becauſe the eccleſiaſtical government of the ſtate is, and ought to be ſubordinate to, and dependent on the civil government of the ſtate. And, the people being the ſupreme head of that civil government, this doctrine of the eccleſiaſtical being ſubordinate to the civil government is placing the government of the church where it may perhaps be placed with the moſt ſafety, or however where it ought to be placed, and that is, in the people, and not in the clergy.

As to the preſent mode of providing for the clergy by a revenue ariſing from tythes. Inſtead of the preſent mode, were we to ſuppoſe the clergy to quit their preſent hold of the ſod, and not only to give up and relinquiſh, in favour of the reſpective landholders, their claim and title to all tythes, but alſo to give up and relinquiſh, in favour of the people, or, what would be the ſame thing, to give up and relinquiſh, in favour of the parliament, their claim and title to all church or glebe lands, and in lieu thereof, were we to ſuppoſe the people of England and Wales, by an act of parliament, or rather, by a declaration of parliament, not only to pledge their eſtates to the church for the punctual and full payment of the miniſters of all the churches and chapels in England and Wales that are now legally eſtabliſhed, but alſo to pledge their eſtates to the church for the punctual and full payment of the miniſters of all the churches and chapels that may, at any time hereafter, be built and legally eſtabliſhed, and that the payment to each and every miniſter ſhall be made agreeably to ſuch legal ſtipends of the reſpective miniſters as will be ſpecified in the next article. Were we, I ſay, to ſuppoſe both the people and the clergy reſpectively to adopt theſe meaſures, ſuch a tranſaction would be, in fact, a contract between the people and the clergy—ſuch a tranſaction would be, in fact, a purchaſe made by the people of all the tythes and glebe lands, and a pledge of their eſtates to the church as the payment for that purchaſe. And, to enable the people to ful-

fil their contract with the clergy, or, to enable the people to pay this purchaſe-money, were we to ſuppoſe the people to eſtabliſh a ſcale of rank in this ſtate, and to oblige all perſons who are honoured with certain degrees of rank to pay a fixed ſum of money to the ſtate for thoſe honours agreeably to the plan which is annexed to this pamphlet, were we, I ſay, to ſuppoſe the people to eſtabliſh ſuch a ſcale of rank, perhaps ſuch an eſtabliſhment might raiſe a ſufficient revenue for the ſupport of the church, without loading the ſtate with either tythes or taxes of any kind whatever, except ſuch a voluntary tax as is here mentioned in this ſuppoſed ſcale of rank. And, ſhould the revenue ariſing from this voluntary tax exceed the expenditure in the church, the ſurplus to be carried into the public treaſure, for the ſervice of the ſtate. And, ſhould the revenue ariſing from this voluntary tax be inſufficient for the expenditure in the church, the deficiency to be taken out of the public treaſure, becauſe the people, on a ſuppoſition of their having made this contract with the clergy, have, by an act of parliament or contract, pledged their eſtates to the church for the punctual and full payment of ſuch legal ſtipends of the reſpective miniſters as are to be ſpecified in the next article; and therefore, the people, or their agents the parliament, are thereby legally bound to the church for the payment of that money, from whatever tax or taxes the money may be raiſed. Now, admitting ſuch a meaſure as this to take place, then, would ſuch a meaſure endanger the preſent religious eſtabliſhment, and particularly the preſent eſtabliſhed, and truly valuable, becauſe they are truly rational modes of faith?—Would the church be in danger, by weakening the ſecurity of the clergy as to their temporal proviſion?

And, as to the preſent partiality in the diſtribution of the revenue of the church amongſt her clergy. Inſtead of the preſent diſtribution of that revenue, were we to ſuppoſe the revenue of the church, ariſing from her contract with the people, as mentioned in the former article, to be diſtributed by government amongſt the clergy, without charge or deduction,

tion, in theſe proportions, viz. to each of the two archbiſhops £.5000, per annum, and to each and every biſhop £.3000, per annum. And, with reſpect to the inferior clergy, as the duty of a miniſter of a very large church, and a very numerous congregation, is certainly more difficult, than the duty of a miniſter of a ſmall church, and a leſs numerous congregation, and as it is certainly reaſonable, that the ſtipends of theſe inferior clergy ſhould bear ſome degree of proportion to the difficulty of their duty, let us therefore ſuppoſe the ſtipends of all the inferior clergy to be in theſe proportions, viz. to each and every miniſter of any church or chapel, where the congregation uſually conſiſts of fewer than four hundred perſons, £.300, per annum—to each and every miniſter of any church or chapel, where the congregation uſually conſiſts of more than four hundred perſons, and fewer than eight hundred perſons, £.400, per annum —to each and every miniſter of any church or chapel, where the congregation uſually conſiſts of more than eight hundred perſons, and fewer than twelve hundred perſons, £.500, per annum, and—to each and every miniſter of any church or chapel, where the congregation uſually conſiſts of more than twelve hundred perſons, £.600, per annum. And, as many pariſhes would, ever after this new diviſion of pariſhes, be ſo large, and the pariſhioners ſo numerous, that one miniſter would be inſufficient for the duties of the church, and as the congregations of even ſome chapels of eaſe might alſo be ſo numerous that one miniſter would be inſufficient for the duties of thoſe chapels, in all ſuch churches and chapels, the rectors and miniſters to be allowed one or more curates or aſſiſtant-miniſters at the diſcretion of the biſhop of the dioceſs, and theſe curates, or, theſe aſſiſtant-miniſters, to be alſo paid their ſtipends by government, viz. —to each and every curate or aſſiſtant-miniſter the very ſame ſtipend as the incumbent, becauſe the curates would be ſure to have their full ſhare of the duty, and becauſe the duty of all curates is as difficult as the duty of the incumbents.

bents. And, as the rectors and miniſters of all the churches and chapels would then be amply provided for, or would be however, in general, much better provided for than they are at preſent, in conſideration of that more ample proviſion, the rectors and miniſters of all churches and chapels to relinquiſh their claim to ſurplice-fees and emoluments of all other kinds whatſoever. And, if there are any chapels ſo extremely ſmall, or ſo little frequented, that the people would not chooſe to be at the expence of ſupporting their miniſters, would it not be better for the ſtate, that theſe very ſmall chapels ſhould either be provided for by ſome other means, or even diſcontinued, than that they ſhould ſtand in the way of a general reform? As to the very high ſtipends which are here mentioned for all the inferior clergy, it is with a view to a ſuppoſition which the reader will find mentioned in the plan for a ſcale of rank that I have here mentioned thoſe very high ſtipends. And, in that plan the reader will find a ſuppoſition of all the livings in the church being hereafter diſpoſed of by public ſale to the higheſt bidder, and on this ſuppoſition, as the purchaſe-money for thoſe livings would be ſure to increaſe in proportion to the increaſe of the ſtipends to the miniſters, it is far from impoſſible, it is even probable, that, by ſuch a mode of diſpoſing of the livings in the church, the income to the ſtate, ariſing from the ſale of thoſe livings, would always bear ſuch a degree of proportion to the expenditure by ſtipends to the miniſters, as not to render the church an unreaſonable burthen on the ſtate, at whatever rates the people might chooſe to fix the ſtipends of all the miniſters. And, with reſpect to ſuch miniſters as might, in caſe of vacancies, ſucceed the preſent incumbents, though a very high ſtipend would certainly increaſe the purchaſe-money to thoſe ſucceeding miniſters, yet, it could not increaſe that purchaſe-money beyond their own will and pleaſure, as they would always have it at their own option, whether they would, or would not, make the purchaſe. And, with reſpect to the preſent miniſters, were theſe very high

ſtipends

ſtipends for all the inferior clergy to be really eſtabliſhed, the advantage to the inferior clergy is ſo obvious that it is almoſt needleſs to mention it, and the advantage would alſo be as great as it is obvious. And, as a further and neceſſary ſupport of the church, we ſhould alſo ſuppoſe the clerks of all theſe churches and chapels to be included in this contract between the church and the people, and theſe clerks alſo to be paid their ſtipends by government, viz. to each and every clerk of any church or chapel in which there is only one miniſter £.100, per annum,—to each and every clerk of any church or chapel in which there are two miniſters £.150, per annum, and—to each and every clerk of any church or chapel in which there are more than two miniſters £200, per annum, and theſe clerkſhips to be alſo diſpoſed of by public ſale to the higheſt bidder. And, as the clerks of all the churches and chapels would then be ſufficiently provided for, theſe clerks alſo to relinquiſh their claim to fees and perquiſites of all kinds whatſoever. And, ſhould it be thought neceſſary, organiſts and choriſters, with ſuitable ſtipends, might alſo be included in this contract between the church and the people. Now, admitting the revenue of the church to be thus diſtributed, then, would not ſuch a diſtribution of the revenue of the church be a leſs degree of partiality than the preſent diſtribution of that revenue?—Would not ſuch a diſtribution of the revenue of the church be more conſiſtent with the principle of reaſon, more conſiſtent with the principle of juſtice, either commutative or diſtributive, and more conſiſtent with the ſacred doctrine of *every labourer being worthy of his hire* than the preſent diſtribution of that revenue?

THESE are the hints, for I dare not call them by a more reſpectable name, theſe are, I ſay, the hints on eccleſiaſtical government which I have been induced to offer to the public: Nor have I done it without ſome degree of reluctance, conſcious

conſcious that they will be thought by many to be inſufficient and inadequate to the evils: Neither can it be denied, that a more equal diſtribution of the revenue of the church would not be promoting a general good without injuring individuals. And indeed I may ſay the ſame of ſome of the meaſures which are mentioned in this pamphlet reſpecting *the civil government* of this ſtate, and that thoſe meaſures alſo are plainly founded on the very ſame principle of endeavouring to promote a general good though even at the expence of injuring individuals. And, in purſuing this object of a general good both in church and ſtate, ſorry I am that it is not in my power to point out ſuch meaſures as would be ſatisfactory to the whole without being offenſive to individuals—ſorry I am that it is not in my power to point out ſuch unexceptionable meaſures as would be productive of *a general good* without the alloy the painful alloy of *partial evil.*

FINIS.

APPENDAGE.

IN the liturgy of the church of England the king is repeatedly diſtinguiſhed by the title of *a ſovereign*, and in the former pamphlet on government I have as repeatedly denied *the ſovereignty of the king*, only calling the king a ſubordinate ſovereign, and an imaginary ſovereign, and have aſſerted that the real ſovereignty is in the people. And, if it is true, that the king is not a real ſovereign, inſtead of conſidering it as a compliment to the king, I ſhould rather think it an affront to the king, to call him a ſovereign, and to continue the mockery of a title where there is not the reality. And, in ſix or ſeven different parts of the public ſervice, there are prayers and ſupplications particularly for the king diſtinct from the other two branches of parliament, diſtinct from the peers and the commoners: But, excepting that the nobility are once mentioned in the litany, there are no prayers particularly for the peers diſtinct from the commoners and the king, neither are there any prayers particularly for the commoners diſtinct from the peers and the king, in any part of the public ſervice. This circumſtance to be ſure cannot be conſidered as an affront to the king: But—may not this partiality to the king be conſidered as a diſreſpect, if it is not called an affront, to the peers and the commoners?—may not this public ſlight ſhewn to the peers and the commoners have a tendency to alienate the hearts of our fellow-citizens from their duty of allegiance and loyalty to the peers and the commoners?—may not this partiality to the king have a tendency to alienate the hearts of our fellow-citizens from that *equal degree* of allegiance and loyalty which we certainly owe to all the three

branches of parliament? And, as the conſtitution has certainly eſtabliſhed *an equality* in all the three branches of parliament—may not this partiality to the king be conſidered as repugnant to the principles of the conſtitution? Indeed, were there to be prayers particularly for each of the three branches of parliament, the public ſervice might be too much lengthened by ſuch a form of prayer: But, that objection might be eaſily removed by including all the three branches of parliament in the ſame prayers; which would not lengthen the ſervice; nor would it be a juſt cauſe of offence to any of the three branches of parliament, were they to be all included in the ſame prayers. And, ſuch a form of prayer would not beſpeak an unreaſonable partiality to any of the three branches of parliament—ſuch a form of prayer would not alienate the hearts of our fellow-citizens from their duty of allegiance and loyalty to any of thoſe three branches. On theſe principles, therefore, I ſhall here tranſcribe thoſe prayers and ſupplications which the preſent eſtabliſhment has applied particularly to the king, and ſhall *ſuppoſe* the ſame prayers and ſupplications to be made in favour of all the three branches of parliament jointly, to be made in favour of the peers, the commoners, and the king. And I alſo beg leave to add a prayer to preſerve the public peace by the obſervance of St. Paul's command of *ſubjection unto the higher powers*. And, as the principles of the conſtitution (were they to be obſerved) or, as the principles of this pamphlet (were they to be adopted) might poſſibly lead to an alteration in the preſent eſtabliſhed form of prayer, I hope the reader will not think it an impropriety to tranſcribe theſe prayers, together with ſome verbal alterations, in this appendage to the pamphlet, and to place theſe ſacred and ſolemn prayers under the ſame cover with a trifling political pamphlet.

As to the Creed of St. Athanaſius, though that creed has not the leaſt connexion with the principles of this pamphlet, yet, as many perſons do not approve of it in its preſent form; I ſhall therefore alſo tranſcribe that creed with ſome alterations,

ons, hoping, by thoſe alterations, to ſtate it in a leſs exceptionable form.

SUPPOSED ALTERATIONS.

In the Order for MORNING AND EVENING PRAYER, daily throughout the Year.

The Abſolution.

ALMIGHTY God, the Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who lamenteth the death of a ſinner, and rejoiceth when a wicked man turneth away from his wickedneſs that he may live; and who hath given authority to his miniſters, to declare and pronounce to his people, being penitent, the Abſolution and Remiſſion of their Sins: He pardoneth and abſolveth all thoſe who truly repent, and unfeignedly believe his holy Goſpel. Wherefore let us beſeech him to grant us true repentance, and his Holy Spirit, that thoſe things may pleaſe him which we do at this time, and that the reſt of our life may be pure and holy; ſo that at the laſt we may come to his eternal joy, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

After the Lord's Prayer.

Prieſt. O Lord, enlighten our minds;
People. And our joyful hearts ſhall praiſe thy Name.
Prieſt. O God, make ſpeed to ſave us:
People. O Lord, make haſte to help us.

Te Deum

Te Deum laudamus.

* * * \

our doings may be ordered by thy governance, to do always that which is righteous in thy ſight, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

A Prayer for our Governors in Parliament, the Peers, the Commoners, and the King.

O Lord our heavenly Father, high and mighty, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, the only Governor of Governors, who doſt from thy throne behold all the Governors upon earth; moſt heartily we beſeech thee with thy favour to behold our moſt gracious Governors in Parliament; and ſo repleniſh them with the grace of thy Holy Spirit, that they may alway incline to thy will, and walk in thy way: Endue them plenteouſly with heavenly gifts; grant them in health and wealth long to live; ſtrengthen them that they may vanquiſh and overcome all our enemies; and that after this life they may attain everlaſting joy and felicity, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

A Prayer for the Peereſſes and Relatives of all our Governors in Parliament.

ALMIGHTY God, the fountain of all goodneſs, we humbly beſeech thee to bleſs and preſerve the Peereſſes and Relatives of all our Governors in Parliament: Endue them with thy Holy Spirit; enrich them with thy heavenly grace; proſper them with all happineſs; and finally bring them to thine everlaſting kingdom, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

A Prayer for the Clergy and the People.

ALMIGHTY and everlaſting God, the ſole fountain and diſpoſer of all bleſſings; Send down upon our Biſhops and Curates, and all Congregations committed to their charge, the healthful Spirit of thy grace; and that they may truly pleaſe thee, pour upon them the continual dew of thy heavenly bleſſings: Grant this, O Lord, for the honour of our Advocate and Mediator Jeſus Chriſt. *Amen.*

The ſecond Collect at Evening Prayer.

* * * * * that our hearts being ſet to obey thy commandments, and being alſo by thee defended from the fear of our enemies, we may paſs our time in reſt and quietneſs, through the merits of Jeſus Chriſt our Saviour. *Amen.*

In the CREED of Saint Athanaſius.

Quicunque ſperat.

WHOSOEVER hopes to be ſaved by Faith: before all things it is neceſſary that he hold the Catholick Faith.

And the Catholick Faith is this, That we believe in the Trinity of the Divine Subſtance: For, there is one Subſtance of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghoſt.

And, That we alſo believe in the Unity of the Divine Subſtance: For, the Subſtance of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt, is one Subſtance, and one God.

Such as the Father is, ſuch is the Son: and ſuch is the Holy Ghoſt.

The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate: and the Holy Ghoſt uncreate.

The Father incomprehenſible, the Son incomprehenſible: and the Holy Ghoſt incomprehenſible.

The Father ēternal, the Son eternal: and the Holy Ghoſt eternal.

And theſe three eternal Subſtances: are one eternal Subſtance.

As alſo the three incomprehenſible, and the three uncreated Subſtances: are one uncreated, and one incomprehenſible Subſtance.

For, Saint John has expreſsly told us, there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt: and theſe three are one;

One, not by a comprehenſible union of Subſtance; and

Three,

Three, not by a comprehenſible diviſion of Subſtance: But, three in one, and one in three, by an incomprehenſible union and diviſion of the Divine Subſtance.

And likewiſe the power of the Father is Almighty, the power of the Son is Almighty: and the power of the Holy Ghoſt is Almighty;

And yet, as theſe three Subſtances, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, are one Subſtance, and one God: therefore, the power which is aſcribed to each Subſtance is ſtill but one Almighty Power.

And likewiſe the Father is God, the Son is God: and the Holy Ghoſt is God;

And yet they are not three Gods: but one God.

And the Father is Lord, the Son is Lord: and the Holy Ghoſt is Lord;

And yet they are not three Lords: but one Lord.

For, though we are compelled by the Chriſtian verity: to acknowledge each Subſtance by itſelf to be God and Lord;

Yet, as Saint John has expreſsly declared: that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt, are one;

Therefore, when we give the title of God and Lord to theſe three Divine Subſtances, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt: then, we give the title of God and Lord to one Divine Subſtance, one God, and one Lord.

And in this Trinity of the Divine Subſtance, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt: none is afore or after the other, none is greater or leſs than another;

But the three Subſtances are one Subſtance, and one God: co-eternal, co-equal, and incomprehenſible.

So that, by the Catholick Religion, or, by the Chriſtian Religion as it is generally underſtood: we muſt not only acknowledge the Trinity of the Divine Subſtance, but we muſt alſo acknowledge the Unity of the Divine Subſtance.

And whoſoever hopes to be ſaved by the Catholick Faith: muſt believe in the truth of this myſtery, this incomprehenſible myſtery in the Divine Subſtance.

He

He muſt believe that the Divine Subſtance conſiſts of theſe three Subſtances, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt: and that theſe three Subſtances, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, are one Subſtance, and one God,

Or, in the aforeſaid words of Saint John, He muſt believe that there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt: and that theſe three are one.

Furthermore, it is neceſſary to everlaſting Salvation: that he alſo believe rightly the Incarnation of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.

And the right Faith is, That we believe and confeſs: That our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, the Son of God, is God and Man;

God, of the Subſtance of the Father, begotten before the creation of the world: and Man, of the Subſtance of his Mother, born in the world;

Perfect God, and perfect Man: of a reaſonable ſoul, and human fleſh ſubſiſting;

Equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood.

Who although he be God and Man: yet he is not two, but one Chriſt;

For as the reaſonable ſoul and fleſh is one man: ſo God and Man is one Chriſt;

Who ſuffered for our ſalvation: deſcended into hell, and roſe again the third day from the dead.

He aſcended into heaven, and ſitteth on the right hand of the Father, God Almighty: from whence he will come to judge the quick and the dead.

At whoſe coming all men will riſe again with their bodies: and will then give account for their own works.

And thoſe who have done good, will go into life everlaſting: and thoſe who have done evil, into everlaſting puniſhment.

This

This is the Catholick Faith: which except a man believe he cannot reaſonably hope to be ſaved by the Catholick Faith.

NOTE. As to the trinity of the Divine ſubſtance: Were it not true, that the Divine ſubſtance conſiſts of three ſubſtances, it would have been impoſſible for St. John to have ſaid, that *there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt*; as that is a direct aſſertion of the exiſtence of thoſe three ſubſtances; and that aſſertion from an inſpired writer is a direct proof of the trinity of the Divine ſubſtance. And, as to the unity of the Divine ſubſtance: Were it not alſo true, that theſe three ſubſtances, *the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt*, are one ſubſtance, it would have been as impoſſible for St. John to have ſaid, that *theſe three are one*; as that is a direct aſſertion of the union of thoſe three ſubſtances—a direct aſſertion that thoſe three ſubſtances are one ſubſtance, and one God; and that aſſertion from the ſame inſpired writer is alſo a direct proof of the unity of the Divine ſubſtance. So that the *truth* of this myſtery of the trinity and unity of the Divine ſubſtance cannot be diſputed without diſputing the veracity of an inſpired writer. But, it is impoſſible to comprehend the myſtery, or, to comprehend the myſterious union and diviſion of the Divine ſubſtance; becauſe the Divine ſubſtance is *an immaterial ſubſtance*, and it is impoſſible for the human mind to comprehend either the union or the diviſion of *immaterial ſubſtances*; and becauſe the qualities, perfections, and properties of the Divine ſubſtance are infinite, and it is impoſſible for duſt and aſhes to comprehend infinity.

In the LITANY.

* * * \

* * * * * * by thy glorious Reſurrection and Aſcenſion, and by the coming of the Holy Ghoſt, the Comforter,

Good Lord, deliver us.

In the time of tribulation, in the time of rejoicing, in the hour of death, and in the day of judgment,

Lord, have mercy upon us.

We ſinners do beſeech thee to hear us, O Lord God, and that it may pleaſe thee evermore to keep thy holy Catholick Church under thy paternal care and governance;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee to keep and ſtrengthen in the true worſhipping of thee, in righteouſneſs and holineſs of life, thy ſervants our moſt gracious Governors in Parliament;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee to rule their hearts in thy faith, fear, and love; and that they may evermore have affiance in thee, and ever ſeek thy honour and glory;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee to be their defender and keeper, giving them the victory over all our enemies;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee to bleſs and preſerve the Peereſſes and Relatives of all our governors in parliament;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee to illuminate all Biſhops, Prieſts, and Deacons, with true knowledge and underſtanding of thy Word, and that both by their preaching and living they may promote thy true religion, and labour to exalt thy glorious Name;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee to endue the great Councils of the nation, and all our Counſellors, with grace, wiſdom, and underſtanding;

We beſeech thee to hear us, good Lord.

That it may pleaſe thee, &c.

The Prayer after the Lord's Prayer.

O God, our merciful Father, who deſpiſeſt not the ſighing of a contrite heart, nor the deſire of ſuch as are ſorrowful; Mercifully aſſiſt us in our prayers which we make before thee in all our troubles and adverſities whenſoever they oppreſs us; and graciouſly hear us, that thoſe evils, which the craft and ſubtilty of the devil or man worketh againſt us, may, by the goodneſs of thy providence, be brought to nought; that we thy ſervants, being hurt by no perſecutions, &c.

The Prayer following.

* * * * * * turn from us all thoſe evils which we moſt juſtly have deſerved; &c.

In the PRAYERS upon ſeveral Occaſions.

A Prayer to preſerve the publick Peace.

O God, the Great Governor of the world, the Prince of Peace, who haſt been graciouſly pleaſed to eſtabliſh peace in our dwellings by commanding every ſoul to be ſubject unto the Higher Powers; We humbly beſeech thee to keep thy ſervants the ſubjects of this ſtate in a due ſubjection to the Parliament; and alſo to keep thy ſervants our governors in Parliament in a due ſubjection to the People; and that thou wilt be pleaſed evermore to hide both the People and the Parliament from the gathering together of the froward, and from the inſurrection of wicked doers; and this we beg, through the merits and for the ſake of Jeſus Chriſt our Lord and Saviour. *Amen.*

Prieſt. O Lord, ſave the People and the Parliament;
People. Who put their truſt in thee.
Prieſt. Send them help from thy holy place;
People. And evermore mightily defend them.

Prieſt. Let not the froward have an advantage over them;

People. Let not the wicked approach to hurt them.

NOTE. Leſt any one ſhould not know with certainty what particular deſcription of perſons are here meant by the harſh appellations of froward perſons and wicked doers, I beg leave to obſerve, That all perſons either in or out of parliament, and that all perſons either in or out of places, who join in the ſupport of a miniſterial faction, or any faction, in oppoſition to *the legal government* of either the people or the parliament, are here included in the number of the froward, and in the number of wicked doers. And—whenever a peer of the realm joins in the ſupport of a miniſterial faction, or any faction, in oppoſition to *the legal and conſtitutional power* of any of the three branches of parliament, the peerage, the commons, or the king: Or—Whenever a commoner joins in the ſupport of a miniſterial faction, or any faction, in oppoſition to *the legal and conſtitutional power* of any of the three branches of parliament, the peerage, the commons, or the king: Or—Whenever a king joins in the ſupport of a miniſterial faction, or any faction, in oppoſition to *the legal and conſtitutional power* of either houſe of parliament, in oppoſition to the legal and conſtitutional power of either the peerage, or the commons, then, in thoſe caſes, ſuch peers, ſuch commoners, and ſuch kings, are alſo here included in the number of the froward, and in the number of wicked doers. And, every perſon, of whatever rank in life, who comes within this deſcription, and who joins in the ſupport of any faction in oppoſition to *the legal government* of either the people or the parliament, is certainly, and in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the words, *a diſturber of government and the public peace.* And, it is the intention of this prayer, to give all perſons who are deſirous of ſupporting *the legal government* of both the people and the parliament, and who are deſirous of leading quiet and peaceable lives, an opportunity of publicly offering up their prayers to heaven, and of humbly entreating the great Governor of the world, that he will be graciouſly pleaſed to defend both the people and the parliament from *the gathering together* of all ſuch forward perſons, and from *the inſurrection* of all ſuch wicked doers.

In the time of War and Tumults.

* * * * * abate their rage, aſſwage their malice, and fruſtrate their wicked devices; &c.

A Prayer

A Prayer to be read during the Seſſion of the High Court of Parliament.

MOST gracious God, the Sovereign Lord of heaven and earth, we humbly beſeech thee, as for this kingdom in general, ſo eſpecially for the High Court of Parliament at this time aſſembled: That thou wouldeſt be pleaſed to direct all their conſultations to the advancement of thy glory, the good of thy Church, and the ſafety, honour, and welfare of the People; and that all things may be ſo ordered and ſettled by their endeavours, upon the beſt and ſureſt foundations, that peace and happineſs, truth and juſtice, religion and piety may be eſtabliſhed among us for all generations. Theſe and all other neceſſaries for the Church, the People, and the Parliament, we humbly beg in the Name and through the Mediation of Jeſus Chriſt our moſt bleſſed Lord and Saviour. *Amen.*

In the THANKSGIVINGS upon ſeveral Occaſions.

A General Thankſgiving.

* * * * * We thank thee for our Creation, * * * * * * * * * * * * *. And we beſeech thee to give us ſuch a due ſenſe of all thy mercies, that our hearts may be unfeignedly thankful; and that we may expreſs our thankfulneſs, not only with our lips but in our lives, by giving up ourſelves to thy ſervice, and by walking before thee in holineſs and righteouſneſs all our Days, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord; to whom, with the Father and the Holy Ghoſt, be honour thankſgivings and glory, now and for evermore. *Amen.*

For reſtoring Publick Peace at home.

O God our heavenly Father, who alone makeſt men to be of one mind in a houſe, and who ſtilleſt the outrages of violent and unruly men; We bleſs thy holy Name, that it hath pleaſed thee to appeaſe the ſeditious tumults which have been

been lately raiſed up amongſt us; moſt humbly beſeeching thee to grant to all of us grace, that we may henceforth obey thy command of ſubjection unto the higher powers, and all thy commands; and leading a quiet and peaceful life in all godlineſs and honeſty, may continually offer unto thee our ſacrifice of praiſe and thankſgiving for theſe thy mercies towards us, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

In the COLLECTS preceding the Epiſtles and Goſpels.

Saint John the Evangeliſt's Day.

MERCIFUL Lord, we beſeech thee to caſt thy brighteſt beams of light upon thy Church, that we being enlightened by the doctrine of thy bleſſed Apoſtle and Evangeliſt Saint John, may ſo walk in the light of thy truth, that we may at length attain the light of everlaſting life, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

The Epiphany.

* * * * * Mercifully grant, that we, who know thee now by faith, may after this life have a more perfect knowledge of thy glorious Majeſty, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

Trinity Sunday.

ALMIGHTY and everlaſting God, who haſt given unto us thy ſervants grace, by the profeſſion of a true faith, not only to acknowledge the Unity of the Divine Subſtance, but alſo to acknowledge the Trinity of the Divine Subſtance, and heartily to rejoice in the glory of the eternal Trinity; We humbly beſeech thee, that thou wouldeſt keep us ſtedfaſt in this faith, and evermore preſerve us from all waverings, doubts, and infidelity, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord, who, with the Father and the Holy Ghoſt, liveth and reigneth, ever one God, world without end. *Amen.*

The

The twenty-fifth Sunday after Trinity.

STRENGTHEN, we beſeech thee, O Lord, the good deſires of thy faithful people, &c.

Saint Michael and all Angels.

* * * * * Mercifully grant, that as thy holy Angels alway do thee ſervice in heaven, ſo, by the aſſiſtance of thy grace, we may likewiſe do thee our beſt ſervice here on earth, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

And, in the COMMUNION Service.

ALMIGHTY God, whoſe kingdom is everlaſting, and power infinite; Have mercy upon the whole Church, and ſo rule the hearts of all thy ſervants; that we and all the ſubjects of this ſtate (duly conſidering the authority of the Parliament) may faithfully ſerve, honour, and humbly obey the Parliament; that the Parliament (duly conſidering the authority of the People) may faithfully ſerve, honour, and humbly obey the People; and that the People (as duly conſidering whoſe miniſters they are) may above all things ſeek thy honour and glory; through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord, who, with the Father and the Holy Ghoſt, liveth and reigneth, ever one God, world without end. *Amen.*

Or,

O God, the ſearcher of hearts, who alone ruleſt the hearts of men, and who makeſt men to be obedient unto the Higher Powers; we moſt earneſtly beſeech thee ſo to rule the hearts of all thy ſervants; that we and all the ſubjects of this ſtate may faithfully ſerve and humbly obey the Parliament; that the Parliament may faithfully ſerve and humbly obey the People; that the People may faithfully ſerve thee, and humbly obey thy bleſſed Will; and that every ſoul may be ſubject unto the higher powers, according to thy bleſſed word and ordinance, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

Or,

Or,

ALMIGHTY and everlaſting God, we are taught by thy holy Word, that the hearts of Governors are in thy rule and governance, and that thou doſt diſpoſe and turn them as it ſeemeſt beſt to thy godly wiſdom; We humbly beſeech thee ſo to diſpoſe and govern the hearts of thy ſervants our Governors in Parliament, that in all their thoughts, words, and works, they may ever ſeek thy honour and glory, and ſtudy to preſerve thy people, in wealth, peace, and godlineſs, Grant this, O merciful Father, for thy dear Son's ſake Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. *Amen.*

The Prayer for the whole ſtate of Chriſt's Church militant here in earth.

* * * * * We beſeech thee alſo to ſave and defend all Chriſtian Governors; and eſpecially thy ſervants our Governors in Parliament, that under them we may be godly and quietly governed: and grant unto all that are put in authority under them that they may truly and indifferently miniſter juſtice, &c.

The Exhortation.

* * * * * for having given his Son our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, * * * * * * * * * * * and open his grief; that by the miniſtry of God's holy Word he may receive the benefit of ghoſtly counſel and advice, to the quieting of his conſcience, and avoiding of all ſcruple and doubtfulneſs.

The Preface upon Chriſtmas-day.

BECAUSE thou didſt give Jeſus Chriſt thy only Son to be born as at this time for us; who was conceived by the Holy Ghoſt, and made very man of the Subſtance of the Virgin Mary his mother; and that without ſpot of ſin, to make us clean from all ſin. Therefore with Angels, &c.

The

The Preface upon the Feaſt of Trinity only.

WHO art one Divine Subſtance, one God, and one Lord; and who art alſo an incomprehenſible and glorious Trinity, an incomprehenſible union of three Divine Subſtances in one Divine Subſtance, one God, and one Lord. For that which we believe of the glory of the Father, the ſame we believe of the glory of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt, without any difference or inequality. Therefore with Angels, Archangels, and with all the hoſts of heaven, we laud and magnify * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * heaven and earth are full of the majeſty of thy glory: Glory be to thee, O God moſt high. *Amen.*

NOTE. In different parts of the ſervice reſpecting the doctrine of the trinity, I have changed the word perſon for the word ſubſtance, becauſe the word perſon is commonly applied to our fellow-creatures who are viſible and material ſubſtances, and for fear that this common uſe of the word perſon ſhould raiſe in our minds ideas of viſible and material ſubſtances when we addreſs the throne of Heaven; whereas the Being that we are to addreſs and worſhip is certainly an inviſible and an immaterial ſubſtance; and whereas the Chriſtian religion has taught us to worſhip a God, inviſible, immaterial, and incomprehenſible.

And, whereas many of our prayers, agreeable to the doctrine of the trinity, conclude with particularly mentioning theſe three Divine ſubſtances, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, who are all, at the beginning of thoſe prayers, included in one and the ſame addreſs by the title of God or Lord. Now, with reſpect to theſe prayers, and whenever the three Divine ſubſtances, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, are particularly mentioned, we cannot be too careful to remember the incomprehenſible doctrine which St. John has taught us, this incomprehenſible truth, that *theſe three are one*, that theſe three Divine ſubſtances are one Divine ſubſtance, one God, and one Lord. So that, by this doctrine of St. John, when we include theſe three Divine ſubſtances, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, in one and the ſame addreſs by the title of God or Lord, then, we addreſs and worſhip one Divine ſubſtance, one God, and one Lord.

THESE are *the ſuppoſed alterations* in the preſent eſtabliſhed form of prayer, and alſo in one of the Creeds. And, though

theſe alterations may be ſo extremely imperfect that they ought not to be adopted, yet, they may ſerve to point out the manner in which ſuch like alterations might be made, which is my reaſon for inſerting theſe imperfect alterations; and I now leave it to the public, and particularly to the clergy, whenever they chooſe to do it, to make ſuch alterations as ought to be adopted, and to make ſuch alterations as they may think moſt conſiſtent with a true Chriſtian faith, moſt conſiſtent with the principles of the conſtitution, and moſt conſiſtent with all your eſtabliſhments in church and ſtate.

And, beſides theſe alterations, the COMMINATION to be diſcontinued, leaving it to the great Judge of the world to denounce his judgments againſt ſinners. And alſo the particular forms of prayer, on the fifth of November, the thirtieth of January, the twenty-ninth of May, and on the twenty-fifth of October, to be diſcontinued, as being either too perſonal, or on occaſions too trifling, to engage the attention of the public in their religious ſervices.

A *ſuppoſed* ſcale of RANK in this State, for the purpoſe of raiſing a voluntary Revenue, either for the particular ſervice of the Church, or, for the general ſervice of the ſtate.

1. THE rank of a DUKE to be the firſt degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Duke to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, fifty thouſand pounds, and every ſucceſſor to the ſame title to pay the ſame ſum. And, in addition to the Ducal dignity, that thoſe perſons who are honoured with that rank ſhall have the excluſive priyilege of bearing the arms of the ſtate, or, the Britiſh arms, commonly called the King's arms; and ſhall alſo have the excluſive privilege of dreſſing their livery ſervants in caps. And every other perſon in the ſtate who ſhall uſe theſe privileges or diſtinctions ſhall be deemed guilty of a miſdemeanor to the ſtate by encroaching on Ducal dignity.

2. The rank of a MARQUIS to be the ſecond degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Marquis to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, forty thouſand pounds, and every ſucceſſor to the ſame title to pay the ſame ſum.

3. The rank of an EARL to be the third degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of an Earl to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, thirty-five thouſand pounds, and every ſucceſſor to the ſame title to pay the ſame ſum.

4. The rank of a VISCOUNT to be the fourth degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Viſcount to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, thirty thouſand pounds, and every ſucceſſor to the ſame title to pay the ſame ſum.

Theſe four orders, viz. a Duke, a Marquis, an Earl, and a Viſcount, to conſtitute the Britiſh Peerage, and every Peer of the realm to be inſtalled a Knight of the Garter, and the blue ribband to be the excluſive privilege of the Peers. But, with reſpect to the title of a LORD, as the title of Lord was given to the LORD and SAVIOUR of the World, Is it not making too familiar an uſe of that ſacred title, nay, Is it not a moſt ſhameful proſtitution of that ſacred title, to give the ſame title to a perſon of any degree of Rank whatever?

theſe alterations may be ſo extremely imperfect that they ought not to be adopted, yet, they may ſerve to point out the manner in which ſuch like alterations might be made, which is my reaſon for inſerting theſe imperfect alterations; and I now leave it to the public, and particularly to the clergy, whenever they chooſe to do it, to make ſuch alterations as ought to be adopted, and to make ſuch alterations as they may think moſt conſiſtent with a true Chriſtian faith, moſt conſiſtent with the principles of the conſtitution, and moſt conſiſtent with all your eſtabliſhments in church and ſtate.

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5. The rank of a COMMONER, or, the rank of having a ſeat in the Britiſh Commons to be the fifth degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank of having a ſeat in the Britiſh Commons to have the privilege of wearing an orange ribband and a ſtar, and the orange ribband to be the excluſive privilege of the Commoners.

6. The rank of a KING to be the ſixth degree of rank in the ſtate. And whoever is honoured with the rank and title of a King to have the privilege of wearing a pink ribband and a ſtar, and the pink ribband to be the excluſive privilege of the King. But, the pink ribband to be an inferior rank to the orange ribband, it being reaſonable that a King, who receives wages from the ſtate for his ſervices, ſhould be inferior in rank to thoſe generous citizens in the lower houſe, who ſerve the ſtate without wages, and to thoſe ſtill more generous citizens in the upper houſe, who not only ſerve the ſtate without wages, but who even pay an immenſe ſum of money to the ſtate to have the honour of doing it. It is the degrading circumſtance of a king receiving wages for his ſervice, like an hireling or a menial ſervant, which has ſunk the royal dignity beneath the dignity of a Peer or a Commoner, and it is for that reaſon, and for that reaſon alone, that the Peers and the Commoners ought to be ſuperior in rank to the King, and more eſpecially the Peers, that they ought certainly to be ſuperior in rank to the King, becauſe the King, on the ſuppoſition of this ſcale of rank being eſtabliſhed, would of conſequence receive a part of his wages out of the very money which would then be generouſly given to the ſtate by the Peers. And, under ſuch a regulation, with a King inferior in rank and dignity to all your other delegated governors, a very moderate ſum of money would then ſupport the rank and dignity of the King. And, inſtead of expending ſuch immenſe ſums of money, as you now expend, to ſupport the pomp, the pageantry, and all the fantaſtic fopperies and fooleries of a court, you might then employ that very money in maintaining fleets and armies to ſupport the dignity of the Crown, to ſupport Great Britain againſt all the inſults that ſhe may meet with, and againſt all the indignities that may be thrown upon her by other nations, which would be ſupporting *the real dignity* of the Britiſh Crown, and which muſt be ſupported,

ported, for the dignity of the Crown is the dignity of the People, the dignity of our moſt gracious Sovereign Lord the People.

7. THE rank of a BARONET to be the ſeventh degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Baronet to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, twenty thouſand pounds, and every ſucceſſor to the ſame title to pay the ſame ſum, and every Baronet to have the privilege of wearing a green ribband and a ſtar, and the green ribband to be the excluſive privilege of the Baronets. But, notwithſtanding the different circumſtances of a Baronet paying an immenſe ſum of money for the ſervice of the ſtate, and a King, on the coutrary, receiving an immenſe ſum of money from the ſtate for his ſervices, I ſay, notwithſtanding theſe different circumſtances, the green ribband to be an inferior rank to the pink ribband, becauſe the people have honoured the King with a ſhare in the ſubordinate power of governing this ſtate, and have not honoured the Baronets with the leaſt ſhare in that ſubordinate power of governing, and it is for that reaſon, and for that reaſon alone, that the King ought to be ſuperior in rank to the Baronets. And, perhaps it would not be improper, were the old and venerable title of *Excellency* to be added to the addreſs of Baronets who generouſly expend their fortunes in the ſervice of the ſtate, and not to be hereafter given or rather thrown away upon Embaſſadors, the mere ſervants of the ſtate, who do not expend their fortunes in the ſervice of the ſtate, but who, contrary to every idea of dignity, and as it was ſaid of the King, receive wages from the ſtate for their ſervices, like hirelings or menial ſervants, and who, on the ſuppoſition of this ſcale of rank being eſtabliſhed, would of conſequence receive a part of their wages out of the very money which would then be generouſly given to the ſtate by the Baronets.

8. THE rank of a KNIGHT OF THE BATH to be the eighth degree of rank in the ſtate. And every military officer who ranks above a Colonel of a regiment to be a Knight of the Bath, and the red ribband to be the excluſive privilege of military officers.

9. THE rank of a KNIGHT to be the ninth degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Knight to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, eight thouſand pounds, and every Knight to be diſtinguiſhed

guiſhed by a blue ribband round his left arm, and that diſtinction to be the excluſive privilege of Knights.

10. THE rank of a KNIGHT BACHELOR to be the tenth degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Knight Bachelor to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, ſix thouſand pounds, and every Knight Bachelor to be diſtinguiſhed by an orange ribband round his left arm, and that diſtinction to be the excluſive privilege of Knights Bachelors.

11. Now, in this eleventh degree of rank, though I believe that the word Herald has hitherto been always uſed to mean an officer employed in Heraldry, yet, I here beg leave to uſe the word Herald as meaning an honorary title, diſtinct from any official employment whatever, and the rank of a HERALD to be the eleventh degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of a Herald to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, two thouſand pounds, and every Herald to be diſtinguiſhed by a gold medal on his breaſt, with the figure of a wheat-ſheaf emboſſed on the medal, as an emblem that the money which he gave for his rank was giving bread to his poorer fellow-citizens, and to every perſon in the ſtate who is not a perſon of rank, and that diſtinction to be the excluſive privilege of Heralds.

12. AND the rank of an ESQUIRE to be the twelfth degree of rank in the ſtate. And every perſon who is honoured with the rank and title of an Eſquire to pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, one thouſand pounds, and every Eſquire to be diſtinguiſhed by a ſilver medal on his breaſt, with the figure of a wheat-ſheaf emboſſed on the medal, and that diſtinction to be the excluſive privilege of Eſquires.

THESE twelve degrees of rank to be all the degrees of rank in this ſtate, and every citizen of the ſtate who is not included in this ſcale of rank to be deemed a PLEBEIAN.

AND, beſides the reſpective privileges and diſtinctions which are here mentioned for each particular order or rank, every perſon who is included in this ſcale of rank to be entitled to the privileges of Heraldry, or, to have the privilege to emblazon or adorn his plate, carriges, &c. with figures of Heraldry, and the privileges of Heraldry

aldry to be the excluſive privilege of perſons of rank. And every Gentleman who is included in this ſcale of rank to have alſo the privilege of wearing a ſword, and that diſtinction to be the excluſive privilege of Gentlemen of rank and military officers.

As to the Gentlemen of the church, the army, and the navy, I cannot help expreſſing a deſire of thoſe Gentlemen being raiſed above the claſs of Plebeians, by adding them to this ſcale of rank, whenever that addition can be made conſiſtently with the principle on which this ſcale of rank is founded, which is merely the principle of raiſing a revenue for the ſervice of the ſtate, and alſo conſiſtently with *legal government*. And, with reſpect to the Clergy and the Military Officers being included in this ſcale of rank—Whenever the livings in the church, and the commiſſions in the army and navy, are diſpoſed of by the King, and are given to perſons as a reward for their ſervices in ſupporting the *illegal government* of the King, in direct oppoſition to the *legal government* of both or either of the other two branches of parliament, that is, in ſupporting the King in an undue influence in either houſe of parliament: Or—whenever the livings in the church, and the commiſſions in the army and navy, are diſpoſed of by Miniſters, and are given to perſons as a reward for their ſervices in ſupporting the *illegal government* of a miniſterial faction, in direct oppoſition to the *legal government* of all or any of the three branches of parliament, that is, in ſupporting a miniſterial faction, either in an undue influence over the King, or, in an undue influence in either houſe of parliament, then, in ſuch caſes, to raiſe the clergy and the military officers above the claſs of Plebeians, by giving them a place in this ſcale of rank, would be utterly inconſiſtent with *legal government*, and with one of the leading principles of this pamphlet, which is the principle of deſtroying, not only the *illegal government* of the King, but alſo the *illegal government* of every miniſterial faction: nor would it be conſiſtent with the very principle on which this ſcale of rank is plainly founded, which, as I ſaid before, is merely the principle of raiſing a revenue for the ſervice of the ſtate. But, inſtead of the practice of thus making not only the army and navy, but even the church, an inſtrument in the hands of Kings or Miniſters, and thereby enabling thoſe Kings or Miniſters, by the allurements of commiſſions, livings, promotions, and tranſlations, to deſ-

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troy the *legal government* of this ſtate. and to ſupport, either an *illegal power* of governing in the King, or, an *illegal power* of governing in a miniſterial faction, I ſay, inſtead of the practice of thus proſtituting not only the army and navy, but even the church, to ſupport an *illegal government*, were we to ſuppoſe all the livings in the church, and all the commiſſions in the army and navy, whenever there are any vacancies in thoſe employments, to be diſpoſed of by public ſale to the higheſt bidder, under proper reſtrictions of the competitors being duly qualified for their reſpective employments, and the money ariſing from thoſe ſales to be paid into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, then, in that caſe, it would be perfectly conſiſtent with the principle of raiſing a revenue by this ſcale of rank, and as perfectly conſiſtent with *legal government*, and with the principle of deſtroying the *illegal government* of both Kings and Miniſters; and it would not only be conſiſtent with theſe principles, but I ſhould alſo think it a real advantage to the church, the army, and the navy, and a real advantage to the community in general, to raiſe all the clergy and all the military officers above the claſs of Plebeians, by giving them a place in this ſcale of rank. And, in this caſe, the rank of the clergy, and the rank of the officers in the army, and which alſo includes the officers of the navy who are of equal rank, might be added to the twelve degrees of rank before mentioned, and this rank, for diſtinction ſake, I beg leave to call *the civil rank* of the clergy and the military officers, and a ſcale of rank including the whole of the civil rank of the ſtate might be ſtated thus, viz.

1. A Duke.
2. A Marquis.
3. An Earl.
4. A Viſcount.
5. A Member of the Houſe of Commons.
6. A King.
7. A Baronet.
8. An Archbiſhop.
9. A Knight of the Bath.
10. A Knight.
11. A Knight Bachelor.
12. A Biſhop.

A Herald.

13. A Herald.
14. An Eſquire.
15. A Rector of a Pariſh, a Miniſter of a Chapel of Eaſe, or, a Curate.
16. A Colonel of a Regiment, a Lieutenant Colonel, or, a Major.
17. A Clerk of any Church or Chapel.
18. A Captain, a Lieutenant, or, an Enſign.

And, this ſcale of rank, or, a ſcale of rank nearly ſimilar to this, would perhaps include every gentleman in the kingdom who either has or ought to have the leaſt degree of rank in this ſtate.

As to the diſtinction between a perſon having a rank in the ſtate, or, having what I have called a *civil rank*, and a perſon having a rank in the church, the army, or the navy: though the rank that every clergyman has in the church, and the rank that every officer has in the army or navy, is certainly eſtabliſhed by public authority, yet, When was the rank that a clergyman has in the ſtate, or, the civil rank of a clergyman, eſtabliſhed by public authority? and, When was the rank that a military officer has in the ſtate, or, the civil rank of a military officer, eſtabliſhed by public authority? That is, When was the rank that a clergyman has with all the other citizens of the ſtate who are not clergymen, and the rank that a military officer has with all the other citizens of the ſtate who are not military officers eſtabliſhed by public authority? It is true, their fellow-citizens who are neither clergymen nor military officers, through courteſy, and if they chooſe to do it, may give to a gentleman of the church, the army, or the navy, a ſuperior rank, and if they do not chooſe to give that gentleman a ſuperior rank, they may deny his right to that rank, becauſe the rank of a clergyman with all the other citizens of the ſtate who are not clergymen, and the rank of a military officer, with all the other citizens of the ſtate who are not military officers, has not been eſtabliſhed by public authority, that is, becauſe the civil rank of the clergy and the military officers has not been eſtabliſhed by public authority; and ſuch a ſpecies of civil rank, ſuch a mockery of dignity and rank, which is only given as a favour, and cannot be demanded as a right, is hardly worth calling a rank, or, however it cannot be fairly called a rank of eſtabliſhed right either in the clergy or the

military Officers. But, were this ſcale of rank to be eſtabliſhed, then, the rank that every clergyman would have in the ſtate, or, the civil rank of every clergyman, would be as much a rank of eſtabliſhed right as his rank in the church, and, the rank that every military officer would have in the ſtate, or, the civil rank of every military officer, would alſo be as much a rank of eſtabliſhed right as his rank in the army or navy, that is, the rank that every clergyman would then have with all the other citizens of the ſtate who are not clergymen, and alſo the rank that every military officer would then have with all the other citizens of the ſtate who are not military officers, would be as much a rank of eſtabliſhed right as their rank in the church, the army, or the navy. And, by eſtabliſhing this ſcale of rank, the civil rank of the clergy and the military officers would not only be eſtabliſhed, but the *degree* of their civil rank would then alſo be determined with as much certainty, and would be as diſtinguiſhable, as the degree of their clerical or military rank: For, as the promotions of the reſpective clergymen determine with certainty their rank in the church, or, determine with certainty the degree of their clerical rank, ſo, the arrangement of the clergy in this ſcale of rank, would alſo, and with the ſame degree of certainty, determine their rank in the ſtate, or, would alſo determine the degree of their civil rank: And, as the commiſſions of the reſpective military officers determine with certainty their rank in the army or navy, or, determine with certainty the degree of their military rank, ſo, the arrangement of the military officers in this ſcale of rank, would alſo, and with the ſame degree of certainty, determine their rank in the ſtate, or, would alſo determine the degree of their civil rank. And thus, the civil rank of every clergyman, and the civil rank of every military officer, would then be as well eſtabliſhed, as certainly determined, and as diſtinguiſhable, as their clerical or military rank; and the civil rank of both the clergy and the military officers would not continue to be, as it is now, *a trifling rank of courteſy*, but would then, though an inferior rank, be as much a rank of *eſtabliſhed right*, and as *real*, as the rank of a peer of the realm.

And, with reſpect to the privileges of heraldry, as in the former, ſo, in this ſcale of rank, every perſon who is included in this ſcale of rank to be alſo intitled to the previleges of heraldry. And

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with reſpect to the dreſs of the clergy, perhaps it would not be improper, were every clergyman in the kingdom to wear a ſquare cap, as being more ſuitable to his clerical dreſs, and being more ſuitable to his clerical dignity, than wearing only a common hat. And, with reſpect to the dreſs of the clerks, it might alſo be as proper, were the clerk of every church to wear a black gown, as being more ſuitable to the ſolemn ſervice of the church, than wearing only a common dreſs.

And, in this ſcale of rank, every married lady, after the deceaſe of her huſband, to continue her rank for life. And, ſhould any unmarried ladies chooſe to have the ſame degree of rank as the lady of a Peer, and to be Peereſſes in their own right, in any of the four orders of Peerage, or, to have the ſame degree of rank as the lady of a Baronet, a Knight, a Knight Bachelor, a Herald, or, an Eſquire; then, any unmarried lady who will pay into the public treaſury, for the ſervice of the ſtate, the reſpective ſum here mentioned for any of theſe nine orders or degrees of rank, that lady to be thereby entitled to that degree of rank for life, and having then a rank in her own right, ſhould ſhe afterwards marry, her huſband to be entitled to the ſame degree of rank, and to be entitled to all the privileges and diſtinctions of that particular order or rank. And, ſhould any perſon chooſe to ſtep from a lower to a higher degree of rank, whatever money has been paid for the lower degree of rank, that money to be allowed to be a payment in part for the higher degree of rank, and only to pay the difference. And, ſhould a gentleman who has a rank in his own right marry a lady who has likewiſe a rank in her own right, whatever money has been paid by both the lady and the gentleman for their reſpective degrees of rank, the aggregate ſum of both thoſe payments to be alſo taken in payment for any further ſtep that they may chooſe to take in this ſcale of rank. And, as in all caſes, whatever money has been paid by a perſon for a lower degree of rank, that money ought to be taken in payment for a higher degree of rank, whenever that perſon chooſes to ſtep from a lower to a higher degree of rank, ſo, in ſome particular caſes, I think, that whatever money has been paid by a perſon for a higher degree of rank, that that money alſo ought to be taken in payment for a lower degree of rank, whenever that perſon chooſes to ſtep from a higher to a lower degree of rank.

For inſtance, ſuppoſe a young man to ſet out in life with ſuch affluent circumſtances as to enable him to purchaſe a high and merely honorary degree of rank, and ſhould he afterwards, either by imprudence or adverſe fortune, be reduced to very neceſſitous circumſtances, and ſhould he alſo be duly qualified, either for the church, the army, or the navy, then, in ſuch a caſe, and on his relinquiſhing his high rank, I think, that whatever money he has paid, in the day of proſperity, for a merely honorary rank, that that money ought to be taken in payment for any purchaſe or purchaſes that he may chooſe to make, either in the church, the army, or the navy. And, however unpleaſant the mere mentioning of ſuch a caſe as this muſt be to a feeling and generous mind; yet, under ſuch circumſtances, ſuch a privilege may perhaps be conſidered as a very valuable privilege, by affording ſuch unfortunate perſons a comfortable retreat in the day of adverſity.

ON TAXES.

SUPPOSE a tax to be laid on every dwelling houſe in this kingdom of the annual rent of £.20, and upwards, and the annual rent of every houſe to be eſtimated at the rate of 7½ per Cent. on the coſt or value of the houſe, and the tax to increaſe in proportion to the rent of the houſes, and to be laid on every houſe in theſe proportions, viz.

Every houſe of the annual rent of £.20,	and upwards to £.30,	to ſubject the tenant to an annual tax of 25 per Ct.	on the rent of the houſe.
—— 30,	—— 40,	—— 50 per Ct.	—
—— 40,	—— 50,	—— 75 per Ct.	—
—— 50,	—— 60,	—— 100 per Ct.	—
—— 60,	—— 70,	—— 125 per Ct.	—
—— 70,	—— 85,	—— 150 pr. Ct.	—
—— 85,	—— 100,	—— 175 per Ct.	—
and —— 100,	and upwards,	—— 200 per Ct.	on the rent of the houſe.

Indeed, it would certainly be reaſonable to make a conſiderable abatement of this tax to perſons who have a great many children, and who would of conſequence require large houſes merely for the purpoſe of accommodating their own families; and I could wiſh the abatements of this tax to be made in proportion to the number of children that a perſon either has, or ever had, and to be made in theſe proportions, viz.

A perſon who either has, or ever had,	to have an abatement of	on any part or proportion of this tax to which his houſe might ſubject him.
—— 1 child,	—— 50 per Ct.	
—— 2 children,	—— 60 per Ct.	——
—— 3 children,	—— 70 per Ct.	——
—— 4 children,	—— 80 per Ct.	——
—— 5 children,	—— 90 per Ct.	——
and —— 6 children,	to pay no houſe tax at all.	

AND whereas in many dwelling houſes a part of the houſe is employed for the purpoſe of a ſhop, and as a tax on a ſhop is in effect a tax on the goods that are ſold in the ſhop, and is of conſequence a tax on the neceſſaries of life; therefore, it is here intended, that in every ſuch dwelling-houſe, whatever part of the houſe is employed for the *ſole purpoſe* of a ſhop or a counting-houſe, that the tennant ſhall not be ſubject to the payment of

of any tax whatever for either the ſhop or the counting-houſe, and that in every ſuch dwelling-houſe the rent ſhall be eſtimated on only the remainder of the houſe, it being only the remainder of the houſe which comes properly within the meaning of the words *dwelling-houſe*.

AND, if the principle of leſſening the weight of taxes in proportion to the increaſe of children is approved of, let us ſuppoſe the ſame principle to be alſo obſerved with reſpect to the land tax, and a land tax to be laid in theſe proportions, viz.

A perſon who neither has, nor ever had, a child, to pay 10 ſhillings in the pound on the rent [or produce of his eſtate.

A perſon who either

[has, or ever had,	1 child,	to pay 5 ſhillings	———
———	2 children,	— 4 ſhillings	———
———	3 children,	— 3 ſhillings	———
———	4 children,	— 2 ſhillings	———
———	5 children,	— 1 ſhilling	———
and ———	6 children,	to pay no land tax at all.	

It is true, this mode of impoſing taxes would preſs hard on perſons who neither have, nor ever had, any children at all, and alſo on perſons who have very few children: But, let it at the ſame time be conſidered, that this mode of impoſing taxes on both lands and houſes might perhaps be a means of preventing ſuch practices as ought to be proſcribed by all nations.

As to all lands that are employed for the purpoſe of kitchen gardens, it is here intended, that all ſuch lands ſhall be included in the former tax, the ſame as if they were employed for any other uſeful purpoſe, and of conſequence, that the proprietors of all ſuch lands ſhall be entitled to all the abatements of this tax in proportion to the increaſe of children: But, whatever number of children a perſon may have, it is alſo here intended, that all lands that are employed, or rather *waſted*, for the purpoſe of gardens for pleaſure, parks, or pleaſure-ground of any kind whatever, ſhall ſubject the proprietor of ſuch lands to the payment of an annual tax of one year's rent, or, to the payment of an annual tax of as much as a farmer would give for the rent of ſuch lands; becauſe ſuch *a wanton waſte of uſeful lands* does certainly leſſen the quantity of bread for the public; and becauſe it is reaſonable, whatever number of children the rich may have themſelves, that the children of the poor ſhall alſo have bread. And, as to all lands that are now in commons and are the joint property of the freeholders of their reſpective townſhips, as long as thoſe lands continue undivided, it would be impoſſible to include them in the former tax: But, is it reaſonable that the proprietors of thoſe lands ſhall be exempt from the payment of taxes, and exempt from bearing their proportion of the common

15 71 FEB

common burthens of the ſtate, becauſe they have never yet made a diviſion of thoſe lands? It appears much more reaſonable to me, that the freeholders of every townſhip, where there are any common lands, ſhould be obliged to make a diviſion of thoſe lands, marking out the exact boundary of each freeholder, and diſtinctly aſcertaining the particular proprietor of every part of thoſe lands, and then, thoſe lands alſo might be included in the former tax, and might be brought to bear their proportion of the common burthens of the ſtate.

As to the means of reſtraining the rich and affluent in the exceſſes of living, let us ſuppoſe a tax to be laid on livery ſervants or men ſervants, and the tax to increaſe in proportion to the number of ſuch ſervants in the ſervice of the ſame perſon, and to be laid in theſe proportions, viz.

For 1 ſuch ſervant to pay £.10 per annum,

2 ——— 20 per annum for each ſervant,

3 ——— 30 ———

4 ——— 40 ———

and for 5 ſuch ſervants, or for any greater number, to pay 50 per annum for each ſervant.

And, if the principle of thus reſtraining the rich and affluent in the exceſſes of living is a juſt principle, that is, if this mode of impoſing taxes with an accumulated weight in proportion to the degree of that exceſs is founded in reaſon, juſtice, and equity, the ſame mode might alſo be obſerved, and with equal juſtice, in framing a law to impoſe a tax on horſes, and which would produce the very ſame effects. For inſtance, ſuppoſe all the horſes in the kingdom to be diſtinguiſhed into three kinds of horſes, viz. horſes of neceſſity, horſes of uſe, and horſes of pleaſure; and all hackney horſes, horſes that cart or carry goods for hire, and all horſes that are deemed abſolutely neceſſary for the ſtate, to be called horſes of neceſſity, and not to ſubject the owners of ſuch horſes to the payment of any taxes whatever; and all horſes that are kept for the purpoſe of huſbandry, and for many other employments that are uſeful to the ſtate, to be called horſes of uſe, and to be ſubject to a tax of £.1, per horſe per annum, And, after we have thus ſuppoſed all horſes that are called horſes of neceſſity not to ſubject the owners to the payment of any taxes whatever, and have alſo ſuppoſed all horſes that are called horſes of uſe to be ſubject to a tax of £.1, per horſe per annum, then, agreeably to this mode of impoſſing taxes with an accumulated weight in proportion to the exceſſes of living, we might alſo ſuppoſe all the other horſes in the kingdom, or, all horſes that are called horſes of pleaſure, to be ſubject to a tax increaſing in proportion to the number of ſuch kind of horſes, or, horſes of pleaſure, that may be kept by the ſame perſon, and the tax to be laid in theſe proportions, viz.

For,

For 1 ſuch horſe to pay £. 10 per annum,
2 ——— 20 per annnm for each horſe
3 ——— 30 ———
4 ——— 40 ———
and for 5 ſuch horſes, or for any greater number, to pay } 50 per annum for each horſe.

As to the tax which is here ſuppoſed to be laid on horſes that are kept for the purpoſe of huſbandry and are ranked in the claſs of uſeful horſes: though the buſineſs of huſbandry is not only uſeful but abſolutely neceſſary, and is, beyond all compariſon, a buſineſs the moſt eſſentially neceſſary for the welfare of the ſtate, yet, as plowing and a great deal of the work of huſbandry may be done with oxen as well as with horſes, and is much more advantageous to the ſtate, when it is done with oxen, than when it is done with horſes, inaſmuch as an ox after he has done his labour may be made uſeful to the ſtate, but a horſe after he has done his labour cannot be made uſeful to the ſtate, and can only be called an uſeful horſe as long as his labour is uſeful, and inaſmuch as whatever part of the produce of a farm is conſumed by horſes, it muſt thereby, to the great injury of the ſtate, leave a leſs produce for the farmer to take to market, I ſay, as plowing and a great deal of the work of huſbandry may be done with oxen, and with much more advantage to the ſtate, then when it is done with horſes; therefore, though the work of huſbandry is neceſſary, yet, it is not neceſſary that the work ſhould be done with horſes, and it is for that reaſon that I have here ſuppoſed a tax of £. 1 per annum to be laid on every horſe that is kept for the purpoſe of huſbandry.

And, with reſpect to a tax on carriages, if articles of ſplendour are properer objects of taxation than articles of only conveniency, on that principle we might alſo ſuppoſe hackney coaches, and all kinds of carriages that are let for hire, to be exempt from the payment of any taxes whatever, and an additional tax to be laid on coaches and all kinds of carriages that are kept for private uſe. And, after we have ſuppoſed a tax of £. 20, per annum to be laid on every chaiſe or two-wheeled carriage in the kingdom, of any kind whatever, that is kept for private uſe, then, on the ſame principle of impoſing taxes with an accumulated weight in proportion to the exceſſes of living which has here been obſerved with reſpect to the other taxes, we might alſo ſuppoſe a tax to be laid on every coach or four-wheeled carriage in the kingdom, of any kind whatever, that is kept for private uſe, and the tax to increaſe in proportion to the number of coaches or four-wheeled carriages that are kept by the ſame perſon, and to be laid in theſe proportions, viz.

For 1 coach or four wheeled carriage to pay £. 100 per annum,
2 ——— 130 per ann. for each carriage
and for 3 ſuch carriages, or for any greater number, to pay } 200 { per annum for each carriage.

Thus

THUS, the parade of carriages, as well as the parade of ſervants, and alſo the exceſſes of a ſtable, as well as the exceſſes of a dwelling houſe, might be legally reſtrained, and perhaps conſiſtently with the principles of reaſon, juſtice, and equity. However, whether theſe reſtrictions are, or are not, conſiſtent with thoſe principles, of this I am very ſure, that the people, or, the republican government of this ſtate, have a right to determine that queſtion, and to determine, whether ſuch laws ſhall, or ſhall not, be enacted; and whether the determination of the people is right or wrong, juſt or unjuſt, that no power on earth has a right to oppoſe their determination. And, ſhould the people determine to have theſe laws enacted, though we cannot ſpeak with as much certainty of the conſequences of laws, as of the right of enacting them, yet, perhaps we may fairly conclude, that by theſe and ſuch like ſamptuary laws, the people might be enabled to repeal all the preſent laws which have impoſed taxes indiſcriminately on both the rich and the poor, and might be enabled to confine the future payment of taxes ſolely to the rich—that by theſe and ſuch like ſamptuary laws, the people, whenever they chooſe to do it, and whenever they chooſe to purſue their own intereſt, might thus take the burthen of heavy taxes from off the ſhoulders of the poor, and might lay the whole of that burthen on the rich.

AND, beſides theſe taxes on houſes, lands, &c. it might be a further means to relieve the poor from the payment of unneceſſary taxes, were we to ſuppoſe a tax of £.5, per dog per annum to be laid on all the dogs in the kingdom except ſuch dogs as are kept by farmers, butchers, and drovers or drivers of cattle, and all dogs that are kept for theſe and ſuch like uſeful and neceſſary employments not to ſubject the owners of ſuch dogs to the payment of any tax whatever. And, were we to ſuppoſe no perſon to be qualified to kill game without paying £.50, per annum for his qualification, and any perſon who chooſes to have a qualification to kill game, that he ſhall, on paying the ſum of fifty pounds, be qualified to kill game for one year in any part of the kingdom wherever he might chooſe to do it. And, were we alſo to ſuppoſe no perſon to have the privilege of fiſhing in any freſh-water river without paying a ſtipulated ſum of money for that privilege, and any perſon who chooſes to have the privilege of fiſhing in any particular river, that he ſhall, on paying the ſtipulated ſum, have the privilege of fiſhing for one year in any part of that river wherever he might chooſe to do it, and any perſon who chooſes to have a more general privilege of fiſhing in freſh-water rivers, that he ſhall, on paying a ſtipulated ſum, have the privilege of fiſhing for one year in any river or rivers in any part of the kingdom wherever he might chooſe to do it.

As to the right of reſtraining a perſon from killing game upon his own eſtate, and alſo the right of reſtraining a perſon from fiſhing in a river which

runs through his own eſtate. This right does certainly depend on the anſwer that is given to this queſtion: viz. Who are the real and legal proprietors of all the game in the kingdom, and the real and legal proprietors of all the fiſh in all the freſh-water rivers in the kingdom? And, if the circumſtance of game coming accidentally into any particular eſtate, or, the circumſtance of fiſh coming accidentally into a river which runs through any particular eſtate, makes the proprietor of that eſtate to become the real and legal proprietor of that game, and of that fiſh, then, there can be no ſuch thing as a right to reſtrain any proprietor of an eſtate from killing and taking all the game, and all the fiſh, that he might find within his own eſtate, every man having an indiſputable right to kill and make uſe of his own property whenever he chooſes to do it: But, after allowing this right that every man has over his own property, it would ſtill reſt with the proprietor of an eſtate to prove, that either this, or ſome other circumſtance, has made all the game and all the fiſh upon his own eſtate his own property before he could prove his right to kill and take either the game or the fiſh which is upon his own eſtate. And, ſhould a perſon ſay, that it is not the circumſtance of game and fiſh coming within his own eſtate, but the circumſtance of game and fiſh *feeding upon his own eſtate*, which makes the game and the fiſh to become his own property, yet, it would ſtill reſt with the proprietor of an eſtate to prove, that this game and this fiſh does actually feed upon his own eſtate, and not upon his neighbours eſtate, which, in many caſes would be very difficult to prove, in ſome caſes quite impoſſible to prove, and in moſt caſes the probability would be, that this game and this fiſh does actually feed, not only upon his own eſtate, and the adjoining eſtate, but alſo upon the eſtates of many other neighbours; all which circumſtances ſeem to render it difficult, if not impoſſible, for individuals clearly and with certainty to aſcertain their right to this ſpecies of property. It is true, the preſent game laws have made all the game in the kingdom as much the property of individuals as their ſheep or their cattle: But, were we to ſuppoſe the people to repeal all theſe game laws, and were we alſo to ſuppoſe that theſe individuals could not, after that repeal, produce a ſatisfactory proof of their being the real and legal proprietors of all the game, and all the fiſh, which is upon their own eſtates, then, in that caſe, and if no other individuals could prove their right to this ſpecies of property, the property would of conſequence revert to the people, and the people would be the real and legal proprietors of all the game in the kingdom, and the real and legal proprietors of all the fiſh in all the freſh-water rivers in the kingdom. And, in ſuch a caſe, I ſhould think that the people would be wanting in juſtice to themſelves, were they to be ſo regardleſs of their own property as not to impoſe ſuch conditions on the privilege of individuals killing

killing and taking that property as they might think would be moſt for their own advantage, always obſerving that the conditions are ſuch as would not injure the eſtates and property of individuals, or, were the people to be ſo regardleſs of their own property as not to ſell all the game in the kingdom, and all the fiſh in all the freſh-water rivers in the kingdom, at the very higheſt prices that they could get for it, and thereby to relieve themſelves, as much as they could poſſibly do it, from the burthen of heavy Taxes.

Thus far theſe ſuppoſed taxes would fall *ſolely on the rich*, and to the advantage of *the poor*. And, in ſome caſes, perhaps it would be impoſing taxes on a principle equally juſt, and equally generous, were taxes to be laid *ſolely on men*, and to the advantage of *women*. For inſtance, let us ſuppoſe the following taxes to be laid on men: viz. Every man who follows the buſineſs of a milliner, a mantua-maker, or, a maſter ſtay-maker, to pay £.30, per annum. Every man who follows the buſineſs of dreſſing women's hair to pay £.20, per annum. And every man who follows the buſineſs of a journeyman taylor to pay £.10, per annum. Then, perhaps, ſuch taxes on men might ſo far improve the revenue as to enable the people to take off the tax which has lately been impoſed on women ſervants. However, let the revenue that might ariſe from theſe taxes be ever ſo uncertain, this is certain: viz. As far as men would ſubmit to pay theſe taxes for the privilege of following theſe employments, ſo far theſe taxes would be in favour of the principle of raiſing a revenue for the general advantage of the ſtate. And, as far as theſe taxes would oblige men to follow more manly employments, and to leave theſe employments to women, ſo far theſe taxes would be in favour of the principle of impoſing taxes on men to the advantage of women, by affording women more opportunities of earning their bread by their own labour. But, with reſpect to the tax on women ſervants, as far as this tax will leſſen the number of women who are employed as domeſtic ſervants, ſo far this tax is certainly a real, and I think a moſt ungenerous oppreſſion of the weaker ſex, by circumſcribing the means of women earning their bread by their own labour. And, it is certainly more reaſonable to impoſe taxes on men for following unmanly employments, than to impoſe taxes on women for following the employment of domeſtic ſervants, the proper and ſuitable employment of women——it is certainly a more generous, and a more manly principle, to impoſe taxes on men of a particular deſcription, than to impoſe taxes on women of a particular deſcription, and to make women, the poor and helpleſs women, the objects of taxation and oppreſſion.

It was the ſuppoſed tax on houſes which led me to mention the ſhop tax, and it is theſe ſuppoſed taxes on men which have led me to mention

the tax on women ſervants: But here, without being led to it by any particular introduction, there is one tax which I cannot help mentioning, and that is, *the tax which obliges a poor man to pay three pence for chriſtening his child.* Now, with reſpect to this tax,—as the eſtabliſhment of chriſtianity in this ſtate is a bleſſing which we do certainly derive from the Great Fountain of all Bleſſings, Shall the ſtate oblige a man to pay three pence into the public treaſury for chriſtening his child, before his child ſhall have the advantage of that bleſſing, and before his child ſhall have the advantage of a bleſſing which has been eſtabliſhed in this ſtate by the Great Fountain of all Bleſſings?—as the eſtabliſhment of chriſtianity in this ſtate is certainly agreeable to the Divine Will, Is it reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that this tax on chriſtenings is agreeable to the Divine Will? Is it not much more reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that this tax on chriſtenings is directly contrary to the Divine Will? and—as the eſtabliſhment of chriſtianity in this ſtate is certainly a Divine Inſtitution, Shall this ſtate preſume to clog that inſtitution with a tax? And may not ſuch a tax, by laying that clog on this Divine Inſtitution, be conſidered as a direct inſult offered to the Throne of Heaven? It is true, the tax is not heavy, but that does not juſtify the principle of the tax, and the lighteſt taxes are certainly unjuſtifiable, when they are founded, as I think that this tax on chriſtenings is founded, and that is, *on very bad principles.*

As to the very extravagant rates at which theſe *ſuppoſed taxes* are here ſtated, I acknowledge the extravagance of theſe rates, and particularly with reſpect to ſuch taxes as are here ſuppoſed to fall with an accumulated weight on perſons of very great fortune, but before this extravagance is too ſeverely cenſured, I could wiſh that the reader would conſider the very deſirable circumſtance of having, if poſſible, a ſurplus in the public revenue, and alſo the very advantageous manner in which a ſuperfluity of public wealth might be employed, whenever ſuch a ſuperfluity, by any juſt and equitable mode of taxation, can poſſibly be obtained. For inſtance, were we to ſuppoſe the revenue ariſing from theſe and ſuch like taxes, together with the revenue ariſing from the above ſcale of rank, ſo far to improve the public revenue as to make that revenue more than ſufficient for the ſupport of the church, the army, the navy, and all

other

other neceſſary and unavoidable expences, then, with reſpect to this ſurplus of the public revenue, beſides the very advantageous manner of employing a ſuperfluity of public wealth which has been already mentioned, and that is, by reducing the national debt to a more moderate ſum, let us ſuppoſe this ſurplus to be alſo employed in ſupporting the poor of this kingdom, and particularly in building ſchools in every county in the kingdom for the purpoſe of maintaining and *educating* the children of the lower ranks of people; by which means perhaps the morals of the lower ranks of people might be greatly improved, and vice might be prevented, inſtead of being puniſhed. And, ſome perſons are of opinion, that an improvement in morals is a much more *effectual mode*, however, I am very ſure that it is a much more *merciful mode* of reſtraining vice, than a rigid exertion of penal laws. I ſay, were we to ſuppoſe the revenue ariſing from theſe taxes to be more than ſufficient for all the neceſſary and unavoidable expences of government, then, let us ſuppoſe the ſurplus to be employed in ſupporting the poor of this kingdom, and the people to be thereby relieved from the burthen of a poor tax. And, after the poor are ſufficiently provided for, ſhould there ſtill be a ſurplus in the public revenue, then, with reſpect to this further ſurplus, let us ſuppoſe a board of works to be eſtabliſhed in every county in this kingdom for the purpoſe of ſuperintending and directing the expenditure of ſuch portions of this ſuperfluous money as might at any time be granted them by parliament, and to be accountable to the parliament for the expenditure of that money, and in every county, the baronets, the knights, the knights bachelors, the heralds, and the eſquires, to conſtitute the board of works for their reſpective counties. And, as to the particular manner of employing this further ſurplus of the public revenue in the different counties, the gentlemen who conſtitute the board of works for each county would certainly be the beſt and the propereſt judges of the manner of doing it, and, from the circumſtance of their being men of rank, and having of conſequence ſo generouſly contributed to the public treaſure, they would alſo have the beſt right of judging in what manner the ſurplus of that public treaſure ought to be employed. However, as the whole that is ſaid here is merely a *ſuppoſition*, I beg leave to go on in the ſame ſtrain of ſuppoſing the board of works for each county not only to employ the public money that might

might be granted them by parliament in ſupporting the poor, but alſo to employ that public money in widening and improving the ſtreets of every county town in the kingdom for the conveniency of the inhabitants—in laying out and making public walks, gardens, parks or pleaſure-ground, in or near every county town, for the pleaſure and health of the inhabitants. And, were there to be a park adjoining to every county town, theſe parks would not only be healthful and pleaſant to the inhabitants, but as they would alſo be uſeful to the inhabitants for grazing cattle, the gentlemen who conſtitute the board of works for each county to receive the rents and profits of all theſe parks, and to be accountable to the parliament for that money, becauſe theſe parks are here ſuppoſed to be bought with the public money, and the public money being certainly the property of the people, theſe parks would therefore be alſo the property of the people, and becauſe the houſe of commons are the ſtewards of the people, and are accountable to the people for the public money with which they are intruſted. It is true, in ſtating the land tax, I have called the laying out of uſeful lands as pleaſure-grounds, and for the pleaſure of *individuals*, a wanton waſte of uſeful lands: But, when you make public walks, and lay out uſeful lands as pleaſure-grounds, in or near large and populous towns, and as a means of contributing to *the health of thouſands*, I don't think that it could then be properly called *a wanton waſte of uſeful lands*—in repairing and improving all the roads in the kingdom, and the gentlemen who conſtitute the board of works for each county to have the care and guardianſhip of all the roads, ſtreets, lanes, and high ways of their reſpective counties—in building public banks, or, branches of the national bank, in every county town, for the purpoſe of promoting a more extenſive and general circulation of ſtock, and for a more convenient circulation of the public money—in building county halls for the more convenient meeting of the freeholders of every county, or, for the more convenient meeting of the republican government of the people. And, as theſe county halls would be for the purpoſe of aſſembling the freeholders whenever the people chooſe to exerciſe their ſupreme power over the parliament, they could not be too magnificent and grand, becauſe ſuch

grandeur

grandeur would beſt ſuit the ſupreme power and dignity of the people; and for the ſame reaſon, it might not be improper, were the gentlemen of each county to have three or four yeomen of the guard to attend theſe halls and theſe county aſſemblies, becauſe the grandeur of ſuch attendance would alſo beſt become the ſupreme power and dignity of the people. And, in the preſent neglected, languid, and almoſt lifeleſs ſtate of our republican government, the circumſtances of magnificent halls, guards, and if we alſo add all the formalities of government, ſuch circumſtances might give an additional ſpirit to the republican government of the people, and might impreſs on the minds of our fellow-citizens a proper ſenſe of the real power and dignity of that part of our civil government, and of the real power and dignity of the people. And indeed I ſhould never expect the people to govern this ſtate effectually, and to any good purpoſes, unleſs the government of the people were to be as properly ſupported by the parade of outward appearances as the parliamentary government, and unleſs the particular places, times, and manner of aſſembling the freeholders, and alſo the times and manner of adjourning and proroging theſe aſſemblies, and all the proper forms of government, were to be as ſtrictly obſerved by the people as they are by the parliament—in building bridges, county gaols, and work-houſes, wherever they might be wanted—in removing all public nuiſances, always making a reaſonable compenſation to individuals whenever private property is injured for the public conveniency—in building garneries or ſtore-houſes, in or near every county town, for the purpoſe of laying up conſiderable quantities of bread-corn at the public expence, and the gentlemen who conſtitute the board of works for each county to ſuperintend and direct the buying and ſelling of this public bread-corn, at ſuch times, and in ſuch a manner, as they might think moſt likely to prevent a ſcarcity or dearneſs of bread at any particular time—in building churches wherever they might be wanted, and in rebuilding ſuch churches as might be thought too meanly conſtructed for public worſhip, in ſhort, without ſwelling this catalogue any further, this catalogue of ways and deviſes to employ a ſuperfluity of public wealth, we may ſafely conclude, that it is impoſſible to contrive taxes which would produce ſuch a ſuperfluity of public wealth as might not be thus employed

ployed in the internal improvement of Great Britain—that it is impoſſible, by any mode of impoſing taxes, and by *the moſt extravagant rates* at which thoſe taxes could poſſibly be impoſed, ever to increaſe the public revenue to ſuch a degree as that the ſurplus of that revenue might not be thus employed for the general good of the ſtate. Indeed, were we to ſuppoſe the long eſtabliſhed practice of employing the public wealth to maintain fleets and armies for the ſupport of foreign and untributary nations, and alſo the long eſtabliſhed practice of employing, I ſhould ſay, if diſſipating the public wealth to maintain an army of placemen and penſioners for the ſupport of a miniſterial faction, to be ſtill continued, then, in that caſe, it would perhaps be impoſſible for the moſt enormous taxes ever to produce one ſhilling of ſuperfluous wealth, and the whole that is ſaid here on the internal improvement of Great Britain would of conſequence be impracticable for want of money to carry thoſe improvements into execution: But, on the contrary, were we to ſuppoſe a ſyſtem of œconomy to be hereafter adopted in every department of government, then, in that caſe, it is far from impoſſible, it is even probable, that theſe or ſuch like taxes, together with the ſavings which would ariſe from this ſyſtem of œconomy in the expenditure of the public wealth, would produce ſuch a ſuperfluity of that wealth, as might enable the people immediately, and in ſome degree, to accompliſh theſe ſuppoſed improvements, and perhaps, in proceſs of time, to accompliſh theſe improvements in a very conſiderable degree. And, it now remains for every one to judge for himſelf, and every citizen of this ſtate has not only a right to judge for himſelf reſpecting the expenditure of the public wealth, becauſe every citizen is certainly a joint and equal proprietor of that wealth, but every citizen of the ſtate has alſo an opportunity of judging for himſelf reſpecting the expenditure of the public wealth, whenever he chooſes to do it, becauſe every citizen is a member of the republican government of the people, and by joining with his fellow-citizens in the exerciſe of the ſupreme power with which that government is inveſted, he may thereby exerciſe that right of judging for himſelf, and may thereby give his voice reſpecting the expenditure of every ſhilling of that wealth, I ſay, it now remains for every citizen to judge for himſelf, and to give his voice, whether he would

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chooſe that the public wealth, whenever there is a ſuperfluity of that wealth, ſhall be hereafter employed, and thus employed, in the internal improvement of Great Britain, or, he would chooſe that the public wealth ſhall be hereafter employed in the ſupport of foreign and untributary nations; and alſo to give his voice, whether he would chooſe that a part of the ſuperfluous public wealth ſhall be hereafter employed in maintaining and educating the children of the poorer ranks of people, or, he would chooſe that that ſuperfluous wealth ſhall ſtill continue to be diſſipated on unneceſſary placemen and penſioners. And, I might add, whether the people would chooſe that a part of their ſuperfluous public wealth, *that a part of their own money*, ſhall be hereafter employed in giving bread to poor and helpleſs children, or, they would chooſe that their money ſhall ſtill continue to be diſſipated in the unneceſſary expences, and in all the vanities and wanton exceſſes of a court. And, as I have with confidence aſſerted, that the people, or, the republican government of this ſtate, have a right to determine, whether theſe laws ſhall, or ſhall not, be enacted; ſo, with reſpect to the expenditure of the public wealth, I may with equal confidence aſſert, that the people, or, the republican government of this ſtate, have a right to determine, what proportion of the public wealth, and whether any part of the public wealth ſhall, or ſhall not, be hereafter employed, and thus employed, in the internal improvement of Great Britain; and alſo to determine, what proportion of the public wealth ſhall be hereafter employed in maintaining and educating the children of the poor, which I ſhould think the greateſt of all improvements; and whether the determination of the people is right or wrong, juſt or unjuſt, in this caſe alſo, no power on earth has a right to oppoſe the determination of the people.

A *ſuppoſed* plan of repreſentation in the Houſe of Commons, for the purpoſe of increaſing the public revenue, in caſe the above ſcale of rank ſhould ever be eſtabliſhed in this ſtate.

AT preſent the whole repreſentation of England, Wales, and Scotland, in the houſe of commons, ſtands thus, viz.

	Members.
For England,	489,
For Wales,	24,
For Scotland,	45,
	558.

AND, though I have already ſtated a plan of repreſentation for England agreeably to the above proportion of four hundred and eighty-nine members, not knowing that ſuch an eſtabliſhment as the above ſcale of rank will ever take place, which, were it to take place, might make it neceſſary or expedient to alter and reduce the preſent number of repreſentatives in the houſe of commons, yet, as it is alſo impoſſible to know with certainty that ſuch an eſtabliſhment will not take place, it may not be improper to ſtate another repreſentation in the houſe of commons more ſuitable to ſuch an eſtabliſhment, and which repreſentation might perhaps increaſe the revenue ariſing from ſuch a ſcale of rank. For inſtance, let us ſuppoſe the repreſentation in the houſe of commons to be reduced to nearly one fourth part of the preſent number, and to be ſtated thus, viz.

	Members.
For England,	122,
For Wales,	6,
For Scotland.	12,
	140,
difference,	418,
	558.

And then, the repreſentation for England might be ſtated thus, viz.

	Members.
The 2 counties of Weſtminſter and London to ſend 2 members from each county,	4
The 116 remaining counties to ſend 1 member from each county,	116.
Univerſity of Oxford,	1,
Univerſity of Cambridge,	1,
	122.

And, ſuch a reduction in the number of repreſentatives in the houſe of commons, were the above ſcale of rank to be eſtabliſhed in this ſtate, might make a very great increaſe in the revenue ariſing from ſuch a ſcale of rank: For, it is probable that ſome of the four hundred and eighteen gentlemen, who are included in this difference, would then, to the great advantage of the ſtate, be found in the rank of peers, or, however, it is highly probable that moſt of theſe four hundred and eighteen gentlemen, if they had not ſeats in the lower houſe, would, to the ſtill great advantage of the ſtate, be found in the rank, either of baronets, knights, knights bachelors, heralds, or, eſquires. Indeed, were we to ſuppoſe the king's ſervants, notwithſtanding what has been ſaid in the paper on the powers of government againſt the practice of thoſe ſervants being allowed the privilege of ſitting in both houſes of parliament, I ſay, were we to ſuppoſe the king's ſervants, notwithſtanding what has been ſaid againſt this practice, to be ſuffered to continue in parliament, then, in that caſe, I ſhould not heſitate to pronounce this plan for reducing the repreſentation in the lower houſe to one hundred and forty members to be *a moſt dangerous plan*, inaſmuch as one hundred and forty ſenators, if thoſe ſenators are allowed the privilege of being, at the ſame time, the ſervants of the king, might, by the allurements of gain, be more eaſily ſeduced from their attachment to the people, and might be more eaſily brought, either under the influence of the king, or, under the influence of a miniſterial faction, than five hundred and fifty-eight ſenators, and it is

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far from impoſſible, that ſuch a meaſure, under ſuch circumſtances, might thereby eſtabliſh, either in the king, or, in a miniſterial faction, an abſolute dominion over the legiſlative branch of government, to the utter ſubverſion of all free and legal government; and therefore, it is only on a ſuppoſition of the king's ſervants not being ſuffered to continue in parliament, that I have ſtated this plan for reducing the repreſentation in the houſe of commons to one hundred and forty members. And, even on this ſuppoſition, it ought to be duly conſidered, whether one hundred and forty members would, or would not, be a ſufficient number of members in the lower houſe, that is, whether the buſineſs of the legiſlative branch of government could, or could not, be tranſacted and properly tranſacted by one hundred and forty members. And, previous to the making of ſuch an alteration, it ought to be as duly conſidered, whether the probability of a great increaſe of revenue, by the circumſtance of four hundred and eighteen gentlemen being precluded from their ſeats in the lower houſe, and being thereby left, either to pay for their rank, or, to ſink into the claſs of plebeians, it ought, I ſay, to be as duly conſidered, whether the probability of this great increaſe of revenue would, or would not, be a ſufficient compenſation for the loſs of four hundred and eighteen ſenators in the legiſlative branch of government. And, whatever might be the reſult of theſe conſiderations reſpecting the tranſaction of the public buſineſs, and the probability of increaſing the public revenue, we ought alſo and more eſpecially to conſider the freedom and independency of the houſe of commons, and the very great danger of adopting this plan for reducing the lower houſe to one hundred and forty members, unleſs a very great majority of the citizens would make it their leading political principle, that they will invariably ſupport the commons in their freedom, their independency, and in all their conſtitutional rights and prerogatives, and unleſs this very great majority of the citizens would, by proper laws and conſtitutions, enforce the obſervance the ſtricteſt obſervance of this principle: viz. *That the members of the houſe of commons ſhall not be ſeduced from their attachment to the people by the influence of kings and miniſters.*

As to the influence of kings, it has been aſſerted, and by the beſt authority, *that the influence of the crown has increaſed, is increaſing, and ought to be diminiſhed.* And, as to the influence of miniſters,

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it might alſo be aſſerted, and perhaps with equal truth, *that the influence of miniſters has increaſed, is increaſing, and ought to be diminiſhed.* However, of this I am very ſure, that the influence of miniſters, as far as that influence is derived from their having the diſpoſal of places, or, as far as that influence is an official and not a ſenatorial influence, is as dangerous to the ſtate as the influence of kings, and that it is impoſſible for any one to be guilty of a greater political folly, than to complain of the influence of the king, and at the ſame time to ſupport the influence of a favourite miniſter, or any miniſter whatever; the influence of both kings and miniſters, that is, the influence of both kings and miniſters in the two houſes of parliament, whether thoſe kings and miniſters are, or are not, the favourites of individuals, being equally repugnant to the principles of the conſtitution, and being equally deſtructive of your civil liberty, your civil rights, and all the bleſſings of ſociety; and it is therefore the influence of miniſters, as well as the influence of kings, which ought to be conſidered, and duly conſidered, before you venture to weaken the houſe of commons by reducing the number of members in that houſe, and before you venture to improve the public revenue by ſuch a meaſure. Nor would it perhaps be prudent, or perfectly conſiſtent with the ſafety of the ſtate, to adopt this plan of improving the public revenue, by a reduced plan of repreſentation in the houſe of commons, without firſt ſubjecting and legally ſubjecting both kings and miniſters to ſuch pains and penalties, as that it would be at the peril of any king, or any miniſter, ſhould he thereafter, and in direct defiance of a poſitive law, attempt to encroach on the conſtitutional rights and power of the commons. And, for the very ſame reaſon, were you to adopt the former plan for a ſcale of rank, as ſuch a ſcale of rank might alſo reduce and weaken the peerage, it would not perhaps be prudent, or perfectly conſiſtent with the ſafety of the ſtate, to adopt that plan of improving the public revenue, without firſt ſubjecting and legally ſubjecting both kings and miniſters to ſimilar pains and penalties, ſhould they thereafter attempt to encroach on the conſtitutional rights and power of the peerage. But, theſe conſiderations, that is to ſay, how far it might be prudent to reduce the number of repreſentatives in either houſe

of parliament merely for the ſake of improving the public revenue, and particularly how far the houſe of commons might be reduced in numbers without endangering the freedom and independence of that branch of parliament, I ſay, theſe conſiderations, together with the conſideration of every other meaſure mentioned in this pamphlet, I now ſubmit to the better judgment of my fellow-citizens, leaving the whole pamphlet, and each particular meaſure, either to be adopted or rejected, by the will and at the pleaſure of the people—either to be adopted or rejected, as to the good ſenſe of the people it ſhall ſeem moſt meet. And, as in the paper on the internal government of Great Britain, I have expreſſed a deſire, that every citizen of this ſtate will invariably purſue his own particular intereſt, whenever, and as far as he interferes in the original government of the people, ſo, in judging of the propriety, or, the impropriety, of the whole of this pamphlet, and alſo of the propriety, or, the impropriety, of every particular part of the pamphlet, I now beg leave to declare, that it is my moſt earneſt deſire, my utmoſt wiſh, that every citizen of this ſtate will invariably purſue his own particular intereſt—will invariably judge of and give his voice, either for or againſt the whole pamphlet, and either for or againſt every particular part of the pamphlet, as it is moſt conſiſtent with the very ſame principle of *ſelf-love*, *ſelf-intereſt*, and *ſelf-preſervation*.